Related provisions for PERG 9.5.4

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PERG 9.5.1GRP
If a particular body corporate ('BC') comes within the definition of a collective investment scheme, the second element in the definition is whether the property to which the scheme relates meets the property condition. This condition is that the property must belong beneficially to, and be managed by or on behalf of, BC. In addition, BC must have as its purpose the investment of its funds to:(1) spread investment risk; and(2) give its members the benefit of the results of the
PERG 9.5.2GRP
The property belonging to BC may be property of any description, including money. For example, the arrangements may relate to real estate, works of art or a particular enterprise or rural activity. It must, of course, be possible to value the property if the requirements of the investment condition concerned with the link to net asset value are to be met (see PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act))).
PERG 9.5.3GRP
The property of the collective investment scheme must belong beneficially to BC, although the legal title to it may be held by a third party. However, the holders of shares or securities issued by BC may not have a beneficial interest in that property. In exchange for their contributions, they will only have rights against BC.
PERG 9.5.5GRP
In the FSA's view, the question of whether funds are invested by BC with the aim of spreading investment risk is not affected by the levels of risk involved in particular investments. What matters for these purposes is that the aim is to spread the risk, whatever it may be. For example, the value of each of BC's investments, if taken separately, might be subject to a high level of risk. However, this would not itself result in BC failing to satisfy the property condition as long
PERG 9.9.1GRP
The test in section 236(3)(b) of the Act is whether the reasonable investor would, before he makes a decision to invest, be satisfied that the value of his investment would be realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to the value of the property belonging to BC.
PERG 9.9.2GRP
In the FSA's view, this means that the reasonable investor must be satisfied that what he will get when he realises his investment is his proportionate share in the value of BC's underlying assets, less any dealing costs. In other words, that he is satisfied he will get net asset value. The investment condition focuses on the way the body corporate operates over time, and not by reference to particular issues of shares or securities (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition
PERG 9.9.3GRP
For the 'satisfaction test' to be met, there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could form a view. He must be satisfied that the value of BC's property will be the basis of a calculation used for the whole, or substantially the whole, of his investment. The FSA considers that the circumstances, or combination of circumstances, in which a reasonable investor would be in a position to form this view include:(1) where the basis of net asset valuation
PERG 9.9.4GRP
PERG 9.9.3 G (2)and PERG 9.9.3 G (3) refer to circumstances where the reasonable investor may be satisfied that he can realise his investment at net asset value because of arrangements made to ensure that the shares or securities trade at net asset value on a market. There may, for example, be cases of market dealing where the price of shares or securities will not depend on the market. An example is where BC or a third party undertakes to ensure that the market value reflects
PERG 9.9.5GRP
However, where there is a market, the FSA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FSA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
PERG 9.9.6GRP
The fact that the definition must be applied to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general)) is also relevant here. So, for example, in a take-over situation the fact that a bidder may be willing to provide an exit route for an investment at net asset value will be irrelevant within the context of the definition. This is so even if an investor invests in particular shares or securities in the knowledge or expectation or in anticipation
PERG 9.9.7GRP
The expression 'wholly or mainly' in section 236(3)(b) determines the extent of the permissible departure from the link between the price of BC's shares or securities and the value of its net assets. The word 'mainly' introduces some flexibility to the process to allow for limited account to be taken of factors other than the value of BC's assets that may result in the sum realised failing to reflect the true net asset value. Such factors may include:(1) the payment by the investor
PERG 9.3.1GRP
For a body corporate to be an open-ended investment company, as defined in section 236(1) of the Act:(1) it must be a collective investment scheme;(2) it must satisfy the property condition in section 236(2); and(3) it must satisfy the investment condition in section 236(3).
PERG 9.3.2GRP
Each of these aspects of the definition is considered in greater detail in PERG 9.4 (Collective investment scheme (section 235 of the Act)) to PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act)). Although the definition has a number of elements, the FSA considers that it requires an overall view to be taken of the body corporate. This is of particular importance in relation to the investment condition (see PERG 9.6.3 G and PERG 9.6.4 G (The
PERG 9.3.3GRP
An open-ended investment company may be described, in general terms, as a body corporate, most or all of the shares in, or securities of, which can be realised within a reasonable period. Realisation will typically involve the redemption or repurchase of shares in, or securities of, the body corporate. This realisation must be on the basis of the value of the property that the body corporate holds (that is, the net asset value).
PERG 9.3.4GRP
