Related provisions for BIPRU 2.3.11
1 - 20 of 96 items.
This chapter sets out the FSA's approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: (1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FSA's approach to the exercise of its powers under:(a) section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions) to give directions to recognised bodies (REC 4.6);(b) section 297 of the Act (Revoking recognition)
The FSA's general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:(1) the FSA has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognition requirements and other obligations imposed by or under the Act and UK RIEs continue at all times to satisfy the MiFID implementing requirements1; and(2) the FSA's supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives.
The Companies Act 1989 also gives the FSA powers to supervise the taking of action under default rules. Under section 166 of the Companies Act 1989 (Powers of the FSA to give directions) (see REC 4.5.4 G), the FSA may direct a UK recognised body to take, or not to take, action under its default rules. Before exercising these powers the FSA must consult the recognised body concerned. The FSA may also exercise these powers if a relevant office-holder applies to it under section
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FSA may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under itsdefault rules- if it appears to [the FSA] that it could take action, [the FSA may direct it to do so, |
|
but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and [the FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, |
|
The FSA may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FSA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FSA] may direct it not to do so. |
|
but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
|
Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and the [FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market. |
|
Under section 166(6) of the Companies Act 1989, a negative direction cannot be given if, in relation to the defaulter, either:(1) a bankruptcy order or an award of sequestration of the defaulter's estate has been made, or an interim receiver or interim trustee has been appointed; or (2) a winding-up order has been made, a resolution for voluntary winding-up has been passed or an administrator, administrative receiver or provisional liquidator has been appointed; and any previous
Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK recognised body has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FSA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK recognised body concerned under its default rules. However, the FSA cannot give such a direction unless it is satisfied that this will not impede or frustrate the proper and efficient conduct of the default proceedings.
The VaR model review process may be conducted through a series of visits covering various aspects of a firm's control and IT environment. Before these visits the FSA may ask the firm to provide some information relating to the firm'sVaR model permission request accompanied by some specified background material. The VaR model review visits are organised on a timetable that allows the firm being visited sufficient time to arrange the visit and provide the appropriate pre-visit
As part of the process for dealing with an application for a VaR model permission the following may be reviewed: organisational structure and personnel; details of the firm's market position in the relevant products; revenue and risk information; valuation and reserving policies; operational controls; information technology systems; model release and control procedures; risk management and control framework; risk appetite and limit structure; future developments relevant to model
Where backtesting reveals severe problems with the basic integrity of the VaR model, the FSA may withdraw model recognition. In particular, if ten or more backtesting exceptions are recorded in a 250 business day period, the FSA may apply a plus factor greater than one or the FSA may consider revoking a firm'sVaR model permission. The FSA may also consider revoking a firm'sVaR model permission if ten or more specific riskbacktesting exceptions occur in such a period.
The minimum multiplication factor will never be less than three. If the FSA does set the minimum multiplication factor above three the VaR model permission will have a table that sets outs the reasons for that add on and specify how much of the add on is attributable to each reason (see BIPRU 7.10.121R). If there are weaknesses in the VaR model that may otherwise be considered a breach of the minimum standards referred to in BIPRU 7.10.24R the FSA may apply such an add on to act
Typically, any add on will be due to a specific weakness in systems and controls identified during the FSA's review that the FSA does not consider material enough to justify withholding overall model recognition. The firm will be expected to take action to address the reasons for any add on. The FSA will then review these periodically and, where satisfactory action has been taken, the add on will be removed through a variation of the VaR model permission.
If a firm ceases to meet any of the requirements set out in BIPRU 7.10, the FSA's policy is that the VaR model permission should cease to have effect. In part this will be achieved by making it a condition of a firm'sVaR model permission that it complies at all times with the minimum standards referred to in BIPRU 7.10.26R - BIPRU 7.10.53R. Even if they are not formally included as conditions, the FSA is likely to consider revoking the VaR model permission if the requirements
If the supervision of a third-country group by a third-country competent authority does not meet the equivalence test referred to in GENPRU 3.2.3 G, competent authorities may apply other methods that ensure appropriate supervision of the EEA regulated entities in that third-country group in accordance with the aims of supplementary supervision under the Financial Groups Directive or consolidated supervision under the applicable EEA prudential sectoral legislation.
