Related provisions for SYSC 3.2.6C
41 - 60 of 85 items.
(1) A transaction in a derivative must:(a) be in an approved derivative; or(b) be one which complies with COLL 5.2.23 R (OTC transactions in derivatives).(2) The underlying of a transaction in a derivative must consist of any one or more of the following to which the scheme is dedicated:(a) transferable securities permitted under COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(a) to (c) and COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(e)7;(b) approved money-market instruments7 permitted underCOLL 5.2.8 R (3)(a) to COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(d)7;77(c)
Firms should also consider whether their systems and controls provide sufficient information to permit senior management to identify the crystallisation of risks in a timely manner so as to provide them with the opportunity to respond and allow the firm to obtain the full value of the modelled management action. Firms should also analyse the wider implications of the management actions, particularly where they represent significant divergence from the business plan and use this
(1) The FSA will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FSA’s view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s employment,
An issuer must ensure that, as a minimum, the relevant body must:(1) monitor the financial reporting process;(2) monitor the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk management systems;(3) monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts;(4) review and monitor the independence of the statutory auditor, and in particular the provision of additional services to the issuer.
An approved person performing a significant influence function will not
always manage the business on a day-to-day basis himself. The extent to which
he does so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale
and complexity of the business and his position within it. The larger and
more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation
and reporting lines. The FSA will look to the approved person performing a significant
influence function
Part 2 of SYSC 1 Annex 1 provides for the application of SYSC 4.1.1 R (General Requirements). In particular, and subject to the provisions on group risk systems and controls requirements in SYSC 12, this means that:(1) in relation to what the Remuneration Code applies to, it:(a) applies in relation to regulated activities, activities that constitute dealing in investments as principal (disregarding the exclusion in article 15 of the Regulated Activities Order (Absence of holding
In
relation to the retention of records for non-MiFID
business, a firm should
have appropriate systems and controls in place with respect to the adequacy
of, access to, and the security of its records so that the firm may
fulfil its regulatory and statutory obligations. With respect to retention
periods, the general principle is that records should be retained for as long
as is relevant for the purposes for which they are made.1
(1) The FSA will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of an individual’s “relevant income”. “Relevant income” will be the gross amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with which the breach occurred (the “relevant employment”), and for the period of the breach. In determining an individual’s relevant income, “benefits” includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, pension contributions, share options and share schemes;
(1) 1A firm must not enter into arrangements for securities financing transactions in respect of
safe custody assets2
held by it on behalf of a client or otherwise use such
safe custody assets2
for its own account or the account of another client of the firm, unless:22(a) the client has given express prior consent to the use of the
safe custody assets2
on specified terms; and2(b) the use of that client'ssafe custody assets2
is restricted to the specified terms to which the
An authorised fund manager carrying out due diligence for the purpose of the rules in this section should make enquiries or otherwise obtain information needed to enable him properly to consider:(1) whether the experience, expertise, qualifications and professional standing of the second scheme's investment manager is adequate for the type and complexity of the second scheme;(2) the adequacy of the regulatory, legal and accounting regimes applicable to the second scheme and its
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
Location of recognition requirements and guidance