In the FSA's view, all of the elements of the definition are clearly objective tests. In applying the definition to any particular case, a person would need to have regard to all the circumstances. This includes any changes in the way that the body corporate operates.
PERG 9.3.5GRP
The FSA understands that the aim of the definition in section 236 of the Act is to include any body corporate which, looked at as a whole, functions as an open-ended investment vehicle. The definition operates against a background that there is a wide range of different circumstances in which any particular body corporate can be established and operated. For example, the definition applies to bodies corporate wherever they are formed. So, in the application of the definition to
PERG 9.3.6GRP
For a body corporate formed outside the United Kingdom, there is an additional issue as to how the applicable corporate law and the definition of open-ended investment company in the Act relate to one another. The FSA understands this to operate as follows. The term 'body corporate' is defined in section 417(1) of the Act (Interpretation) as including 'a body corporate constituted under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom'. So, whether or not any particular
PERG 9.8.2GRP
In the FSA's view, the 'realisation' of an investment means converting an asset into cash or money. The FSA does not consider that 'in specie' redemptions (in the sense of exchanging shares or securities of BC with other shares or securities) will generally count as realisation. Section 236(3)(a) refers to the realisation of an investment, the investment being represented by the 'value' of shares or securities held in BC. In the FSA's view, there is no realisation of value where
PERG 9.8.3GRP
The most typical means of realising BC's shares or securities will be by their being redeemed or repurchased, whether by BC or otherwise. There are, of course, other ways in which a realisation may occur. However, the FSA considers that these will often not satisfy all the elements of the definition of an open-ended investment company considered together. For example, the mere fact that shares or securities may be realised on a market will not meet the requirements of the 'satisfaction
PERG 9.8.4GRP
An investor in a body corporate may be able to realise part, but not all, of his investment. The FSA considers that the fact that partial realisations may take place at different times does not prevent the body corporate coming within the definition of an open-ended investment company. But, in any particular case, the 'expectation test' will only be met if the overall period for realising the whole of the investment can be considered to be reasonable. Apart from this, the simple
PERG 9.8.5GRP
The use of an expectation test ensures that the definition of an open-ended investment company is not limited to a situation where a holder of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate has an entitlement or an option to realise his investment. It is enough if, on the facts of any particular case, the reasonable investor would expect that he would be able to realise the investment. The following are examples of circumstances in which the FSA considers that a reasonable investor
PERG 9.8.7GRP
In the FSA's view, the fact that a person may invest in the period shortly before a redemption date would not cause a body corporate, that would not otherwise be regarded as such, to be open-ended. This is because the investment condition must be applied in relation to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general).
PERG 9.8.8GRP
Similarly, if BC issues shares or securities on different terms as to the period within which they are to be redeemed or repurchased (see PERG 9.6.4 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general), BC must be considered as a whole. Whether or not the expectation test is satisfied in relation to a particular body corporate is bound to involve taking account of the terms on which its shares or securities, or classes of shares or securities, are issued. But this
PERG 9.8.9GRP
As indicated in PERG 9.3.5 G (The definition), the potential for variation in the form and operation of a body corporate is considerable. So, it is only possible in general guidance to give examples of the factors that the FSA considers may affect any particular judgment. These should be read bearing in mind any specific points considered elsewhere in the guidance. Such factors include:(1) the terms of the body corporate's constitution;(2) the applicable law;(3) any public representations
PERG 9.10.1GRP
A number of controls apply under the Act to the promotion of shares or securities that are issued by any body corporate. These controls differ according to whether the person making the promotion is an unauthorised person (see PERG 9.10.2 G) or an authorised person (see PERG 9.10.3 G to PERG 9.10.6 G). In addition, where a body corporate is not an open-ended investment company:(1) the requirements of Prospectus Rules relating to the publication of an approved prospectus may1 apply
PERG 9.10.2GRP
The controls under the Act that apply to promotions of shares or securities by unauthorised persons are in section 21 of the Act (Restrictions on financial promotion). These controls apply where an unauthorised person makes a financial promotion in, or from, the United Kingdom that relates to the shares in or securities of any body corporate. The same controls apply regardless of whether the shares or securities being promoted are issued by a body corporate that is an open-ended
PERG 9.10.3GRP
Promotions made by authorised persons in the United Kingdom are generally subject to the controls in COB 3 (Financial Promotion). However, in the case of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate which is an open-ended investment company, additional controls are imposed by Chapter II of Part XVII of the Act (Restrictions on promotion of collective investment schemes) (see PERG 8.20). Section 238 of the Act (Restrictions on promotion) prevents an authorised person communicating
