Related provisions for SUP 3.6.1

41 - 60 of 70 items.

LR 9.8.10R06/08/2010

A listed company must ensure that the auditors review each of the following before the annual report is published:(1) LR 9.8.6R (3) (statement by the directors that the business is a going concern); and(2) the parts of the statement required by LR 9.8.6R (6) (corporate governance) that relate to the following provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code:99(a) C.1.1;9(b) C.2.1;9 and(c) C.3.1 to C.3.7.9

SUP 18.4.18G21/06/2001

The FSA may require confirmation from the auditors of either friendly society involved in the transfer or amalgamation about the reasonableness of any part of the information in the statement. For instance such confirmation would normally be required if the financial information relates to a date more than six months previously.

SYSC 2.1.6G06/08/2010

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

	Question	Answer
1	Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?	An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). 5
2	If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?	If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.
3	What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?	The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.
4	If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?	Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).
5	Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?	Yes.
6	Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?	Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).
7	If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?	Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14.
8	If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?	Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).
9	What if a firm does not have a chief executive?	Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2
10	What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?	A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)
11	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?	The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.7 R)6. Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10 R6 does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1). 6 6
12	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?	SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R6and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8 R6restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2 G3). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.1 6 6 3
13	What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?	The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).
14	What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?	The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 7 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1). 7
15	What about electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?4 4	SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1 4

COLL 3.3.5BG06/03/2009

(1) 1Before undertaking a class hedging transaction for a class of units, the authorised fund manager should:2(a) ensure that the relevant prospectus clearly:(i) states that such a transaction may be undertaken for the relevant class of units2; and(ii) explains the nature of the risks that such a transaction may pose to investors in all classes;(b) consult the depositary about the adequacy of the systems and controls it uses to ensure compliance with COLL 3.3.5A R (Hedging of

SUP 12.5.3G21/06/2001

A firm should satisfy itself that the terms of the contract with its appointed representative (including an introducer appointed representative):(1) are designed to enable the firm to comply properly with any limitations or requirements on its own permission;(2) require the appointed representative to cooperate with the FSA as described in SUP 2.3.4 G (Information gathering by the FSA on its own initiative: cooperation by firms) and give access to its premises, as described in

BIPRU 9.12.20R01/01/2007

(1) If:(a) a firm'sIRB permission allows it to use this treatment; and(b) the conditions in (2)(16) are satisfied,a firm may attribute to an unrated position in an asset backed commercial paper programme a derived rating as laid down in (3).(2) Positions in the commercial paper issued from the programme must be rated positions.(3) Under the ABCP internal assessment approach, the unrated position must be assigned by the firm to one of the rating grades described in (5). The position

SUP 13A.9.5G01/11/2007

(1) The purpose of the precautionary measure rule is to ensure that an incoming EEA firm is subject to the standards of MiFID and the MiFID implementing Directive to the extent that the Home State has not transposed MiFID or the MiFID implementing Directive by 1 November 2007. It is to 'fill a gap'.(2) The rule is made in the light of the duty of the United Kingdom under Article 62 of MiFID to adopt precautionary measures to protect investors. (3) The rule will be effective for

SYSC 13.7.9G31/12/2006

Operating processes and systems at separate geographic locations may alter a firm's operational risk profile (including by allowing alternative sites for the continuity of operations). A firm should understand the effect of any differences in processes and systems at each of its locations, particularly if they are in different countries, having regard to:(1) the business operating environment of each country (for example, the likelihood and impact of political disruptions or

COLL 1.1.1G01/07/2011

(1) This sourcebook, except for COLL 9 (Recognised schemes), applies to:(a) investment companies with variable capital (ICVCs);(b) ACDs, other directors and depositaries of ICVCs;3(c) managers and trustees of authorised unit trust schemes (AUTs); and3(d) to the extent indicated, UK UCITS management companies operating EEA UCITS schemes.3(2) COLL 9 applies to operators of schemes that are recognised schemes and to those seeking to secure recognised status for such schemes.(3) COLL

COLL 11.2.2R01/07/2011

(1) An application for approval of an investment in a master UCITS under section 283A of the Act must be accompanied by the following documents:(a) the instrument constituting the scheme of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;(b) the prospectus and the key investor information referred to in COLL 4.7.2 R (Key investor information) of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;(c) the master-feeder agreement or the internal conduct of business rules in accordance with COLL 11.3.2R

DEPP 6.5.1G06/03/2010

2For the purpose of DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.6.2 G, the term “firm” means firms and those unauthorised persons who are not individuals.

