Related provisions for LR 10.1.5

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LR 8.2.1RRP
A company with, or applying for, a premium listing of its equity shares5 must appoint a sponsor on each occasion that it:4(1) makes an application for admission of equity shares5 which:(a) requires the production of a prospectus or equivalent document1; or(b) is accompanied by a certificate of approval from another competent authority; or(c) is accompanied by a summary document as required by PR 1.2.3R (8); or(d) requires the production of listing particulars and is referred to
BIPRU 9.11.2RRP

Table: Positions other than ones with short-term credit assessments

This table belongs to BIPRU 9.11.1 R

Credit Quality step

1

2

3

4

5 and below

Risk weight

20%

50%

100%

350%

1250%

[Note: For mapping of the credit quality step to the credit assessments of eligible ECAIs, refer to: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/ecais_securitisation.pdf ]

MCOB 13.1.5GRP
The FSA expects a firm to treat a sale shortfall in the same way that it treats a payment shortfall.1
COLL 7.6.1GRP
(1) A proposal that an authorised fund should be involved in a scheme of arrangement is subject to written notice to and approval by the FSA under section 251 of the Act (Alteration of schemes and changes of manager or trustee) or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company). Effect cannot be given to such a change except in accordance with that section or regulation.(2) The issue of units in exchange for assets as
PERG 5.12.13GRP
The effect of the IMD is that any EEA-based insurance intermediaries doing business within the Directive’s scope4 must first be registered in their home EEA State before carrying on insurance mediation in that EEA State or other EEA States. For these purposes, an EEA-based insurance intermediary is either:(1) a legal person with its registered office or head office in an EEA State other than the United Kingdom; or(2) a natural person resident in an EEA State other than the United
SUP 3.4.6GRP
If it appears to the FSA that an auditor of a firm has failed to comply with a duty imposed on him under the Act, it may disqualify him under section 345 of the Act. For more detail about what happens when the disqualification of an auditor is being considered or put into effect, see EG 151. A list of persons who are disqualified by the FSA under section 345 of the Act may be found on the FSA website (www.fsa.gov.uk).1
REC 2.8.3GRP
In determining whether there are satisfactory arrangements for securing the timely discharge of the rights and liabilities of the parties to transactions, the FSA may have regard to the UK recognised body's:(1) rules and practices relating to clearing and settlement;(2) arrangements for matching trades and ensuring that the parties are in agreement about trade details;(3) arrangements for making deliveries and payments and, where relevant, for collecting margin and holding collateral,
SUP 12.3.6GRP
1The effect of section 39A(6)(b) of the Act is to prohibit a UK MiFID investment firm from appointing an FSA registered tied agent unless it has accepted responsibility in writing for the agent's activities in acting as a tied agent.
PERG 9.11.1GRP

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question

Answer

1

Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).

2

Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.

3

Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?

The FSA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FSA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FSA's view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FSA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.

4

Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).

5

In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account.

  • The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means.
  • The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFSA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise.
  • Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.

6

Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?

In the FSA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).

7

Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?

In the FSA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.

8

Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).

9

Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?

In the FSA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).
DISP App 3.1.2GRP
The aspects of complaint handling dealt with in this appendix are how the firm should:(1) assess a complaint in order to establish whether the firm's conduct of the sale failed to comply with the rules, or was otherwise in breach of the duty of care or any other requirement of the general law (taking into account relevant materials published by the FSA, other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service and former schemes). In this appendix this is referred to as a "breach
PERG 4.3.3GRP
A person will only need authorisation or exemption if he is carrying on a regulated activity 'by way of business' (see section 22 of the Act (Regulated activities)). There are, in fact, three different forms of business test applied to the regulated mortgage activities. In the FSA's view, however, the difference in the business tests should have little practical effect.
REC 2.11.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body has made satisfactory arrangements for the safeguarding and administration of assets belonging to the users of its facilities, the FSA may have regard to: (1) the level of protection which the arrangements provide against the risk of theft or other types or causes of loss;(2) whether the arrangements ensure that assets are only used or transferred in accordance with the instructions of the owner of those assets or in accordance with
FEES 6.3.3GRP
The FSCS may impose one or more levies in a financial year to meet its management expenses,6 its compensation costs or its management expenses in respect of relevant schemes.6 The FSCS may also impose interim levies, as part of its overall levy commitment. This flexibility allows the FSCS to phase its financing over the course of a financial year and thus avoid collecting levies from firms before the money is actually needed. The FSCS has committed itself in the Memorandum of
MCOB 4.1.8GRP
1The FSA would not view the removal of a party to the regulated mortgage contract following the death of that party (and where no other variation is proposed) as a variation for the purposes of MCOB 4.1.4 R(1).
DTR 1B.1.5AGRP
2LR 9.8.7A R, LR 14.3.24 R and LR 18.4.3 R (2) extend the application of DTR 7.2 (Corporate governance statements) for certain overseas companies which have securities admitted to the official list maintained by the FSA in accordance with section 74 (The official list) of the Act.
COLL 9.3.2RRP
An operator of a scheme recognised under section 272 of the Act must ensure the prospectus:(1) contains a statement that "Complaints about the operation of the scheme may be made to the FSA."; and(2) states whether or not investors in the scheme would be covered by the compensation scheme, and if so, it must state how they are covered and who they would need to contact for further information.
COLL 5.7.6GRP
(1) COLL 5.7.5R (8) to (11) replicate the provisions of Article 5 of the Commission Recommendation 2004/383/EC of 27 April 2004 on the use of financial derivative instruments for undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities, so as to enable non-UCITS retail schemes to benefit from the same flexibility.(2) The attention of authorised fund managers is specifically drawn to condition (d) in COLL 5.7.5R (9) under which the collateral has to be legally enforceable
CASS 7A.3.19RRP
On the failure of a third party with which money is held, a firm must notify the FSA:(1) as soon as it becomes aware of the failure of any bank, intermediate broker, settlement agent, OTC counterparty or other entity with which it has placed, or to which it has passed, client money; and(2) as soon as reasonably practical, whether it intends to make good any shortfall that has arisen or may arise and of the amounts involved.
COLL 1.1.2GRP
(1) The general purpose of this sourcebook is to contribute to the FSA meeting its regulatory objective of the protection of consumers. It provides a regime of product regulation for authorised funds, which sets appropriate standards of protection for investors by specifying a number of features of those products and how they are to be operated.(2) In addition, this sourcebook implements part of the requirements of the UCITS Directive to meet EU law 2 obligations relevant to authorised