Related provisions for SUP 18.2.50

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DEPP 1.1.1GRP
1This manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved persons and other persons, whether or not they are regulated by the FSA. It sets out:(1) the FSA's decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);(2) the FSA's policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties under the Act (see DEPP 6);(2A) 2the FSA's policy with respect to the imposition of suspensions or restrictions,
SUP 13A.3.6GRP
The effect of paragraph 5(1) and 5(2) of Schedule 4 to the Act is that a Treaty firm which qualifies for authorisation under that Schedule must, at least seven days before it carries on any of the regulated activities covered by its permission, give the FSA written notice of its intention to do so. Failure to do so is a criminal offence under paragraph 6(1) of that Schedule.
SUP 13A.3.7DRP
(1) A written notice from a Treaty firm under paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 4 to the Act must be: (a) given to a member of, or addressed for the attention of , the Authorisation Department; and(b) delivered to the FSA by one of the methods in (2).(2) The written notice may be delivered by:(a) post to the address in SUP 13A.3.9 G below; or(b) leaving the application at the address in SUP 13A.3.9 G below and obtaining a time-stamped receipt; or(c) hand delivery to a member of the Authorisation
COLL 5.2.10RRP
(1) A market is eligible for the purposes of the rules in this sourcebook if it is:(a) a regulated market;(b) a market in an EEA State which is regulated, operates regularly and is open to the public; or(c) any market within (2).(2) A market not falling within (1)(a) and (b) is eligible for the purposes of the rules in this sourcebook if:(a) the authorised fund manager, after consultation with and notification to the depositary (and in the case of an ICVC, any other directors),
BIPRU 4.10.8GRP
(1) Under paragraph 16 of Part 1 of Annex VIII of the Banking Consolidation Directive, a competent authority may only disapply the condition in BIPRU 4.10.6 R (3) if the competent authority has evidence that the relevant market is well-developed and long-established with loss-rates which are sufficiently low to justify such action.(2) If the evidence were to change so that the action was no longer justified the FSA would expect to revoke BIPRU 4.10.7 R.
BIPRU 4.10.17GRP
If a firm wishes to recognise other types of collateral in accordance with BIPRU 4.10.16 R (whether as part of its application for an IRB permission or under a variation of its IRB permission) it should demonstrate to the FSA how the criteria in BIPRU 4.10.16 R (1) - BIPRU 4.10.16 R (3) have been met with respect to that type of collateral.
BIPRU 5.4.16RRP
A firm must not use both the financial collateral simple method and the financial collateral comprehensive method, unless such use is for the purposes of BIPRU 4.2.17 R to BIPRU 4.2.19 R and BIPRU 4.2.26 R, and such use is provided for by the firm'sIRB permission. A firm must demonstrate to the FSA that this exceptional application of both methods is not used selectively with the purpose of achieving reduced minimum capital requirements and does not lead to regulatory arbitrage.4[Note:BCD
BIPRU 5.4.55GRP
The FSA may also require a firm to calculate its volatility adjustments using a shorter observation period if, in the FSA's judgement, this is justified by a significant upsurge in price volatility.
DEPP 6.5C.3GRP
(1) The FSA may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the market abuse. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the market abuse:(a) the conduct of the individual in
DISP 1.4.2GRP
Factors that may be relevant in the assessment of a complaint under DISP 1.4.1R (2), include the following:(1) all the evidence available and the particular circumstances of the complaint;(2) similarities with other complaints received by the respondent;(3) relevant guidance published by the FSA , other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service or former schemes; and(4) appropriate analysis of decisions by the Financial Ombudsman Service concerning similar complaints
LR 8.2.1RRP
A company with, or applying for, a premium listing of its equity shares5 must appoint a sponsor on each occasion that it:4(1) makes an application for admission of equity shares5 which:(a) requires the production of a prospectus or equivalent document1; or(b) is accompanied by a certificate of approval from another competent authority; or(c) is accompanied by a summary document as required by PR 1.2.3R (8); or(d) requires the production of listing particulars and is referred to
SYSC 9.1.1RRP
A firm must arrange for orderly records to be kept of its business and internal organisation, including all services and transactions undertaken by it, which must be sufficient to enable the FSA or any other relevant competent authority under MiFID to monitor the firm's compliance with the requirements under the regulatory system, and in particular to ascertain that the firm has complied with all obligations with respect to clients.[Note: article 13(6) of MiFID and article 5(1)(f)
DEPP 6.5B.3GRP
(1) The FSA may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the individual in bringing (or
DISP App 3.1.2GRP
The aspects of complaint handling dealt with in this appendix are how the firm should:(1) assess a complaint in order to establish whether the firm's conduct of the sale failed to comply with the rules, or was otherwise in breach of the duty of care or any other requirement of the general law (taking into account relevant materials published by the FSA, other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service and former schemes). In this appendix this is referred to as a "breach
SYSC 21.1.2GRP
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
DISP 3.5.12GRP
15The Ombudsman may take into account evidence from third parties, including (but not limited to) the FSA , other regulators, experts in industry matters and experts in consumer matters.
SUP 4.2.5GRP
Actuaries3 act as a valuable source of information to the FSA in carrying out its functions. For example, in determining whether a firm satisfies the threshold conditions, the FSA has regard to whether the firm has appointed an actuary3 with sufficient experience in the areas of business to be conducted by the firm (COND 2.5.7 G (11)).3
PR 1.1.1RRP
(1) 1PR 2, PR 3, PR 4.2, PR 5.1, PR 5.3.1 UK to PR 5.3.3 G and PR 5.5 only apply (subject to paragraph (2)) in relation to:(a) an offer, or a request for admission to trading of transferable securities, in respect of which section 85 of the Act applies (other than an exempt offer under section 86 of the Act) and in relation to which the United Kingdom is the Home State;(b) an offer, or a request for admission to trading of transferable securities, where under section 87 of the
SUP App 2.15.14GRP
The FSA may request additional information and explanations from the firm. (See section 165 (Authority's power to require information) of the Act.)
SYSC 4.4.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals will nevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R). Note that SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.10R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 4.4 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.1R(2) and SYSC 1 Annex 1.1.8R restrict the application of SYSC 4.4.5 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).

5

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities carried on from an establishment in another EEA State with or for a person in the United Kingdom?

SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.
REC 2.9.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body has satisfactory arrangements for recording the transactions effected on, or cleared or to be cleared by means of, its facilities, the FSA may have regard to:(1) whether the UK recognised body has arrangements for creating, maintaining and safeguarding an audit trail of transactions for at least three years (five years in respect of transactions carried out by members who are not incorporated in the United Kingdom if the UK recognised