Related provisions for COLL 6.9.5

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RCB 2.3.8GRP
(1) The credit risk of an asset is the risk of loss if another party fails to perform its obligations or fails to perform them in a timely fashion.(2) Where, for example, the asset pool includes residential mortgages the relevant factors which the FSA may consider include: (a) whether the asset pool contains (or could contain) loans made to individuals who have been made bankrupt or have had court judgments made against them;(b) the extent to which the asset pool contains (or
RCB 2.3.15GRP
The FSA expects the issuer to demonstrate, as part of showing that Regulations 17 (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations will be complied with, that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme which enable the views and interests of investors in the regulated covered bond to be taken account of in an appropriate and timely way by a suitably qualified, adequately resourced,
COLL 6.9.2GRP
(1) Regulation 15(8)(f) of the OEIC Regulations (Requirements for authorisation) requires independence between the depositary, the ICVC and the ICVC's directors, as does section 243(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the trustee and manager of an AUT. COLL 6.9.3 G to COLL 6.9.5 G give FSA's view of the meaning of independence of these relationships. An ICVC, its directors and depositary or a manager and a trustee of an AUT are referred to as "relevant parties" in this guidance.(2)
COLL 6.9.3GRP
(1) Independence is likely to be lost if, by means of executive power, either relevant party could control the action of the other.(2) The board of one relevant party should not be able to exercise effective control of the board of another relevant party. Arrangements which might indicate this situation include quorum provisions and reservations of decision-making capacity of certain directors.(3) For an AUT, the FSA would interpret the concept of directors in common to include
COLL 6.9.4GRP
Independence is likely to be lost if either of the relevant parties could control the actions of the other by means of shareholders' votes. The FSA considers this would happen if any shareholding by one relevant party and their respective associates in the other exceeds 15% of the voting share capital, either in a single share class or several share classes. The FSA would be willing, however, to look at cross-shareholdings exceeding 15% on a case-by-case basis to consider if there
SYSC 3.2.6IRRP
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FSA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
SYSC 3.2.10GRP
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
SYSC 3.2.16GRP
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
MCOB 2.6A.14GRP
Members of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, for example, are required to operate a complaints procedure that allows the complaint to be referred to an independent person whose decision binds the valuer and which, in the FSA's view, provides a customer with an appropriate remedy.
REC 2.4.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FSA may have regard to any relevant factor including, but not limited to:(1) the commitment shown by the UK recognised body'sgoverning body to satisfying the recognition requirements and to complying with other obligations in or under the Act;(2) its arrangements, policies and resources for fulfilling its obligations under the Act in relation to its activities as a UK recognised body;(3) the extent to
SYSC 4.2.4GRP
At least two independent minds should be applied to both the formulation and implementation of the policies of a common platform firm and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1. Where such1 a firm1 nominates just two individuals to direct its business, the FSA will not regard them as both effectively directing the business where one of them makes some, albeit significant, decisions relating to only a few aspects of the business. Each should play a part in the decision-making process
TC App 6.1.1GRP

1Introduction

1.

An accredited body is a body recognised by the FSA to act as an accredited body.

2.

Information on accredited bodies, including guidance on the process for including an applicant body in the list, is set out below and the obligation to pay the application fee is set out in FEES 3.2.

3.

The role of an accredited body relates to rules in TC which come into force on 31 December 2012.

Process for including a body in the list of accredited bodies

4.

In considering the compatibility of a proposed addition with the regulatory objectives, the FSA will determine whether the applicant will, if accredited, contribute to securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers having regard in particular to:

(1)

the matters set out in paragraphs 10 to 20; and

(2)

the rules and practices of the applicant.

5.

An application to the FSA to be added to the list of accredited bodies should set out how the applicant will satisfy the criteria in paragraphs 10 to 20. The application should be accompanied by a report from a suitable auditor which sets out its independent assessment of the applicant's ability to meet these criteria. An application form is available from the FSA upon request.

6.

When considering an application for accredited body status the FSA may:

(1)

carry out any enquiries and request any further information that it considers appropriate, including consulting other regulators;

(2)

ask the applicant or its specified representative to answer questions and explain any matter the FSA considers relevant to the application;

(3)

take into account any information which the FSA considers appropriate to the application; and

(4)

request that any information provided by the applicant or its specified representative is verified in such a manner as the FSA may specify.

7.

The FSA will confirm its decision in writing to the applicant.

8.