COLL 8.4.11BG14/12/2007

(1) 4The authorised fund manager may transfer capital and income between an intermediate holding vehicle and the scheme by the use of inter-company debt if the purpose of this is for investment in immovables and repatriation of income generated by such investment. In using inter-company debt, the authorised fund manager should ensure the following:(a) a record of inter-company debt is kept in order to provide an accurate audit trail; and(b) interest paid out on the debt instruments

SUP 5.4.9G21/06/2001

In appropriate circumstances, it may be cost effective for the FSA to nominate or approve the appointment of a skilled person who has previously acted for, or advised, the person in SUP 5.2.1 G. For example, the FSA may nominate, or approve the appointment of, the auditor of a person in SUP 5.2.1 G to prepare a report taking into account, where relevant, the considerations set out in SUP 5.4.7 G.

SYSC 3.2.15G01/11/2007

Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to form an audit committee. An audit committee could typically examine management's process for ensuring the appropriateness and effectiveness of systems and controls, examine the arrangements made by management to ensure compliance with requirements and standards under the regulatory system, oversee the functioning of the internal audit function (if applicable - see SYSC 3.2.16 G9)

COLL 6.8.2R06/03/2010

(1) An authorised fund must have:(a) an annual accounting period;33(b) a half-yearly accounting period; and(c) an accounting reference date.(2) A half-yearly accounting period begins when3 an annual accounting period begins3 and ends on:13(a) the day which is six months before the last day of that annual accounting period; or(b) some other reasonable date as set out in the prospectus of the scheme.1(3) The first annual accounting period of a scheme must begin:(a) on the first

