Related provisions for LR 10.5.3
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The FSA will consider the full circumstances of each case when determining whether or not to take action for a financial penalty or public censure. Set out below is a list of factors that may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.(1) The nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach, including:(a) whether the breach was deliberate
In some cases it may not be appropriate to take disciplinary measures against a firm for the actions of an approved person (an example might be where the firm can show that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the breach). In other cases, it may be appropriate for the FSA to take action against both the firm and the approved person. For example, a firm may have breached the rule requiring it to take reasonable care to establish and maintain such systems and controls as are
In some cases, it may be appropriate for both the FSAand another authority to be involved, and for both to take action in a particular case arising from the same facts. For example, a breach of RIE rules may be so serious as to justify the FSA varying or cancelling the firm's Part IV permission, or withdrawing approval from approved persons, as well as action taken by the RIE. In such cases, the FSA will work with the relevant authority to ensure that cases are dealt with efficiently
8The illustration must include under the heading "Risks - important things you must consider" brief statements and warnings on all material risks involving a home reversion plan, including:(1) prominently at the beginning of the section: "A home reversion is a complex property transaction. You should seek legal advice to ensure that you fully understand all of the implications for you and your home and for anyone who might otherwise inherit the property.";(2) the effect of the
The disaster recovery provider sets up and maintains a range of IT and related facilities (PABX etc). The disaster recovery contracts so far considered by the FSA give the recipient, subject to certain conditions including an up front payment, priority access to all or a specified part of these facilities if a 'disaster' causes the failure of a similar business system on which the recipient relies. The provider sells access to the same facilities to a number of different recipients,
A manufacturer or retailer may undertake an obligation to ensure that the customer becomes a party to a separate contract of insurance in respect of the goods sold. This would include, for example, a contract for the sale of a freezer, with a simple warranty in relation to the quality of the freezer, but also providing insurance (underwritten by an insurer and in respect of which the customer is the policyholder) covering loss of frozen food if the freezer fails. The FSA is unlikely
The FSA distinguishes the contract in PERG 6.7.15 G from a contract under which the manufacturer or retailer assumes the obligation to provide the customer with an indemnity against loss or damage if the freezer fails, but takes out insurance to cover the cost of having to provide the indemnity to the customer. The obligation to indemnify is of a different nature from the seller's or supplier's usual obligations as regards the quality of goods or services and is an insurance obligation.
The following are examples of typical warranty schemes operated by motor dealers. Provided that, in each case, the FSA is satisfied that the obligations assumed by the dealer are not significantly more extensive in content, scope or duration that a dealer's usual obligations as to the quality of motor vehicles of that kind, the FSA would not usually classify the contracts embodying these transactions as contracts of insurance.(1) The dealer gives a verbal undertaking to the purchaser
The FSA will:(1) expect the issuer to demonstrate that it has in place appropriate systems, controls, procedures and policies, including in relation to risk management, underwriting, arrears and valuation; (2) expect the issuer to demonstrate that the cash-flows generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the payments due in a timely manner including under conditions of economic stress and in the event of the failure of the issuer;(3) take account of any over collateralisation
(1) The credit risk of an asset is the risk of loss if another party fails to perform its obligations or fails to perform them in a timely fashion.(2) Where, for example, the asset pool includes residential mortgages the relevant factors which the FSA may consider include: (a) whether the asset pool contains (or could contain) loans made to individuals who have been made bankrupt or have had court judgments made against them;(b) the extent to which the asset pool contains (or
Counterparty risk is the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transactions cash flows. The relevant factors the FSA may consider include whether the:(1) counterparty has an appropriate credit rating;(2) counterparty can unilaterally terminate the hedging agreement, and if so under what circumstances;(3) contractual arrangements contain appropriate termination procedures (for example, what provisions apply in the event of
(1) The FSA will assess each risk factor separately and then assess any inter-dependencies and correlations to form a judgment on the quality of the asset pool as a whole. For example, an asset pool which is of high credit quality and so low risk due to a combination of factors such as owner occupation, low income multiples, full valuation methodologies, and a strong payments track record, may permit another factor such as high loan-to-value ratios, that would otherwise be considered
The FSA expects the issuer to demonstrate that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme that adequately deal with:(1) the identification and rectification of any breach of Regulations 17(2) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations;(2) the appointment of replacements for parties, for example servicers, cash managers or paying agents; and(3) the orderly winding-up
(1) The FSA expects the report from the accountants to address at least the following matters:(a) that the level of over collateralisation meets the limits set out in the covered bond arrangements which are designed to ensure compliance with the requirement that the asset pool is capable of covering claims attaching to the bond in Regulation 17 (requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations; and(b) that appropriate due diligence procedures have been
Information required under LR 13.3.1R(1) (Contents of all circulars) to be included in the circular or announcement should include an explanation of:(1) the background and reasons for the proposed transfer;(2) any changes to the issuer's business that have been made or are proposed to be made in connection with the proposal;(3) the effect of the transfer on the issuer's obligations under the listing rules;(4) how the issuer will meet any new eligibility requirements, for example
