Related provisions for PERG 1.5.4
121 - 140 of 222 items.
The FSA expects to maintain a close working relationship with certain
types of firm and expects that
routine supervisory matters arising can be resolved during the normal course
of this relationship by, for example, issuing individual guidance where
appropriate (see SUP 9.3). However,
the FSA may seek to vary a firm's Part
IV permission:(1) in
circumstances where it considers it appropriate for the firm to
be subject to a formal requirement,
breach of which could attract enforcement
1The purpose of the rules and guidance in this section is to ensure that, in addition to the notifications made under SUP 12.7 (Appointed representatives; notification requirements), the FSA receives regular and comprehensive information about the appointed representatives engaged by a firm, so that the FSA is in a better position to pursue the regulatory objective of the protection of consumers.3
23One of the reasons for introducing the guidance in this appendix is to seek a reduction in the number of complaints which are referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. If a firm writes to the complainant proposing terms for settlement which are in accordance with this appendix, the letter may include a statement that the calculation of loss and redress accords with the FSAguidance, but should not imply that this extends to the assessment of whether or not the complaint should
This chapter sets out the FSA's approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: (1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FSA's approach to the exercise of its powers under:(a) section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions) to give directions to recognised bodies (REC 4.6);(b) section 297 of the Act (Revoking recognition)
2In
line with guidance from CESR, the FSA acknowledges that, from a practical
point of view, it would be burdensome for branches of investment firms to be obliged to report
their transactions to two competent authorities. Therefore, all transactions executed by branches may
be reported to the competent authority of
the Host State, if the investment firm elects to do so. In these
cases transaction reports should
follow the rules of the competent authority to
which the report is
This guidance is issued under section 157 of the Act. It represents the FSA's views and does not bind the courts. For example, it would not bind the courts in an action for damages brought by a private person for breach of a rule (see section 150 of the Act (Actions for damages)), or in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of sections 19 (The general prohibition) or 21 (Restrictions on financial promotion) of the Act (see sections 26 to 30
The 'assumption of risk' by the provider is an important descriptive feature of all contracts of insurance. The 'assumption of risk' has the meaning in (1) and (3), derived from the case law in (2) and (4) below. The application of the 'assumption of risk' concept is illustrated in PERG 6.7.2 G (Example 2: disaster recovery business).(1) Case law establishes that the provider's obligation under a contract of insurance is an enforceable obligation to respond (usually, by providing
In the FSA's view, it is the very existence of the body corporate that is the collective investment scheme. There are a number of statutory references that support this view. For example, it is clear that paragraph 21 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme) is drafted on the basis that it is the body corporate itself that is (or would