PERG 9.10.7GRP
In the Regulated Activities Order, shares in or securities of an open-ended investment company are treated differently from shares in other bodies corporate. They are treated as units in a collective investment scheme under article 81 of the Regulated Activities Order (Units in a collective investment scheme) rather than shares under article 76 (Shares etc).
PERG 9.10.9GRP
In order to be authorised, a person must have permission to carry on the regulated activities in question. What the permission needs to cover may differ according to whether the regulated activity being carried on relates to units or shares. So, for example, a body corporate that is an open-ended investment company will need permission if it carries on the regulated activity of dealing as principal or agent, arranging (bringing about) or making arrangements with a view to transactions
PERG 9.10.10GRP
A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted by an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself. But where the open-ended investment company is incorporated outside the United Kingdom, it will
PERG 9.7.2GRP
The characteristics that a reasonable investor can be expected to have will inform the use of judgment required by the 'expectation test' and the 'satisfaction test'. These tests relate to the investor's ability to realise an investment within a reasonable period and to do so on the basis of the net value of its assets. In the FSA's view, the characteristics of the reasonable investor include:(1) sound judgment based on good sense;(2) some knowledge of, and possibly experience
PERG 9.7.3GRP
The reasonable investor is a hypothetical investor. The implications of this are that the test does not relate to actual investment by a particular person at a particular time or in relation to a particular issue of any class of shares or securities. In the FSA's view, what underlies the test is what a reasonable investor would think he was getting into if he were contemplating investment in a particular body corporate. In addition, because the investor is hypothetical, the investment
PERG 9.7.4GRP
In practice, the assessment of the nature of a particular body corporate will have to be made by applying the definition whenever an authorised person proposes to communicate an invitation or inducement to others for them to participate in the body corporate by buying shares or securities issued by it.
PERG 9.7.5GRP
After an initial assessment, however, the FSA's view is that subsequent applications of the investment condition could produce a different result, but only if there is a change to the constitution or practice of the body corporate which is significant and sustained. For example, this may happen if there is a change in the body corporate's published intentions or regular practices. As the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said in parliamentary debate when commenting on the definition,
PERG 9.7.6GRP
Section 236(3) uses the words "the investor would, if he were to participate in the scheme". This is consistent with the fact that the reasonable investor is hypothetical. But applying the test at this early stage makes it clear that there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could base the expectation in section 236(3)(a). And on which he could be satisfied on the matters in section 236(3)(b). In the FSA's view, this requires, for example,
PERG 2.8.4GRP
The regulated activity of dealing in investments as principal applies to specified transactions relating to any security or to any contractually based investment (apart from rights under funeral plan contracts or rights to or interests in such contracts). The activity is cut back by exclusions as follows.(1) Of particular significance is the exclusion in article 15 of the Regulated Activities Order (Absence of holding out etc). This applies where dealing in investments as principal
PERG 2.8.5GRP
The regulated activity of dealing in investments as agent applies to specified transactions relating to any security or to any relevant investment (apart from rights under funeral plan contracts or rights to or interests in such rights). In addition, the activity is cut back by exclusions as follows.(1) An exclusion applies to certain transactions entered into by an agent who is not an authorised person which depend on him dealing with (or through) an authorised person. It does
PERG 2.8.6AGRP
3The exclusions in the Regulated Activities Order that relate to the various arranging activities are as follows.(1) Under article 26, arrangements that do not or would not bring about the transaction to which they relate are excluded from the arranging activities that relate to a particular transaction (see PERG 2.8.6G (1)) only. A person will bring about a transaction or a contract or plan variation only if his involvement in the chain of events leading to a transaction or contract
PERG 2.8.7GRP
The activities of persons appointed under a power of attorney are excluded under article 38 of the Regulated Activities Order, from the regulated activity of managing investments, if specified conditions are satisfied. The exclusion only applies where a person is not carrying on insurance mediation or reinsurance mediation and is subject to further limitations discussed below2. In addition, the following exclusions (outlined in PERG 2.9) apply in specified circumstances where
PERG 2.8.8GRP
The exclusions from the regulated activity of safeguarding and administering investments are as follows.(1) Safeguarding and administration activities carried on by one person are excluded if a specified third party undertakes a responsibility for the assets which is no less onerous than it would have been if he were doing the safeguarding and administration himself. The effect of this is that an authorised person with permission to carry on this regulated activity (or in certain
PERG 2.8.12AGRP