TC App 6.1.1G01/02/2011

1Introduction
1.	An accredited body is a body recognised by the FSA to act as an accredited body.
2.	Information on accredited bodies, including guidance on the process for including an applicant body in the list, is set out below and the obligation to pay the application fee is set out in FEES 3.2.
3.	The role of an accredited body relates to rules in TC which come into force on 31 December 2012.
Process for including a body in the list of accredited bodies
4.	In considering the compatibility of a proposed addition with the regulatory objectives, the FSA will determine whether the applicant will, if accredited, contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers having regard in particular to:
	(1)	the matters set out in paragraphs 10 to 20; and
	(2)	the rules and practices of the applicant.
5.	An application to the FSA to be added to the list of accredited bodies should set out how the applicant will satisfy the criteria in paragraphs 10 to 20. The application should be accompanied by a report from a suitable auditor which sets out its independent assessment of the applicant's ability to meet these criteria. An application form is available from the FSA upon request.
6.	When considering an application for accredited body status the FSA may:
	(1)	carry out any enquiries and request any further information that it considers appropriate, including consulting other regulators;
	(2)	ask the applicant or its specified representative to answer questions and explain any matter the FSA considers relevant to the application;
	(3)	take into account any information which the FSA considers appropriate to the application; and
	(4)	request that any information provided by the applicant or its specified representative is verified in such a manner as the FSA may specify.
7.	The FSA will confirm its decision in writing to the applicant.
8.	The FSA will enter into an agreement with the applicant or accredited body which will specify the requirements that the accredited body must meet. These will include the matters set out in paragraphs 10 to 20. Approval as an accredited body becomes effective only when the name of the applicant is added to the Glossary definition of accredited body.
9.	Paragraphs 10 to 20 set out the criteria which an applicant should meet to become an accredited body and which an accredited body should meet at all times.
Acting in the public interest and furthering the development of the profession
10.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to act in the public interest, to contribute to raising consumer confidence and professional standards in the retail investment advice market and to promoting the profession.
Carrying out effective verification services
11.	If independent verification of a retail investment adviser's professional standards has been carried out by an accredited body, the FSA will expect the accredited body to provide the retail investment adviser with evidence of that verification in a durable medium and in a form agreed by the FSA. This is referred to in this Appendix and TC 2.1.28 R as a 'statement of professional standing'.
12.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to have in place effective procedures for carrying out its verification activities. These should include:
	(1)	verifying that each retail investment adviser who is a member of or subscriber to the accredited body's verification service has made an annual declaration in writing that the retail investment adviser has, in the preceding 12 months, complied with APER and completed the continuing professional development required;
	(2)	verifying annually the continuing professional development records of no less than 10% of the retail investment advisers who have used its service in the previous 12 months to ensure that the records are accurate and the continuing professional development completed by the retail investment advisers is appropriate; and
	(3)	verifying that, if required by TC, the retail investment advisers who use its services have attained an appropriate qualification. This should include, where relevant, checking that appropriate qualification gap-fill records have been completed by the retail investment advisers.
13.	The FSA will not expect an accredited body to carry out the verification in paragraph 12(3) if a retail investment adviser provides the accredited body with evidence in a durable medium which demonstrates that another accredited body has previously verified the retail investment adviser's appropriate qualification, including, where relevant, appropriate qualification gap-fill.
14.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to make it a contractual condition of membership (where a retail investment adviser is a member of the accredited body) or of using its verification service (where a retail investment adviser is not a member of the accredited body) that, as a minimum, the accredited body will not continue to verify a retail investment adviser's standards and will withdraw its statement of professional standing if the accredited body is provided with false information in relation to a retail investment adviser's qualifications or continuing professional development or a false declaration in relation to a retail investment adviser's compliance with APER. In this regard, an accredited body must have in place appropriate decision-making procedures with a suitable degree of independence and transparency.
Having appropriate systems and controls in place and providing evidence to the FSA of continuing effectiveness
15.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to ensure that it has adequate resources and systems and controls in place in relation to its role as an accredited body.
16.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to have effective procedures in place for the management of conflicts of interest and have a well-balanced governance structure with at least one member who is independent of the sector.
17.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to have a code of ethics and to ensure that its code of ethics and verification service terms and conditions do not contain any provisions that conflict with APER.
Ongoing cooperation with the FSA
18.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to provide the FSA with such documents and information as the FSA reasonably requires, and to cooperate with the FSA in an open and transparent manner.
19.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to share information with the FSA (subject to any legal constraints) in relation to the professional standards of the retail investment advisers who use its service as appropriate. Examples might include conduct issues, complaints, dishonestly obtaining or falsifying qualifications or continuing professional development or a failure to complete appropriate continuing professional development. The FSA will expect an accredited body to notify the firm if issues such as these arise.
20.	The FSA will expect an accredited body to submit to the FSA an annual report by a suitable independent auditor which sets out that auditor's assessment of the quality of the body's satisfaction of the criteria in paragraphs 10 to 19 in the preceding 12 months and whether, in the auditor's view, the body is capable of satisfying the criteria in the subsequent 12 months. The FSA will expect this annual report to be submitted to the FSA within three months of the anniversary of the date on which the accredited body was added to the Glossary definition of accredited body.
Withdrawal of accreditation
21.	If an accredited body fails or, in the FSA's view, is likely to fail to satisfy the criteria, the FSA will discuss this with the accredited body concerned. If, following a period of discussion, the accredited body has failed to take appropriate corrective action to ensure that it satisfies and will continue to satisfy the criteria, the FSA will withdraw the accredited body's accreditation by removing its name from the list of accredited bodies published in the Glossary. The FSA will expect the body to notify each retail investment adviser holding a current statement of professional standing of the FSA's decision. A statement of professional standing issued by the accredited body before the withdrawal of accreditation will continue to be valid until its expiration.

DTR 4.1.7R29/06/2008

(1) If an issuer is required to prepare consolidated accounts, the financial statements must be audited in accordance with Article 37 of the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC.(2) If an issuer is not required to prepare consolidated accounts the financial statements must be audited in accordance with Articles 51 and 51a of the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC.(3) The audit report, signed by the person or persons responsible for auditing the financial statements must be disclosed

Related provisions for SUP 3.6.1

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Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R