Related provisions for MAR 1.1.7
1 - 20 of 26 items.
(1) Behaviour which conforms with articles 3 to 6 of the Buy-back and Stabilisation Regulation (see MAR 1 Annex 1) will not amount to market abuse.(2) See MAR 2 in relation to stabilisation.(3) Buy-back programmes which are not within the scope of the Buy-back and Stabilisation Regulation are not, in themselves, market abuse.
There are no rules which permit or require a person to behave in a way which amounts to market abuse.Some rules contain a provision to the effect that behaviour conforming with that rule does not amount to market abuse:(1) COB 2.4.4 R (1) (Chinese walls) (see COB 2.4.4 R (4));2the control of information rule (SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) (see SYSC 10.2.2 R (4)));2 and(2) those parts of the Part 6 rules which relate to the timing, dissemination or availability, content and standard of care
Behaviour conforming with any of the rules of the Takeover Codeabout the timing, dissemination or availability, content and standard of care applicable to a disclosure, announcement, communication or release of information, does not, of itself, amount to market abuse, if:1(1) the rule is one of those specified in the table in MAR 1.10.5 C;(2) the behaviour is expressly required or expressly permitted by the rule in question (the notes for the time being associated with the rules
1Table: Provisions of the Takeover Code conformity with which will not, of itself, amount to market abuse (This table belongs to MAR 1.10.4C):1
Takeover Code provisions: |
|
Disclosure of information which is not generally available |
1(a) 2.1 plus notes, 2.5, 2.6, 2.9 plus notes 8 19.7 20.1, 20.2, 20.3 28.4 37.3(b) and 37.4(a) |
Standards of care |
2.8 first sentence and note 4 19.1, 19.5 second sentence and note 2, 19.8 23 plus notes 28.1 |
Timing of announcements, documentation and dealings |
2.2, 2.4(b) 5.4 6.2(b) 7.1 11.1 note 6 only 17.1 21.2 30 31.6(c), 31.9 33 (in so far as it refers 31.6(c) and 31.9 only) 38.5 |
Content of announcements |
2.4 (a) and (b) 19.31 |
Behaviour conforming with Rule 4.2 of the Takeover Code (in relation to restrictions on dealings by offerors and concert parties) does not, of itself, amount to market abuse, if:(1) the behaviour is expressly required or expressly permitted by that rule (the notes for the time being associated with the rules identified in the Takeover Code are treated as part of the rule for these purposes); and(2) it conforms to any General Principle set out at Section B of the Takeover Code
This chapter provides assistance in determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse. It also forms part of the UK's implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (including its EU implementing legislation, that is Directive 2003/124/EC, Directive 2003/125/EC, Regulation 2273/2003 and Directive 2004/72/EC). It is therefore likely to be helpful to persons who:(1) want to avoid engaging in market abuseor to avoid requiring or encouraging another to do so; or(2) want to
The Code does not exhaustively describe all types of
behaviour
or may not amount to
market abuse. In particular, the descriptions of
behaviour
which, in the opinion of the
FSA, amount to market abuse should be read in the light of: (1) the elements specified by the Act as making up the relevant type of market abuse; and(2) any relevant descriptions of
behaviour
which , in
The following are examples of
behaviour
that might fall within the scope of section 123(1)(b) :(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to
deal in qualifying investments or related investments in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in
behaviour
which, if he himself engaged
Principle 2 is intended to ensure that listed companies have adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable them to comply with their obligations under the listing rules and disclosure rules and transparency rules. In particular, the FSA considers that listed companies should place particular emphasis on ensuring that they have adequate procedures, systems and controls in relation to:(1) identifying whether any obligations arise under LR 10 (Significant transactions) and
Timely and accurate disclosure of information to the market is a key obligation of listed companies. For the purposes of Principle 2, a listed companywith a primary listing of equity securities should have adequate systems and controls to be able to:(1) ensure that it can properly identify information which requires disclosure under the listing rules or disclosure rules and transparency rules in a timely manner; and(2) ensure that any information identified under paragraph (1)
When deciding whether to take action for market abuse or requiring or encouraging, the FSA may consider the following additional factors:(1) The degree of sophistication of the users of the market in question, the size and liquidity of the market, and the susceptibility of the market to market abuse.(2) The impact, having regard to the nature of the behaviour, that any financial penalty or public censure may have on the financial markets or on the interests of consumers:(a) a
The FSA will not take action against a person over behaviour which (a) conforms with the Takeover Code or rules of an RIE and (b) falls within the terms of any provision of the Code of Market Conduct which states that behaviour so conforming does not amount to market abuse. The FSA will seek the Takeover Panel's or relevant RIE's views on whether behaviour complies with the Takeover Code or RIE rules and will attach considerable weight to its views.