3Advice given by an unauthorised person in relation to a home finance transaction in the circumstances referred to in PERG 2.8.6AG (5)(a) or (b) (Arranging deals in investments and arranging a home finance transaction) is also excluded. In addition:(1) the following exclusions apply in specified circumstances where a person is advising on investments or advising on a home finance transaction:(a) while acting as trustee or personal representative (see PERG 2.9.3 G);(b) in connection
PERG 9.2.1GRP
The nature of many bodies corporate means that they will, in most if not all circumstances, come within the definition of collective investment scheme in section 235(1) to (3) of the Act (Collective investment schemes). The property concerned will generally be managed as a whole under the control of the directors of the body corporate or some other person for the purpose of running its business. The idea underlying the investment is that the investors will participate in or receive
PERG 9.2.2GRP
However, there are a number of exclusions that apply to prevent certain arrangements from being a collective investment scheme. These are in the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme). The exclusion in paragraph 21 of the Schedule to that Order is of particular significance for bodies corporate. It excludes from being a collective investment
PERG 9.2.3GRP
Certain consequences flow according to whether or not a body corporate is an open-ended investment company. Different requirements apply to the marketing of the shares or securities issued by a body corporate which is an open-ended investment company, compared with one that is not (see PERG 9.10.1 G to PERG 9.10.6 G (Marketing of shares or securities issued by a body corporate)). In addition, the regulated activities that require permission may differ (see PERG 9.10.7 G to PERG
PERG 9.4.3GRP
In the FSA's view, it is the very existence of the body corporate that is the collective investment scheme. There are a number of statutory references that support this view. For example, it is clear that paragraph 21 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme) is drafted on the basis that it is the body corporate itself that is (or would
PERG 9.4.4GRP
Analysing a typical corporate structure in terms of the definition of a collective investment scheme, money will be paid to the body corporate in exchange for shares or securities issued by it. The body corporate becomes the beneficial owner of that money in exchange for rights against the legal entity that is the body corporate. The body corporate then has its own duties and rights that are distinct from those of the holders of its shares or securities. Such arrangements will,
PERG 9.4.5GRP
Where a body corporate does come within the definition of a collective investment scheme in section 235(1) to (3), the only relevant issue is to determine whether or not it is excluded. As PERG 9.2.2 G (Introduction) explains, the exclusions are in the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme). If a body corporate satisfies any of the exclusions
PERG 9.4.6GRP
In the FSA's view, the question of what constitutes a single scheme in line with section 235(4) of the Act does not arise in relation to a body corporate. This is simply because the body corporate is itself a collective investment scheme (and so is a single scheme). Section 235(4) contemplates a 'separate' pooling of parts of the property that is subject to the arrangements referred to in section 235(1). But to analyse a body corporate in this way requires looking through its
DISP 1.1.3RRP
(1) This chapter applies to a firm in respect of complaints from eligible complainants concerning activities carried on from an establishment maintained by it or its appointed representative in the United Kingdom.(2) For complaints relating to the MiFID business of a firm, the complaints handling rules and the complaints record rule:(a) apply to complaints from retail clients and do not apply to complaints from eligible complainants who are not retail clients; (b) also apply in
DISP 1.1.5RRP
This chapter does not apply to:(1) [deleted]739739(2) a credit union; and(3) an authorised professional firm in respect of expressions of dissatisfaction about its non-mainstream regulated activities
PERG 9.1.1GRP
This guidance applies to persons who need to know whether a body corporate is an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act (Open-ended investment companies). This would mean that it is a collective investment scheme.
PERG 9.1.2GRP
The purpose of this guidance is to outline the circumstances in which a body corporate will be an open-ended investment company and, in so doing, to:(1) give an overview of the definition (see PERG 9.3 (The definition)) and describe its three main elements:(a) an open-ended investment company must be a collective investment scheme (see PERG 9.4 (Collective investment scheme (section 235 of the Act)));(b) it must satisfy the 'property' condition in section 236(2) of the Act (see
PERG 9.1.4GRP
The only kind of body corporate of an open-ended kind that may currently be formed under the law of the United Kingdom is one that is authorised by the FSA. A person intending to form an open-ended body corporate that has its head office in Great Britain should refer to the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1228). Bodies corporate formed under these Regulations are referred to in the Handbook as investment companies with variable capital (or ' ICVCs ').
SYSC 2.1.2GRP
The role undertaken by a non-executive director will vary from one firm to another. For example, the role of a non-executive director in a friendly society may be more extensive than in other firms. Where a non-executive director is an approved person, for example where the firm is a body corporate, his responsibility and therefore liability will be limited by the role that he undertakes. Provided that he has personally taken due care in his role, a non-executive director would not
SYSC 2.1.4RRP