The FSA will enter into an agreement with the applicant or accredited body which will specify the requirements that the accredited body must meet. These will include the matters set out in paragraphs 10 to 20. Approval as an accredited body becomes effective only when the name of the applicant is added to the Glossary definition of accredited body.

9.

Paragraphs 10 to 20 set out the criteria which an applicant should meet to become an accredited body and which an accredited body should meet at all times.

Acting in the public interest and furthering the development of the profession

10.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to act in the public interest, to contribute to raising consumer confidence and professional standards in the retail investment advice market and to promoting the profession.

Carrying out effective verification services

11.

If independent verification of a retail investment adviser's professional standards has been carried out by an accredited body, the FSA will expect the accredited body to provide the retail investment adviser with evidence of that verification in a durable medium and in a form agreed by the FSA. This is referred to in this Appendix and TC 2.1.28 R as a 'statement of professional standing'.

12.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to have in place effective procedures for carrying out its verification activities. These should include:

(1)

verifying that each retail investment adviser who is a member of or subscriber to the accredited body's verification service has made an annual declaration in writing that the retail investment adviser has, in the preceding 12 months, complied with APER and completed the continuing professional development required;

(2)

verifying annually the continuing professional development records of no less than 10% of the retail investment advisers who have used its service in the previous 12 months to ensure that the records are accurate and the continuing professional development completed by the retail investment advisers is appropriate; and

(3)

verifying that, if required by TC, the retail investment advisers who use its services have attained an appropriate qualification. This should include, where relevant, checking that appropriate qualification gap-fill records have been completed by the retail investment advisers.

13.

The FSA will not expect an accredited body to carry out the verification in paragraph 12(3) if a retail investment adviser provides the accredited body with evidence in a durable medium which demonstrates that another accredited body has previously verified the retail investment adviser's appropriate qualification, including, where relevant, appropriate qualification gap-fill.

14.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to make it a contractual condition of membership (where a retail investment adviser is a member of the accredited body) or of using its verification service (where a retail investment adviser is not a member of the accredited body) that, as a minimum, the accredited body will not continue to verify a retail investment adviser's standards and will withdraw its statement of professional standing if the accredited body is provided with false information in relation to a retail investment adviser's qualifications or continuing professional development or a false declaration in relation to a retail investment adviser's compliance with APER.

In this regard, an accredited body must have in place appropriate decision-making procedures with a suitable degree of independence and transparency.

Having appropriate systems and controls in place and providing evidence to the FSA of continuing effectiveness

15.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to ensure that it has adequate resources and systems and controls in place in relation to its role as an accredited body.

16.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to have effective procedures in place for the management of conflicts of interest and have a well-balanced governance structure with at least one member who is independent of the sector.

17.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to have a code of ethics and to ensure that its code of ethics and verification service terms and conditions do not contain any provisions that conflict with APER.

Ongoing cooperation with the FSA

18.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to provide the FSA with such documents and information as the FSA reasonably requires, and to cooperate with the FSA in an open and transparent manner.

19.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to share information with the FSA (subject to any legal constraints) in relation to the professional standards of the retail investment advisers who use its service as appropriate. Examples might include conduct issues, complaints, dishonestly obtaining or falsifying qualifications or continuing professional development or a failure to complete appropriate continuing professional development. The FSA will expect an accredited body to notify the firm if issues such as these arise.

20.

The FSA will expect an accredited body to submit to the FSA an annual report by a suitable independent auditor which sets out that auditor's assessment of the quality of the body's satisfaction of the criteria in paragraphs 10 to 19 in the preceding 12 months and whether, in the auditor's view, the body is capable of satisfying the criteria in the subsequent 12 months. The FSA will expect this annual report to be submitted to the FSA within three months of the anniversary of the date on which the accredited body was added to the Glossary definition of accredited body.

Withdrawal of accreditation

21.

If an accredited body fails or, in the FSA's view, is likely to fail to satisfy the criteria, the FSA will discuss this with the accredited body concerned. If, following a period of discussion, the accredited body has failed to take appropriate corrective action to ensure that it satisfies and will continue to satisfy the criteria, the FSA will withdraw the accredited body's accreditation by removing its name from the list of accredited bodies published in the Glossary. The FSA will expect the body to notify each retail investment adviser holding a current statement of professional standing of the FSA's decision. A statement of professional standing issued by the accredited body before the withdrawal of accreditation will continue to be valid until its expiration.