In determining whether a UK recognised body has financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its relevant functions, the FSA may have regard to:(1) the operational and other risks to which the UK recognised body is exposed;(2) if the UK recognised body acts as a central counterparty or otherwise guarantees the performance of transactions in specified investments, the counterparty and market risks to which it is exposed in that capacity; (3) the amount and composition
In the FSA's view, money payable to an introducer on his own account includes money legitimately due to him for services rendered to the borrower, whether in connection with the introduction or otherwise. It also includes sums payable to an introducer (for example, a housebuilder) by a buyer in connection with a transfer of property. For example, article 33A allows a housebuilder to receive the purchase price on a property that he sells to a borrower, whom he previously introduced
In the FSA's view, details of fees or commission referred to in PERG 4.5.14G (2) does not require an introducer to provide an actual sum to the borrower, where it is not possible to calculate the full amount due prior to the introduction. This may arise in cases where the fee or commission is a percentage of the eventual loan taken out and the amount of the required loan is not known at the time of the introduction. In these cases, it would be sufficient for the introducer to
In the FSA's view, the information condition in PERG 4.5.14G (3) requires the introducer to indicate to the borrower any other advantages accruing to him as a result of ongoing arrangements with N relating to the introduction of borrowers. This may include, for example, indirect benefits such as office space, travel expenses, subscription fees and this and other relevant information may be provided on a standard form basis to the borrower, as appropriate.
The FSA will have regard to circumstances relating to the firm, for example:(1) attitude of the firm: whether the firm is being cooperative;(2) history of similar issues: whether similar issues have arisen in the past and, if so, whether timely corrective action was taken;(3) quality of a firm's systems and records: whether the FSA has confidence that the firm has the ability to provide the required information;(4) objectivity: whether the FSA has confidence in the firm's willingness
The FSA will have regard to alternative tools that may be available, including for example:(1) obtaining what is required without using specific statutory powers (for example, by a visit by FSA staff or a request for information on an informal basis); (2) requiring information from firms and others, including authorising an agent to require information, under section 165 of the Act (Authority's power to require information);(3) appointing investigators to carry out general investigations
The FSA recognises that a UK RCH2 has legitimate interests of its own and that its general business policy may properly be influenced by other persons (such as its owners). Such a connection does not necessarily imply the existence of a conflict of interest nor is it necessary to exclude individuals closely connected with other persons (for example, those responsible for the stewardship of the owner's interests) from all decision-making processes in a UK recognised body. However,
(1) In assessing whether a penalty would cause an individual serious financial hardship, the FSA will consider the individual’s ability to pay the penalty over a reasonable period (normally no greater than three years). The FSA’s starting point is that an individual will suffer serious financial hardship only if during that period his net annual income will fall below £14,000 and his capital will fall below £16,000 as a result of payment of the penalty. Unless the FSA believes
(1) The FSA will consider reducing the amount of a penalty if a firm will suffer serious financial hardship as a result of having to pay the entire penalty. In deciding whether it is appropriate to reduce the penalty, the FSA will take into consideration the firm’s financial circumstances, including whether the penalty would render the firm insolvent or threaten the firm’s solvency. The FSA will also take into account its regulatory objectives, for example in situations where
Where the FSA considers that, following commencement of an FSA investigation, an individual or firm has reduced their solvency in order to reduce the amount of any disgorgement or financial penalty payable, for example by transferring assets to third parties, the FSA will normally take account of those assets when determining whether the individual or firm would suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the disgorgement and financial penalty.
Members will individually comply with this chapter if and only if all complaints by policyholders against members are dealt with under the Lloyd's complaints procedures. Accordingly, certain of the obligations under this chapter, for example the obligation to report on complaints received and the obligation to pay fees under the rules relating to the funding of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FEES 5), must be complied with by the Society on behalf of members. Managing agents
The firm is responsible for ensuring delivery of the required report at the FSA's offices by the due date. If a report is received by the FSA after the due date and the firm believes its delivery arrangements were adequate, it may be required to provide proof of those arrangements. Examples of such proof would be:(1) "proof of posting" receipts from a UK post office or overseas equivalent which demonstrates that the report was posted early enough to allow delivery by the due
(1) In the FSA's view, a customer's interests will include:(a) protection of the customer's rights under the plan, in particular the right to occupy the property throughout its term;(b) protection of any interest (legal or beneficial) that the customer retains, acquires or is intended to acquire in the property, including the expectation that such interests will be unencumbered by third party interests; and(c) that, where a customer pays sums under a home purchase plan towards
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other conditions which the FSA seeks to impose by way of such action. Such conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FSA recognises the benefits of such agreements, in that they offer the potential for securing earlier redress or protection for consumers and the saving of cost to the person concerned and the
(1) Any settlement agreement between the FSA and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may be,