Allocation of functions

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.3 R

1: Firm type

2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):

3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:

(1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)

(1) the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and(2) senior managers

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of:

(a) the group; or(b) a group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall

(2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the function in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2) must be allocated)

(not applicable)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior managers

(3) Any other firm

the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior manager's

Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.
SYSC 2.1.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). In particular, an incoming EEA firm is referred to the EEA investment business oversight function (CF 9, see SUP 10.7.6 R).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1.1.7 R). Note that SYSC 1.1.10 R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1.1.1 R (2) and SYSC 1.1.7 R restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SUP 13A Annex 2 G3). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.1

3

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the Combined Code developed by the Committee on Corporate Governancerecommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities?

ECO 1.1.6 R has the effect that SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1
PERG 9.6.1GRP
If BC comes within the definition of a collective investment scheme, the third element in determining whether it is an open-ended investment company is whether the 'investment condition' is satisfied. This condition is that, in relation to BC, a reasonable investor would, if he were to participate in the scheme:(1) expect that he would be able to realise his investment in the scheme, within a period appearing to him to be reasonable; his investment would be represented, at any
PERG 9.6.3GRP
Section 236(3) of the Act states clearly that the investment condition must be met 'in relation to BC'. In the FSA's view, this means that the investment condition should not be applied rigidly in relation to specific events such as particular issues of shares or securities or in relation to particular points in time. The requirements of the investment condition must be satisfied in relation to the overall impression of the body corporate itself, having regard to all the circ
PERG 9.6.4GRP
In the FSA's view, and within limits, the investment condition allows for the possibility that a body corporate that is an open-ended investment company may issue shares or securities with different characteristics. Some shares or securities may clearly satisfy the condition whereas others may not. The FSA considers that a reasonable investor contemplating investment in such a body corporate may still take the view, looking at the body corporate overall, that the investment condition
COLL 5.2.7RRP
(1) A transferable security is an investment which is any of the following:(a) a share;(b) a debenture;(c) a government and public security;(d) a warrant; or(e) a certificate representing certain securities.(2) An investment is not a transferable security if the title to it cannot be transferred, or can be transferred only with the consent of a third party.(3) In applying (2) to an investment which is issued by a body corporate, and which is a share or a debenture, the need for
COLL 5.2.27RRP
(1) An ICVC must not acquire transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of that body corporate if:(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held by the ICVC gives the ICVC power to influence significantly the conduct of business of that body corporate; or(b) the acquisition gives the ICVC that power.(2) For the purpose of (1), an ICVC is to
COLL 5.2.28RRP
(1) A manager must not acquire, or cause to be acquired for an AUT of which it is the manager, transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of the body corporate if:(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held for that AUT, taken together with any such securities already held for other AUTs of which it is also the manager, gives the manager
COLL 5.2.29RRP
A UCITS scheme:(1) must not acquire transferable securities (other than debt securities) which:(a) do not carry a right to vote on any matter at a general meeting of the body corporate that issued them; and(b) represent more than 10% of those securities issued by that body corporate;(2) must not acquire more than 10% of the debt securities issued by any single body;(3) must not acquire more than 25% of the units in a collective investment scheme;(4) must not acquire more than
PERG 8.14.35GRP
The exemption in article 62 of the Financial Promotion Order applies to any financial promotioncommunicated by or on behalf of a body corporate, a partnership, an individual or a group of connected individuals. The financial promotion must relate to a transaction which is one to acquire or dispose of shares in a body corporate and either:(1) it is the case that:(a) the shares, in addition, where appropriate, to any shares already held by the buyer, amount to 50% or more of the
PERG 8.14.36GRP
A group of connected individuals is defined in article 62(4) of the Financial Promotion Order as being a group of persons each of whom is (for sellers) or is to be (for buyers):(1) a director or manager of the body corporate;(2) a close relative of such a person; or(3) a person acting as trustee for a person as referred to in (1) or (2)
PERG 8.14.37GRP
In the FSA's view, a main aim of the exemption (see PERG 8.14.35G (1)) is to remove from the scope of section 21 a financial promotion concerning the sale of a corporate business by a person who, either alone or with others, controls the business to another person who, either alone or with others, proposes to control the business.
PERG 8.14.41GRP
Several exemptions, including article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order (Members and creditors of certain bodies corporate), apply only in relation to relevant investments being shares or debentures in the body corporate or a member of its group, or warrants or certificates representing certain securities relating to such shares or debentures. In the FSA's view, an exchangeable debt security which is partly a debenture and partly an option is a relevant investment for these
DISP 2.6.1RRP
The Compulsory Jurisdiction covers complaints about the activities of a firm (including its appointed representatives) carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom.519(1) [deleted](2) [deleted](3) [deleted](4) [deleted](5) [deleted](6) [deleted]519
DISP 2.6.2GRP
This:519(1) includes incoming EEA firms and incoming Treaty firms; but(2) excludes complaints about business conducted in the United Kingdom on a services basis from an establishment outside the United Kingdom.
CASS 6.2.3RRP
To the extent practicable, a firm must effect appropriate registration or recording of legal title to a financial instrument in the name of:(1) the client (or, where appropriate, the trustee firm), unless the client is an authorised person acting on behalf of its client, in which case it may be registered in the name of the client of that authorised person;(2) a nominee company which is controlled by:(a) the firm;(b) an affiliated company;(c) a recognised investment exchange
CASS 6.2.4RRP
A firm must accept the same level of responsibility to its client for any nominee company controlled by the firm with respect of any requirements of the custody rules.
COND 2.1.1UKRP

