Related provisions for PERG 7.7.5
301 - 320 of 651 items.
Where any key individual of a UK recognised body:(1) is the subject of any disciplinary action because of concerns about his alleged misconduct; (2) resigns as a result of an investigation into his alleged misconduct; or(3) is dismissed for misconduct;that body must immediately give the FSA notice of that event, and give the information specified for the purposes of this rule in REC 3.5.2 R.
Where a UK recognised body becomes aware that any of the following events has occurred in relation to a key individual, it must immediately give the FSA notice of that event:(1) a petition for bankruptcy is presented (or similar or analogous proceedings under the law of a jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom are commenced) against that key individual; or(2) a bankruptcy order (or a similar or analogous order under the law of a jurisdiction outside the United Kingdom) is made
Where a UK recognised body becomes aware that a person has been appointed by any regulatory body (other than the FSA or a UK recognised body) to investigate:(1) any business transacted by means of its facilities, if it is an RIE; or(2) any aspect of the clearing services which it provides;it must immediately give the FSA notice of that event.
A UK recognised body need not give the FSA notice of:(1) routine inspections or visits undertaken in the course of regular monitoring, complaints handling or as part of a series of 'theme visits'; or(2) routine requests for information; or(3) investigations into the conduct of members of the UK recognised body or of other users of its facilities where the use of its facilities is a small or incidental part of the subject matter of the investigation.
Once the FSA has given a waiver, it may vary it with the firm's consent, or on the firm's application. If a firm wishes the FSA to vary a waiver, it should follow the procedures in SUP 8.3.3 D, giving reasons for the application. In a case where a waiver has been given to a number of firms (see SUP 8.3.10 G), if the FSAwishes to vary such waivers with the consent of those firms, it will follow the procedures in SUP 8.3.10 G.
(1) If the FSA considers that an issuer, a person discharging managerial responsibilities or a connected person has breached any of the disclosure rules it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty or publish a statement censuring that person.(2) If the FSA considers that a former director was knowingly concerned in a breach by an issuer it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty.
If FSA staff recommend that action be taken and they consider that the
decision falls within the responsibility of a senior
staff committee:(1) in general the FSA staff's recommendation will go before the senior
staff committee;(2) in urgent statutory
notice cases for which a senior
staff committee is responsible, the decision to give the statutory notice may be taken by the chairman
or, if he is unavailable, a deputy chairman of the senior
staff committee, and, if it is practicable,
In the circumstances described
in DEPP 4.2.1 G (4) the FSA considers
that it may be necessary for an FSA director of division or member of a senior
staff committee to take the decision to give a supervisory notice even if he has been involved
in establishing the evidence on which the decision is based, as permitted
by section 395(3) of the Act.
Where practicable, however, FSA staff will seek to ensure that the FSA director or committee member has not been so involved.
If any civil or criminal legal proceedings are instituted against a UK recognised body, it must, unless REC 3.12.2 R applies, immediately give notice of that event and give the following information to the FSA:(1) in the case of civil proceedings, the name of the claimant, particulars of the claim, the amount of damages and any other remedy sought by the claimant, and particulars of any allegation that any act or omission of that body was in bad faith; and(2) in the case of criminal
A UK recognised body is not required to give notice of civil legal proceedings or information about them to the FSA under REC 3.12.1 R, where:(1) the amount of damages claimed would not significantly affect that UK recognised body's financial resources, if the claim were successful;(2) the claim would not have a significant adverse effect on the reputation and standing of that body, if that claim were successful; and (3) the claim does not relate to that body's regulatory fun
An issuer, person discharging managerial responsibilities or connected person should consult with the FSA at the earliest possible stage if they:
- (1)
are in doubt about how the disclosure rules apply in a particular situation; or
- (2)
consider that it may be necessary for the FSA to dispense with or modify a disclosure rule.
Address for correspondence
Note: The FSA's address for correspondence in relation to the disclosure rules is:
Company Monitoring Team
Markets Division
The Financial Services Authority
25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
London E14 5HS
Fax: 020 7066 8368
The FSA has similar powers to supervise overseas recognised bodies to those it has to supervise UK recognised bodies. It may (in addition to any other powers it might exercise):(1) give directions to an overseas recognised body under section 296 of the Act (Authority's power to give directions) if it has failed, or is likely to fail, to satisfy the recognition requirements or if it has failed to comply with any other obligation imposed by or under the Act; or(2) revoke a recognition
(1) A firm may arrange for records to be kept in such form as it chooses, provided the record is readily accessible for inspection by the FSA.(2) Where a firm chooses to maintain records in electronic form, it should take reasonable steps to ensure that:(a) the electronic record accurately reflects the original information; and (b) the electronic record has not been subject to unauthorised or accidental alteration.
In an exceptionally urgent case the decision to give a supervisory notice may be taken by a member of the FSA's executive of at least director of division level if:(1) FSA staff consider that the action should be taken before a recommendation to the Chairman or a Deputy Chairman of the RDC can be made; and(2) an urgent decision on the proposed action is necessary to protect the interests of consumers.
