Related provisions for BIPRU 7.5.2

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DISP 2.7.4GRP
127In determining whether an enterprise meets the tests for being a micro-enterprise, account should be taken of the enterprise's 'partner enterprises' or 'linked enterprises' (as those terms are defined in the Micro-enterprise Recommendation). For example, where a parent company holds a majority shareholding in a complainant, if the parent company does not meet the tests for being a micro-enterprise then neither will the complainant. [Note: Articles 1 and 3 to 7 of the Annex
DISP 2.7.7GRP
127DISP 2.7.6R (5)and DISP 2.7.6R (6) include, for example, employees covered by a group permanent health policy taken out by an employer, which provides in the insurance contract that the policy was taken out for the benefit of the employee.
DISP 1.3.3RRP
In respect of complaints that do not relate to MiFID business, a respondent must put in place appropriate management controls and take reasonable steps to ensure that in handling complaints it identifies and remedies any recurring or systemic problems, for example, by: 1(1) analysing the causes of individual complaints so as to identify root causes common to types of complaint;(2) considering whether such root causes may also affect other processes or products, including those
DEPP 6.7.1GRP
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other conditions which the FSA seeks to impose by way of such action. Such conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FSA recognises the benefits of such agreements, in that they offer the potential for securing earlier redress or protection for consumers and the saving of cost to the person concerned and the
DEPP 6.7.4GRP
(1) Any settlement agreement between the FSA and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may be,
REC 2.3.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body has financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its relevant functions, the FSA may have regard to:(1) the operational and other risks to which the UK recognised body is exposed;(2) if the UK recognised body acts as a central counterparty or otherwise guarantees the performance of transactions in specified investments, the counterparty and market risks to which it is exposed in that capacity; (3) the amount and composition
MCOB 2.4.2GRP
12(1) Principle 6 (Customers' interests) requires that a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. This means, for example, that a firm should avoid selling practices that commit customers (or lead customers to believe that they are committed) to any regulated mortgage contract or home reversion plan before they have been able to consider the illustration and offer document. One such practice might be to present a new customer with an illustration,
MCOB 2.4.3GRP
Principle 7 (Communications with clients) requires that a firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. This means, for example, that a firm should avoid giving any customer a false impression about the availability of a regulated mortgage contract, home reversion plan1 or regulated sale and rent back agreement2, such as describing it as a 'special offer' not available after
PRIN 1.1.5GRP
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FSA) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems or resources will automatically lead to a firm contravening Principle 3 or 4. Rather, the potential impact of a group member's activities (and, for example, risk management systems
PRIN 1.1.7GRP
Breaching a Principle makes a firm liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FSA to show that a firm has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity), for example, the FSA would need to demonstrate a lack of integrity
PERG 2.6.11HGRP
  1. (1)

    The main provision within the definition of alternative debenture arrangements that seeks to ensure that only instruments that display the characteristics of a debt security can be alternative debentures is set out at PERG 2.6.11CG (5). It provides that the amount of additional payments under the arrangements must not exceed an amount which would, at the time the bond is issued, be a reasonable commercial return on a loan of capital. Where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered in deciding this question. The following example demonstrates how this condition should be approached.

    2. Example

    ABC Ltd is a property development company. It wishes to increase its portfolio on a short-term basis. It issues 5-year sukuk to investors and uses the proceeds to buy the head lease of a commercial property. The rental income from the lease is distributed to investors in proportion to their holdings without a cap on the level of return. After 5 years, the head lease is sold on at a profit and the proceeds shared between investors.

    In this example, the investors participate directly in the success or failure of the underlying property business. The sakk is not really in the nature of a debt instrument. It is unlikely to be an alternative debenture as:

    • additional payments under the arrangements would exceed a reasonable commercial return on a loan of the capital.

      Further, where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered. Here, the issue terms of the sukuk impose no upper limit on the amount of the periodic distributions: a sakk holder subscribing 1,000 may, in a year, get back 200 or 2,000 or nothing depending on the rental market. The maximum potential return is clearly in excess of a reasonable commercial return on a loan of 1,000; and

    • the arrangements have not been admitted to an official list or admitted to trading on a regulated market or recognised investment exchange (see PERG 2.6.11CG (6)).
  2. (2)

    If, in the above example, investors returns were capped at 500 per sakk per year, then this is the amount that must be considered in deciding whether the return exceeds a reasonable commercial return on a loan, even where the amounts actually received turn out to be far lower.

  3. (3)

    In applying the reasonable commercial return test, the sakk should be compared to a hypothetical loan to the issuer on similar terms and carrying similar risks. For example, a conventional security convertible into shares will normally carry a lower rate of interest because the conversion right has a value. The return on an exchangeable or convertible sakk should be measured against the return on an equivalent exchangeable or convertible debt security.

