Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4
241 - 260 of 602 items.
Section 250 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FSA to waive the application of certain rules in COLL and CIS to:(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT) or the ICVC and its depositary (in the case of an ICVC).2
The FSA, (for periodic fees, FOS and FSCS levies), FOS Ltd (for FOS case fees), expect to issue invoices at least 30 days before the date on which the relevant amounts fall due. FOS case fees are invoiced on a monthly basis. Accordingly it will generally be the case that a person will have at least 30 days from the issue of the invoice before an administrative fee becomes payable.2
Paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 1 and section 99(5) to the Act permit the FSA to recover fees ( and, where relevant, FOS levies), and section 213(6) permits the FSCS to recover shares of the FSCS levy payable, as a debt owed to the FSA and FSCS respectively, and the FSA and FSCS, as relevant, will consider taking action for recovery (including interest) through the civil courts. Also, the FOS Ltd (in respect of case fees) may take steps to recover any money owed to it (including
In addition, the FSA may be entitled to take regulatory action in relation to the non-payment of fees and FOS levies. FSA may also take regulatory action in relation to the non-payment of FOS case fees or share of the FSCS levy, after reference of the matter to FSA by FOS Ltd or FSCSrespectively. What action (if any) that is taken by the FSA will be decided upon in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
Neither assisting in the administration nor assisting in the performance of a contract alone will fall within this activity. Generally, an activity will either amount to assisting in the administration or assisting in the performance but not both. Occasionally, however, an activity may amount to both assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance. For example, where a person assists a claimant in filling in a claims form, in the FSA's view this amounts
Put another way, where an intermediary's assistance in filling in a claims form is material to whether performance takes place of the contractual obligation to notify claims, it is more likely to amount to assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance. Conversely, in the FSA's view, a person who merely gives pointers about how to fill in the claims form or merely supplies information in support of a claim will not be assisting in the performance of
More generally, an example of an activity that, in the FSA's view, is likely to amount to assisting a policyholder in both the administration and the performance of a contract of insurance is notifying a claim under a policy and then providing evidence in support of the claim, or helping negotiate its settlement on the policyholder's behalf. Notifying an insurance undertaking of a claim assists the policyholder in discharging his contractual obligation to do so (assisting in the
Where a person receives funds on behalf of a policyholder in settlement of a claim, in the FSA's view, the act of receipt is likely to amount to assisting in the performance of a contract. By giving valid receipt, the person assists the insurance undertaking to discharge its contractual obligation to provide compensation to the policyholder. He may also be assisting the policyholder to discharge any obligations he may have under the contract to provide valid receipt of funds,
1This
chapter applies to:(1) a MiFID
investment firm;(2) a third country investment firm; and to(3) a person who
is the operator of an approved reporting
mechanism or of a regulated
market or MTF that
is used by a firm to report transactions to the FSA; and(4) a firm acting in its capacity as
a manager or operator of:(a) a collective investment undertaking;
or(b) a pension
scheme; or(c) an occupational
pension scheme; or(d) a personal
pension scheme; or(e) a stakeholder
pension
2In
line with guidance from CESR, the FSA acknowledges that, from a practical
point of view, it would be burdensome for branches of investment firms to be obliged to report
their transactions to two competent authorities. Therefore, all transactions executed by branches may
be reported to the competent authority of
the Host State, if the investment firm elects to do so. In these
cases transaction reports should
follow the rules of the competent authority to
which the report is
1A common
platform firm must:(1) when relying on a third party for
the performance of operational functions which are critical for the performance
of regulated activities, listed activities or ancillary
services (in this chapter "relevant services and activities")
on a continuous and satisfactory basis, ensure that it takes reasonable steps
to avoid undue additional operational risk; (2) not undertake the outsourcing of important operational functions
in such a way as to impair
A common platform firm must in particular
take the necessary steps to ensure that the following conditions are satisfied:(1) the service provider must have
the ability, capacity, and any authorisation required
by law to perform the outsourced functions,
services or activities reliably and professionally;(2) the service provider must carry
out the outsourced services
effectively, and to this end the firm must
establish methods for assessing the standard of performance of the service
provider;(3)
A common platform firm must make available
on request to the FSA and
any other relevant competent authority all
information necessary to enable the FSA and
any other relevant competent authority to
supervise the compliance of the performance of the outsourced activities
with the requirements of the regulatory system.[Note: article
14(5) of the MiFID implementing Directive]
As SUP
15.3.8 G explains,
a common platform firm should notify the FSA when
it intends to rely on a third party for the performance of operational functions
which are critical or important for the performance of relevant services and
activities on a continuous and satisfactory basis.[Note: recital 20 of theMiFID implementing Directive]
The FSA will not grant an investment firm consolidation waiver unless:(1) the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group meets the conditions for being a CAD Article 22 group;(2) the FSA is satisfied that each BIPRU firm in the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group will be able to meet its capital requirements using the calculation of capital resources in GENPRU 2 Annex 6 (Capital resources table for a BIPRU investment firm with a waiver from consolidated supervision);
If a firm has an investment firm consolidation waiver, it must:(1) ensure that each CAD investment firm in the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group which is a firm or an EEA firm has in place systems to monitor and control the sources of capital and funding of all the members in the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group;(2) notify the FSA of any serious risk that could undermine the financial stability of the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group, as soon as
Although an investment firm consolidation waiver switches off most of this chapter, a firm should still carry out the capital adequacy calculations in BIPRU 8.3 to BIPRU 8.8 as if those parts of this chapter still applied to the UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group and report these to the FSA. It should also still monitor large exposure risk on a consolidated basis.