Where the behaviour of a person which amounts to market abuse is behaviour to which the Takeover Code is relevant, the use of the Takeover Panel's powers will often be sufficient to address the relevant concerns. In cases where this is not so, the FSA will need to consider whether it is appropriate to use any of its own powers under the market abuse regime. The principal circumstances in which the FSA is likely to consider such exercise are:(1) where the behaviour falls within
6A firm operating an MTF must:(1) have effective arrangements and procedures, relevant to the MTF, for the regular monitoring of the compliance by its users with its rules; and(2) monitor the transactions undertaken by its users under its systems in order to identify breaches of those rules, disorderly trading conditions or conduct that may involve market abuse.[Note: Article 26(1) of MiFID]
Where a UK recognised body has evidence tending to suggest that any person has:(1) been carrying on any regulated activity in the United Kingdom in contravention of the general prohibition; or(2) been engaged in market abuse; or(3) committed a criminal offence under the Act or subordinate legislation made under the Act; or(4) committed a criminal offence under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Insider dealing); or(5) committed a criminal offence under the Money Laundering
1A firm operating an MTF must:(1) report to the FSA:(a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions; and(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; (2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FSA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and (3) provide full assistance to the FSA, and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse, in
1An issuer should be aware that matters that
fall within the scope of this chapter may also fall within the scope of:(1) the market abuse regime set out
in section 118 of the Act;(2) section 397 of the Act relating to misleading statements and
practices;(3) Part V of the Criminal Justice
Act 1993 relating to insider dealing; and(4) the Takeover
Code.
The byelaws referred to in INSPRU 8.4.3 R should:(1) ensure that adequate and effective arrangements are in place to enable members and persons applying to be admitted as members to enter into transactions to transfer syndicate capacity and settle these transactions in a timely manner;(2) give clear and comprehensive guidance about the dissemination of information that is, or may be, relevant to the price of syndicate capacity and the transparency of the capacity transfer market;
Where the securities are subject to an underwriting agreement a listed company may, at its discretion and subject to DTR 2 (Disclosure and control of inside information by issuers), delay notifying a RIS as required by LR 9.6.4R (6) for up to two business days until the obligation by the underwriter to take or procure others to take securities is finally determined or lapses. In the case of an issue or offer of securities which is not underwritten, notification of the result must
For market makers and persons that may lawfully deal in qualifying investments or related investments on their own account, pursuing their legitimate business of such dealing (including entering into an agreement for the underwriting of an issue of financial instruments) will not in itself amount to market abuse (insider dealing). [Note: Recital 18 Market Abuse Directive]
This chapter sets out:(1) guidance on the type of event or change in condition which a firm should consider notifying in accordance with Principle 11; the purpose of this guidance is to set out examples and not to give comprehensive advice to firms on what they should notify in order to be in compliance with Principle 11;(2) rules on events and changes in condition that a firm must notify; these are the types of event that the FSA must be informed about, usually as soon as possible,
A company with, or applying for, a primary listing of its equity securities must appoint a sponsor on each occasion that it:(1) makes an application for admission of equity securities which:(a) requires the production of a prospectus or equivalent document1; or(b) is accompanied by a certificate of approval from another competent authority; or(c) is accompanied by a summary document as required by PR 1.2.3R (8); or(2) is required to producea class 1 circular; or(3) is producinga
(1) Notification of suspicious transactions to the FSA requires sufficient indications (which may not be apparent until after the transaction has taken place) that the transaction might constitute market abuse. In particular a firm will need to be able to explain the basis for its suspicion when notifying the FSA (see SUP 15.10 R). Certain transactions by themselves may seem completely devoid of anything suspicious, but might deliver such indications of possible market abuse,
When the FSA's investigator has exercised the compulsory interview power, at
the outset of the interview the interviewee will be given an appropriate warning.
The warning, amongst other things, must state that the interviewee is obliged
to answer all questions put to them during the interview, including any put
by the representative of the overseas regulator. It will also state that in criminal
proceedings or proceedings for market abuse the FSA will
not use as evidence against