Paragraph 1, Schedule 6 to the Act

3(1)

If the regulated activity concerned is the effecting or carrying out of contracts of insurance the authorised person must be a body corporate (other than a limited liability partnership), a registered friendly society or a member of Lloyd's.

(2)

If the person concerned appears to the [FSA] to be seeking to carry on, or to be carrying on, a regulated activity constituting accepting deposits or issuing electronic money, it must be-

(a)

a body corporate; or

(b)

a partnership.21
COND 2.1.2GRP
Section 40(1) of the Act (Application for permission) allows an application to be made to the FSA for Part IV permission by an individual, a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association. However, in the case of the regulated activities of accepting deposits and effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance, article 1 of the Banking Consolidation Directive and article 8(1) of the First Non-Life Directive and ofthe First Life Directive place further limits on
DISP 1.11.15RRP
For the purposes of DISP 1.11.13 R "individual member" includes a member which is a limited liability partnership or a body corporate whose members consist only of, or of the nominees for, a single natural person or a group of connected persons.
PERG 2.9.12GRP
The exclusions apply in relation to transactions to buy or sellshares in a body corporate where, in broad terms:(1) the transaction involves the acquisition or disposal of a least 50 per cent of the voting shares in the body corporate and is, or is to be, between certain specified kinds of person; or(2) the object of the transaction may otherwise reasonably be regarded as being the acquisition of day-to-day control of the affairs of the body corporate.These exclusions also apply
PERG 2.9.19GRP
The exclusions in this group apply to certain regulated activities involving certain contracts of insurance. The exclusions and the regulated activities to which they apply are as follows.(1) The first exclusion of this kind relates to certain activities carried on by a provider of non-motor goods or services related to travel in connection with general insurance contracts only. The contracts must be for five years duration or less and have an annual premium of no more than 500.
PERG 2.9.21GRP
1The exclusions apply, in general terms:(1) to a body corporate with limited liability:(a) that is formed in accordance with the law of, and having its registered office, central administration or principal place of business in, an EEA State;(b) that operates a business angel-led enterprise capital fund, being a fund that invests only in securities of unlisted companies and whose participants are made up solely of persons of a specified kind; and(c) whose members are limited to