In the circumstances described in DEPP 3.4.3 G, the FSA considers that it may be necessary for an FSA director of division to take the decision to give the supervisory notice even if he has been involved in establishing the evidence on which the decision is based, as permitted by section 395(3) of the Act. Where practicable, however, FSA staff will seek to ensure that the FSA director has not been so involved.
If a firm decides to cease to effect new contracts of insurance, it must, within 28 days of that decision, submit a run-off plan to the FSA including: (1) a scheme of operations; and (2) an explanation of how, or to what extent, all liabilities to policyholders (including, where relevant, liabilities which arise from the regulatory duty to treat customers fairly in setting discretionary benefits) will be met in full as they fall due.
Under Principle 11, the FSA normally expects to be notified by a firm when it decides to cease effecting new contracts of insurance in respect of one or more classes of contract of insurance (see SUP 15.3.8 G). At the same time, the FSA would normally expect the firm to discuss with it the need for the firm to apply to vary its permission (see SUP 6.2.6 G and SUP 6.2.7 G) and, if appropriate, to submit a scheme of operations in accordance with SUP App 2.8.1 R.
Section 87B(1) of the Act sets out when the FSA may authorise the omission of information from a prospectus:
(1) |
The [FSA] may authorise the omission from a prospectus of any information, the inclusion of which would otherwise be required, on the ground – |
|
(a) |
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest; |
|
(b) |
that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission would be unlikely to mislead the public with regard to any facts or circumstances which are essential for an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2); or |
|
(c) |
that the information is only of minor importance for a specific offer to the public or admission to trading on a regulated market and unlikely to influence an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2). |
|
A request to the FSA to authorise the omission of specific information must:(1) be in writing from the applicant;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for its omission; and(3) state why in the applicant's opinion one or more of the grounds in section 87B(1) of the Act applies.
1This
manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved
persons and other persons,
whether or not they are regulated by the FSA. It sets out:(1) the FSA's decision-making procedure for giving statutory
notices. These are warning
notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);(2) the FSA's policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties
under the Act (see DEPP 6);(2A) 2the FSA's policy
with respect to the imposition of suspensions or restrictions,
The 'assumption of risk' by the provider is an important descriptive feature of all contracts of insurance. The 'assumption of risk' has the meaning in (1) and (3), derived from the case law in (2) and (4) below. The application of the 'assumption of risk' concept is illustrated in PERG 6.7.2 G (Example 2: disaster recovery business).(1) Case law establishes that the provider's obligation under a contract of insurance is an enforceable obligation to respond (usually, by providing
Contracts, under which the amount and timing of the payments made by the recipient make it reasonable to conclude that there is a genuine pre-payment for services to be rendered in response to a future contingency, are unlikely to be regarded as insurance. In general, the FSA expects that this requirement will be satisfied where there is a commercially reasonable and objectively justifiable relationship between the amount of the payment and the cost of providing the contract
Under most commercial contracts with a customer, a provider will assume more than one obligation. Some of these may be insurance obligations, others may not. The FSA will apply the principles in PERG 6.5.4 G, in the way described in (1) to (3) to determine whether the contract is a contract of insurance.(1) If a provider undertakes an identifiable and distinct obligation that is, in substance an insurance obligation as described in PERG 6.5.4 G, then, other things being equal,
For the purposes of LR 10.2.4R (1), the FSA considers the following indemnities not to be exceptional:(1) those customarily given in connection with sale and purchase agreements;(2) those customarily given to underwriters or placing agents in an underwriting or placing agreement;(3) those given to advisers against liabilities to third parties arising out of providing advisory services; and(4) any other indemnity that is specifically permitted to be given to a director or auditor
The FSA may modify these rules to require the aggregation of transactions in circumstances other than those specified in LR 10.2.10 R.Note: If an issuer is proposing to enter into a transaction that could be a Class 1 transaction or reverse takeover it is required under LR 8 to obtain the guidance of a sponsor to assess the potential application of LR 10.
As long as the conditions in section 39 of the Act are satisfied, any person, other than an authorised person, may become an appointed representative, including a body corporate, a partnership or an individual in business on his own account. However, an appointed representative cannot be an authorised person under the Act; that is, it cannot be exempt for some regulated activities and authorised for others.
(1) 12A tied agent is a person who acts for and under the responsibility of a MiFID investment firm (or a third country investment firm) in respect of MiFID business (or the equivalent business of the third country investment firm). Most tied agents appointed by firms are also appointed representatives.(2) Unless otherwise provided, this chapter applies to a firm that appoints a tied agent that is an appointed representative in the same way as it applies to the appointment of
(1) The Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FSA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of
The FSA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FSA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FSA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
If the Part IV permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country banking and investment group of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country banking and investment group, with the rules in Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
Upon request, an issuer or other person must be able to communicate to the FSA, in relation to any disclosure of regulated information:(1) the name of the person who communicated the regulated information to the RIS;(2) the security validation details;(3) the time and date on which the regulated information was communicated to the RIS;(4) the medium in which the regulated information was communicated; and(5) details of any embargo placed by the issuer on the regulated information,