Within the legal constraints that apply, the FSA may pass on to a skilled person any information which it considers relevant to the skilled person's function. A skilled person, being a primary recipient under section 348 of the Act (Restrictions on disclosure of confidential information by Authority etc.), is bound by the confidentiality provisions in Part XXIII of the Act (Public record, disclosure of information and cooperation) as regards confidential information he receives
So-called 'mortgage clubs' or 'wholesalers' essentially act as a distribution function for lenders, providing information to intermediaries about current deals available from a range of lenders. They provide information (often through an electronic sourcing system) in a way that helps intermediaries search the market effectively and, as such, do not deal directly with individual borrowers. If only engaged in these activities and without direct contact with individual borrowers,
So-called 'mortgage packaging companies' may undertake certain parts of the mortgage process for lenders on an outsourced basis, ensuring that a complete set of documentation is collated and sent to the lender. This might include receiving application forms from intermediaries, undertaking credit reference checks and instructing a valuer. Other activities might include a product placement service for other intermediaries who provide product advice or recommendations to their clients.
The term 'broker packagers' is typically used to describe intermediaries who either market their services directly to borrowers or who offer other intermediaries a complete mortgage outsourcing service. They are often involved in the sales and advice process, including helping the borrower complete application forms. In the FSA's view, broker packagers carrying on these types of activity in direct contact with the borrower are likely to be carrying on the regulated activities
Behaviour
of the type referred to in APER 4.1.3 E includes, but is not limited to, deliberately:(1) falsifying documents;(2) misleading
a client about the risks of
an investment;(3) misleading
a client about the charges or
surrender penalties of investment products;(4) misleading
a client about the likely performance
of investment products by providing
inappropriate projections of
future investment returns;(5) misleading
a client by informing him that
products require only a single
Deliberately
failing to inform, without reasonable cause:(1) a customer; or(2) his firm (or its auditors or an actuary appointed
by his firm under SUP 4 (Actuaries)1); or1(3) the FSA;of the fact that their understanding
of a material issue is incorrect, despite being aware of their misunderstanding,
falls within APER 4.1.2 E.
(1) If it appears to the FSA that there is, or there may be, a breach of the listing rules by an issuer with a primary listing, the FSA may in writing require the issuer to appoint a sponsor to advise the issuer on the application of the listing rules.(2) If required to do so under paragraph (1), an issuer must, as soon as practicable, appoint a sponsor to advise it on the application of the listing rules.Note: LR 8.2 sets out the various circumstances in which an issuer must
In respect of banking services, the European Commission believes that "...to determine where the activity was carried on, the place of provision of what may be termed the 'characteristic performance' of the service i.e. the essential supply for which payment is due, must be determined" (Commission interpretative communication: Freedom to provide services and the interests of the general good in the Second Banking Directive (97/C 209/04)). In the FSA's view , this requires consideration
The FSA is of the opinion that UK firms that are credit institutions and MiFID investment firms2 should apply the 'characteristic performance' test (as referred to in SUP App 3.6.7 G) when considering whether prior notification is required for services business. Firms should note that other EEA States may take a different view. Some EEA States may apply a solicitation test. This is a test as to whether it is the consumer or the provider that initiates the business relationshi
The FSA considers that, in order to comply with Principle 3:Management and control (see PRIN 2.1.1 R), a firm should have appropriate procedures to monitor the nature of the services provided to its customers. Where a UK firm has non-resident customers but has not notified the EEA State in which the customers are resident that it wishes to exercise its freedom to provide services, the FSA would expect the firm's systems to include appropriate controls. Such controls would include
Principle 4 requires a firm to maintain adequate financial resources. GENPRU 2 sets out provisions that deal specifically with the adequacy of that part of a firm's financial resources that consists of capital resources. The adequacy of a firm'scapital resources needs to be assessed both by that firm and the FSA. Through its rules, the FSA sets minimum capital resources requirements for firms. It also reviews a firm's own assessment of its capital needs, and the processes and
For the purposes of GENPRU 2.1.9 R, a firm should have systems in place to enable it to be certain whether it has adequate capital resources to comply with GENPRU 2.1.13 R and the main BIPRU firm Pillar 1 rules (as applicable) at all times. This does not necessarily mean that a firm needs to measure the precise amount of its capital resources and its CRR on a daily basis. A firm should, however, be able to demonstrate the adequacy of its capital resources at any particular time
On the failure of
a third party with which client money is
held, a firm must notify the FSA:(1) as
soon as it becomes aware, of the failure of
any bank, other broker or settlement agent or
other entity with which it has placed, or to which it has passed, client money; and(2) as
soon as reasonably practical, whether it intends to make good any shortfall that has arisen or may arise and
of the amounts involved.
In the FSA's opinion, however, such information may take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:(1) a person may offer to provide information on directors’ dealings on the basis that, in his opinion, were directors to buy or sell investors would do well to follow suit;(2) a person may offer to tell a client when certain shares reach a certain value (which would be advice if the person providing the
Where the auditors of a UK recognised body cease to act as such, that UK recognised body must immediately give the FSA notice of that event, and the following information:(1) whether the appointment of those auditors expired or was terminated;(2) the date on which they ceased to act; and(3) if it terminated, or decided not to renew, their appointment, its reasons for taking that action or decision.
1This
manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved
persons and other persons,
whether or not they are regulated by the FSA. It sets out:(1) the FSA's decision-making procedure for giving statutory
notices. These are warning
notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);(2) the FSA's policy with respect to the imposition and amount of penalties
under the Act (see DEPP 6);(3) the FSA's policy with respect to the conduct of interviews by investigators
appointed