Related provisions for COBS 20.2.55
1 - 7 of 7 items.
A firm that is seeking to make a reattribution of its inherited estate must:(1) identify at the earliest appropriate point a policyholder advocate, who is free from any conflicts of interest that may be, or may appear to be, detrimental to the interests of policyholders, to negotiate with the firm on behalf of relevant with-profits policyholders;(2) seek the approval of the FSA for the appointment of the policyholder advocate as soon as he is identified, or appoint a policyholder
The firm should include an independent element in the policyholder advocate selection process, which may include consulting representative groups of policyholders or using the services of a recruitment consultant. When considering an application for approval of a nominee to perform the policyholder advocate role, the FSA will have regard to the extent to which the firm has involved others in the selection process.
The precise role of the policyholder advocate in any particular case will depend on the nature of the firm and the reattribution proposed. A firm will need to discuss with the FSA the precise role of the policyholder advocate in a particular case (COBS 20.2.45 R). However, the role of the policyholder advocate should include:(1) negotiating with the firm, on behalf of the relevant with-profits policyholders, the benefits to be offered to them in exchange for the rights or interests
A firm must:(1) notify the FSA of the terms on which it proposes to appoint a policyholder advocate (whether or not the candidate was nominated by the FSA); and(2) ensure that the terms of appointment for the policyholder advocate:(a) stress the independent nature of the policyholder advocate's appointment and function, and are consistent with it;(b) define the relationship of the policyholder advocate to the firm and its policyholders;(c) set out arrangements for communications
A firm's execution policy should determine the relative importance of each of the execution factors or establish a process by which the firm will determine the relative importance of the execution factors. The relative importance that the firm gives to those execution factors must be designed to obtain the best possible result for the execution of its client orders. Ordinarily, the FSA would expect that price will merit a high relative importance in obtaining the best possible
Examples of goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FSA does not regard as meeting the requirements of the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) include price feeds or historical price data that have not been analysed or manipulated to reach meaningful conclusions.
Examples of goods or services that relate to the execution of trades or the provision of research that the FSA does not regard as meeting the requirements of either evidential provisions COBS 11.6.4 E or COBS 11.6.5 E include:(1) services relating to the valuation or performance measurement of portfolios;(2) computer hardware; (3) connectivity services such as electronic networks and dedicated telephone lines; (4) seminar fees;(5) subscriptions for publications;(6) travel, accommodation
The reference to research in the rule on use of dealing commission (COBS 11.6.3 R) is not confined to investment research as defined in the Glossary. The FSA's view is that research can include, for example, the goods or services encompassed by investment research, provided that they are directly relevant to and are used to assist in the management of investments on behalf of customers. In addition, any goods or services that relate to the provision of research that the FSA regards
In assessing the adequacy of prior and periodic disclosures made by an investment manager under this section, the FSA will have regard to the extent to which the investment manager adopts disclosure standards developed by industry associations such as the Investment Management Association, the National Association of Pension Funds and the London Investment Banking Association.
The FSA would expect a firm'sconflicts of interest policy to provide
for investment research to be
published or distributed to its clients in
an appropriate manner. For example, the FSA considers it will be:(1) appropriate for a firm to take reasonable steps to ensure that
its investment research is published
or distributed only through its usual distribution
channels; and(2) inappropriate for an employee (whether or not a financial
analyst) to communicate the substance of any
The FSA would expect a firm to
consider whether or not other business activities of the firm could
create the reasonable perception that its investment
research may not be an impartial analysis of the market in,
or the value or prospects of, a financial
instrument. A firm would
therefore be expected to consider whether its conflicts
of interest policy should contain any restrictions on the timing
of the publication of investment research.
For example, a firm might consider
whether
The FSA considers that the significant
conflicts of interest which could arise are likely to mean it is inappropriate
for a financial analyst or
other relevant person to prepare investment research which is intended firstly
for internal use for the firm's
own advantage, and then for later publication to its clients (in
circumstances in which it might reasonably be expected to have a material
influence on its clients' investment
decisions).
The FSA considers that it is important
for the proportions published in compliance with COBS 12.4.10 R (4) to be consistent and meaningful to the recipients of the research recommendations. Accordingly for
non-equity material, the relevant categories should be meaningful to the recipients
in terms of the course of action being recommended.