  4. (4)

    The risk to investors in sukuk may vary slightly from that of a conventional bond in some instances. This may be due to the fact that sukuk holders only have recourse to the bond assets or some other structural feature which results in the risk profile being higher. In such instances it may be justifiable for the rate of return to be slightly higher than that of a conventional loan.

  5. (5)

    As with any financial instrument, the pricing of sukuk will depend on the issuers view of the market at the time of issue and reasonable commercial return may vary depending on the issuer and the economic circumstances prevalent at the time of issue.

BIPRU 7.10.27GRP
A firm may meet the requirement in BIPRU 7.10.26R by using different model parameters and employing a suitable adjustment mechanism to produce a figure which is equivalent to the figure produced using the parameters set out in BIPRU 7.10.26R. For example, a firm's model may use a 95% one-tailed confidence limit if the firm has a mechanism to convert the output of the model to reflect a 99% one-tailed confidence limit.
BIPRU 7.10.47GRP
This paragraph provides guidance on BIPRU 7.10.46R (3). Take as an example a VaR model based on a factor model or on a historical simulation model. The ability of the model to explain price variation could be demonstrated by a statistical comparison over the same period of time between actual price changes on the portfolio and the profit and loss impact of risk factors included within the model. A firm may wish to include an estimate of residual variation not explained by the
BIPRU 7.10.54GRP
For example, BIPRU 7.10.53R might involve creating and documenting a prudent incremental PRR charge for the risk not captured in the VaR model and holding sufficient capital resources against this risk. In that case the firm should hold capital resources at least equal to its capital resources requirement as increased by adding this incremental charge to the model PRR. Alternatively the firm may make valuation adjustments through its profit and loss reserves to cover this material
ICOBS 8.3.3GRP
(1) Principle 8 requires a firm to manage conflicts of interest fairly. SYSC 10 also requires an insurance intermediary to take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest, and maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to prevent conflicts of interest from constituting or giving rise to a material risk of damage to its clients. 1(2) [deleted]11(3) If a firm acts for a customer in arranging a policy, it is likely to be the customer's
MCOB 12.4.2GRP
A firm may calculate the same level of arrears charges for all regulated mortgage contracts where the customer is in arrears, rather than on the basis of the individual regulated mortgage contract with the particular customer.
REC 3.16.1GRP
The purpose of REC 3.16 is to ensure that the FSA receives a copy of the UK recognised body's plans and arrangements for ensuring business continuity if there are major problems with its computer systems. The FSA does not need to be notified of minor revisions to, or updating of, the documents containing a UK recognised body's business continuity plan (for example, changes to contact names or telephone numbers).
LR 10.5.3GRP
1The FSA would (amongst other things) generally consider an increase of 10% or more in the consideration payable to be a material change to the terms of the transaction.
ICOBS 2.5.3GRP
(1) Where it is compatible with the nature of the obligation imposed by a particular rule and with the Principles, in particular Principles 1 (Integrity), 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and 3 (Management and control), firms may rely on third parties in order to comply with the rules in this sourcebook.(2) For example, where a rule requires a firm to take reasonable steps to achieve an outcome, it will generally be reasonable for a firm to rely on information provided to it in writing
CASS 7A.1.2GRP
The client money distribution rules seek to facilitate the timely return of client money to a client in the event of the failure of a firm or third party at which the firm holds client money.
DTR 1.4.4GRP
Examples of when the FSA may require the suspension of trading of a financial instrument include:(1) if an issuer fails to make a RIS announcement as required by the disclosure rules within the applicable time-limits which the FSA considers could affect the interests of investors or affect the smooth operation of the market; or(2) if there is or there may be a leak of inside information and the issuer is unwilling or unable to issue an appropriate RIS announcement within a reasonable
SUP 9.4.2GRP
The extent to which a person can rely on individual guidance given to him will depend on many factors. These could include, for example, the degree of formality of the original query and the guidance given, and whether all relevant information was submitted with the request. Individual guidance is usually given in relation to a set of particular circumstances which exist when the guidance is given. If the circumstances later change, for example, because of a change in the circumstances
RCB 3.6.4GRP
The issuer or the owner, as the case may be, should review legal advice as necessary. For example, advice should be reviewed if a relevant statutory provision is amended or where a new decision or judgment of a court might have a bearing on the conclusions reached which is material to the issuer's or owner's compliance with the requirements of the RCB Regulations or the RCB.
LR 5.5.3GRP
(1) The FSA will not automatically suspend, cancel or restore the listing of securities at the request of an overseas exchange or overseas authority (for example, if listing of a listed3issuer'ssecurities are suspended, cancelled or restored on its home exchange).(2) The FSA will not normally suspend the listing of securities where there is a trading halt for the security on its home exchange.(3) If a listedissuer3 requests a suspension, cancellation or restoration of the listing