Related provisions for BIPRU 2.3.11
61 - 80 of 109 items.
BIPRU 12.4 contains further rules and guidance on stress testing and contingency funding plans. These are both extensions of the overarching systems and controls provisions in BIPRU 12.3. In formulating the rules and guidance in these two sections, the FSA has taken account of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Management and Supervision dated September 2008 issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It is intended that the content of BIPRU 12.3 and BIPRU 12.4 be consistent
(1) The conflicts of interest policy must include the following content:(a) it must identify in accordance with SYSC 10.1.3 R and SYSC 10.1.4 R, by reference to the specific services and activities carried out by or on behalf of the common platform firm, the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clients; and(b) it must specify procedures to be followed and measures to be adopted
A firm does not have to give notice to the FSA under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:(1) the FSA; or(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Article 10(2) of the Financial Groups Directive
Once a financial conglomerate has become a financial conglomerate and subject to supervision in accordance with the Financial Groups Directive, the figures in the financial conglomerate definition decision tree are altered as follows:(1) the figure of 40% in the box titled Threshold Test 1 is replaced by 35%;(2) the figure of 10% in the box titled Threshold Test 2 is replaced by 8%; and(3) the figure of six billion Euro in the box titled Threshold Test 3 is replaced by five billion
Sections 292(3) and 292(4) state:
2Section 292(3) |
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The requirements are that- |
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(a) |
investors are afforded protection equivalent to that which they would be afforded if the body concerned were required to comply withrecognition requirements; |
(b) |
there are adequate procedures for dealing with a person who is unable, or likely to become unable, to meet his obligations in respect of one or more market contracts connected with the [ROIE] or [ROCH]; |
(c) |
the applicant is able and willing to co-operate with the[FSA] by the sharing of information and in other ways; and |
(d) |
adequate arrangements exist for co-operation between the[FSA] and those responsible for the supervision of the applicant in the country or territory in which the applicant's head office is situated. |
Section 292(4) |
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In considering whether it is satisfied as to the requirements mentioned in subsections (3)(a) and (b), the[FSA] is to have regard to- |
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(a) |
the relevant law and practice of the country or territory in which the applicant's head office is situated; |
(b) |
the rules and practices of the applicant. |
The Act does not specify a time limit for processing the application but the FSA intends to deal with an application as quickly as possible. The more complete and relevant the information provided by an applicant, the more quickly a decision can be expected. But on occasion it may be necessary to allow time in which the FSA can monitor the content of the service. This might happen where, for example, a service is in a form that makes record keeping difficult (such as a large website
(1) The purpose of this section2 is to set out the requirements for firms in the retail mortgage, investment, and pure protection contract markets specified in SUP 16.11.1 R to report individual product sales data to the FSA. In the case of firms in the sale and rent back market, there is a requirement to record, but not to submit, thedata.6 These requirements apply6 whether the regulated activity has been carried out by the firm, or through an intermediary which has dealt directly
The FSA would normally expect a firm to carry out a check on its appointed representative's financial position every year (more often, if necessary) and to review critically the information obtained. An appropriately experienced person (for example, a financial accountant) should carry out these checks.
The FSA may also use its powers under section 45 for
enforcement purposes. EG 82 sets out in detail the FSA's powers under section 45 and
the circumstances under which the FSA may vary a firm's permission in this way, whether for enforcement purposes or as part of its
day to day supervision of firms.
This chapter provides additional guidance on when the FSA will use these powers for supervision purposes.2
SYSC 12.1.8R (1) deals with the systems and controls that a firm should have in respect of the exposure it has to the rest of the group. On the other hand, the purpose of SYSC 12.1.8R (2) and the rules in this section that amplify it is to require groups to have adequate systems and controls. However a group is not a single legal entity on which obligations can be imposed. Therefore the obligations have to be placed on individual firms. The purpose of imposing the obligations
A firm should keep a record of and be ready to explain to its supervisory contacts in the FSA the reasons for any difference between the deficit reduction amount and any commitment the firm has made in any public document to provide funding in respect of a defined benefit occupational pension scheme.
(1) The purpose of REC 3.18 is to enable the FSA to monitor changes in the types of member admitted by UK recognised bodies and to ensure that the FSA has notice of foreign jurisdictions in which the members of UK recognised bodies are based. UK recognised bodies may admit persons who are not authorised persons or persons who are not located in the United Kingdom, provided that the recognition requirements continue to be met.(2) REC 3.18.2 R focuses on the admission of persons
(1) References to a market maker are to a market maker which:(a) (subject to (3) below) is authorised by its Home State under MiFID;(b) does not intervene in the management of the issuer concerned; and (c) does not exert any influence on the issuer to buy such shares or back the share price.[Note: articles 9(5) and 9(6) of the TD](2) A market maker relying upon the exemption for shares held by it in that capacity must notify the competent authority of the Home Member State of
This chapter sets out rules and guidance on the role auditors play in the FSA's monitoring of firms' compliance with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system. In determining whether a firm satisfies the threshold conditions, the FSA has regard to whether the firm has appointed auditors with sufficient experience in the areas of business to be conducted by the firm (COND 2.5.7 G (11)). Auditors act as a source of information for the FSA in its supervision. They