Recognition Requirements Regulations |
Subject |
Section in REC 2 |
Regulation 6 |
Method of satisfying recognition requirements |
2.2 |
Part I of the Schedule |
UK RIE recognition requirements |
|
Paragraph 1 |
Financial resources |
2.3 |
Paragraph 2 |
Suitability |
2.4 |
Paragraph 3 |
Systems and controls |
2.5 |
Paragraphs 4(1) and 4(2)(aa)2 2 |
General safeguards for investors |
2.6 |
Paragraph 4(2)(a) |
Access to facilities |
2.7 |
Paragraph 4(2)(b) |
Proper markets |
2.12 |
Paragraph 4(2)(c) |
Availability of relevant information |
2.12 |
Paragraph 4(2)(d) |
Settlement |
2.8 |
Paragraph 4(2)(e) |
Transaction recording |
2.9 |
2Paragraph 4(2)(ea) |
Conflicts |
2.5 |
Paragraph 4(2)(f) |
Financial crime and market abuse |
2.10 |
Paragraph 4(2)(g) |
Custody |
2.11 |
Paragraph 4(3) |
Definition of relevant information |
2.12 |
2Paragraph 4A |
Provision of pre-trade information about share trading |
2.6 |
2Paragraph 4B |
Provision of post-trade information about share trading |
2.6 |
Paragraph 6 |
Promotion and maintenance of standards |
2.13 |
Paragraph 7 |
Rules and consultation |
2.14 |
2Paragraph 7A |
Admission of financial instruments to trading |
2.12 |
2Paragraph 7B and 7C |
Access to facilities |
2.7 |
2Paragraph 7D |
Settlement |
2.8 |
2Paragraph 7E |
Suspension and removal of financial instruments from trading |
2.6 |
Paragraph 8 |
Discipline |
2.15 |
Paragraph 9 |
Complaints |
2.16 |
2Paragraph 9A |
Operation of a multilateral trading facility |
2.16A |
Part II of the Schedule |
UK RIE default rules in respect of market contracts |
2.17 |
Part III of the Schedule |
UK RCH recognition requirements |
|
Paragraph 16 |
Financial resources |
2.3 |
Paragraph 17 |
Suitability |
2.4 |
Paragraph 18 |
Systems and controls |
2.5 |
Paragraph 19(1) |
General safeguards for investors |
2.6 |
Paragraph 19(2)(a) |
Access to facilities |
2.7 |
Paragraph 19(2)(b) |
Clearing services |
2.8 |
Paragraph 19(2)(c) |
Transactions recording |
2.9 |
Paragraph 19(2)(d) |
Financial crime and market abuse |
2.10 |
Paragraph 19(2)(e) |
Custody |
2.11 |
Paragraph 20 |
Promotion and maintenance of standards |
2.13 |
Paragraph 21 |
Rules |
2.14 |
Paragraph 22 |
Discipline |
2.15 |
Paragraph 23 |
Complaints |
2.16 |
Part IV of the Schedule |
UK RCH default rules in respect of market contracts |
2.17 |
1In assessing, under SUP 12.4.8A R, whether an appointed representative, or prospective appointed representative, has established the knowledge and ability requirements for persons within its management structure and for those directly involved in its insurance mediation activity, a firm should refer to TC.
SYSC 4.1.1 R requires
a firm to have effective processes to
identify, manage, monitor and report risks and internal control mechanisms.
Except in relation to those functions described in SYSC 8.1.5 R, where a firm relies on a third party for the performance
of operational functions which are not critical or important for the performance
of relevant services and activities (see SYSC 8.1.1 R (1)) on a continuous
and satisfactory basis, it should take into account, in a manner that
(1) 8If the UK firm'sEEA right derives from the Banking Consolidation Directive, MiFID8 or the UCITS Directive, the FSA will give the Host State regulator a consent notice within three months unless it has reason to doubt the adequacy of a UK firm's resources or its administrative structure.8 The Host State regulator then has a further two months to notify the applicable provisions (if any) and prepare for the supervision, as appropriate, of the UK firm, or in the case of a MiFID
(1) A common platform firm must establish, implement and maintain an effective conflicts of interest policy that is set out in writing and is appropriate to the size and organisation of the firm and the nature, scale and complexity of its business.(2) Where the common platform firm is a member of a group, the policy must also take into account any circumstances, of which the firm is or should be aware, which may give rise to a conflict of interest arising as a result of the structure
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should
(1) does not envisage that an issuer will: DTR 2.5.3 R (1) does
not allow an issuer to delay
public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its
worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the
negotiations to deal with such a situation. An issuer cannot
delay disclosure of inside information on
the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation
will be jeopardised by the disclosure of its financial