If the supervision of a third-country group by a third-country competent authority does not meet the equivalence test referred to in GENPRU 3.2.3 G, a competent authority may, rather than take the measures described in GENPRU 3.2.4 G, apply, by analogy, the provisions concerning supplementary supervision under the Financial Groups Directive or, as applicable, consolidated supervision under the applicable EEA prudential sectoral legislation, to the EEA regulated entities in the
If the Part IV permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country financial conglomerate of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country financial conglomerate, with the rules in Part 1 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
If the Part IV permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country banking and investment group of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country banking and investment group, with the rules in Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
As the approval of the FSA is not required under the Act for a new controller of an overseas firm, the notification rules on such firms are less prescriptive than they are for UK domestic firms. Nevertheless, the FSA still needs to monitor such an overseas firm's continuing satisfaction of the threshold conditions, which normally includes consideration of a firm's connection with any person, including its controllers and parent undertakings (see COND). The FSA therefore needs
As part of the FSA's function of monitoring a firm's continuing satisfaction of the threshold conditions, the FSA needs to consider the impact of any significant change in the circumstances of one or more of its controllers, for example, in their financial standing and, in respect of corporate controllers, in their governing bodies. Consequently, the FSA needs to know if there are any such changes. SUP 11.8 therefore requires a firm to tell the FSA if it becomes aware of particular
Similarly, the FSA needs to monitor a firm's continuing satisfaction of threshold condition 3 (Close links) (see COND 2.32), which requires that a firm's close links are not likely to prevent the FSA's effective supervision of that firm. Accordingly the FSA needs to be notified of any changes in a firm's close links. This requirement is contained in SUP 11.9.2
Under section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions), the FSA has the power to give directions to a recognised body to take specified steps 1in order to secure its compliance with the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act or, in the case of a UK RIE, the MiFID implementing requirements. In the case of a UK RIE those steps may include granting the FSA access to the UK RIE's premises for the purposes of inspecting those premises or any documents
The FSA is likely to exercise its power under section 296 of the Act if it considers that:(1) there has been, or was likely to be, a failure to satisfy the recognition requirements or there has been a failure to comply with any other obligation in or under the Act or, in the case of a UK RIE, the MiFID implementing requirements1which has serious consequences; (2) compliance with the direction would ensure that the recognition requirements, or other obligation in or under the Act
Under section 298(7) of the Act (Directions and revocation: procedure), the FSA need not follow the consultation procedure set out in the rest of section 298 (see REC 4.8), or may cut short that procedure, if it considers it essential to do so. The FSA is likely to consider it essential to cut short the procedure if, in the absence of immediate action, there would be:(1) a serious risk of substantial losses to investors, particularly retail clients1; or1(2) a serious threat to
The FSA will usually consider revoking a recognition order if:(1) the recognised body is failing or has failed to satisfy the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act or, in the case of a UK RIE, the MiFID implementing requirements 1and that failure has or will have serious consequences; or(2) it would not be possible for the recognised body to comply with a direction under section 296 of the Act (FSA's power to give directions); or (3) for some other
The FSA would be likely to consider the conditions in REC 4.7.3 G (2) or REC 4.7.3 G (3) to be triggered1in the following circumstances:1(1) the recognised body appears not to have the resources or management to be able to organise its affairs so as to satisfy the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act or, in the case of a UK RIE, the MiFID implementing requirements; or1(2) the recognised body does not appear to be willing to satisfy the recognition
In addition to the relevant 1factors set out in REC 4.7.4 G, the FSA will usually consider that it would not be able to secure an overseas recognised body's compliance with the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act by means of a direction under section 296 of the Act, if it appears to the FSA that the overseas recognised body is prevented by any change in the legal framework or supervisory arrangements to which it is subject in its home territory from
In complying with Principle 11, the FSA considers that a firm should, in relation to the discharge by the FSA of its functions under the Act:(1) make itself readily available for meetings with representatives or appointees of the FSA as reasonably requested;(2) give representatives or appointees of the FSA reasonable access to any records, files, tapes or computer systems, which are within the firm's possession or control, and provide any facilities which the representatives
The cooperation that a firm is expected to procure from such suppliers is similar to that expected of the firm, in the light of the guidance in SUP 2.3.3 G to SUP 2.3.4 G, but does not extend to matters outside the scope of the FSA's functions in relation to the firm. SUP 2.3.5 R (2) also requires a firm to take reasonable steps regarding access to the premises of such suppliers.
When a firm appoints or renews the appointment of a supplier under a material outsourcing arrangement, it should satisfy itself that the terms of its contract with the supplier require the supplier to give the FSA access to its premises as described in SUP 2.3.5 R (2), and to cooperate with the FSA as described in SUP 2.3.7 R. The FSA does not consider that the 'reasonable steps' in SUP 2.3.7 R would require a firm to seek to change a contract, already in place when that rule
Information is needed to support the FSA's risk based approach to the supervision of all regulated entities. Risk based supervision is intended to ensure that the allocation of supervisory resources and the supervisory process are compatible with the regulatory objectives and the FSA's general duties under the Act. The central element of the process of risk based supervision is a systematic assessment by the FSA (a risk assessment) of the main supervisory risks and concerns for
The risk assessment will guide the FSA's supervisory focus. It is important, therefore, that there is good dialogue between the FSA and the recognised body. The FSA expects to review its risk assessment with the staff of the UK recognised body to ensure factual accuracy and a shared understanding of the key issues, and may discuss the results of the risk assessment with key individuals of the UK recognised body. If appropriate, the FSA may send a detailed letter to the body's
A firm which is seeking to: (1) vary its Part IV permission substantially; or(2) cancel its Part IV permission;should discuss its plans with its usual supervisory contact at the FSA as early as possible before making an application, in order to comply with Principle 11 (see SUP 15.3.7 G (Notifications to the FSA)). These discussions will help the FSA and the firm to agree the correct approach for the firm.
A firm which is winding down (running off) its activities should contact its usual supervisory contact at the FSA to discuss its circumstances. The FSA will discuss the firm's winding down plans and the need for the firm to vary or cancel its Part IV permission. Following these discussions, an application for variation or cancellation of Part IV permission, as appropriate, should usually be made by the firm, although, in certain circumstances, the FSA may use its own-initiative
A UK firm should assess the effect of any change to its Part IV permission on its ability to continue to exercise any EEA right or Treaty right and discuss any concerns with its usual supervisory contact at the FSA. A variation of Part IV permission may also change the applicable provisions with which it is required to comply by a Host State.
The decisions referred to in DEPP 2.5.12 G are:(1) the decision to give a supervisory notice pursuant to section 259(3), (8) or 9(b) (directions on authorised unit trust schemes); section 268(3), 7(a) or 9(a) (directions in respect of recognised overseas schemes); or section 282(3), (6) or (7)(b) (directions in respect of relevant recognised schemes) of the Act;(2) the decision to give a warning notice or decision notice pursuant to section 280(1) or (2)(a) (revocation of recognised
Some of the distinguishing features of notices given under enactments other than the Act are as follows: (1) Building Societies Act 1986, section 36A: There is no right to refer a decision to issue a prohibition order under section 36A to the Tribunal. Accordingly, a decision notice under section 36A(5A) is not required to give an indication of whether any such right exists. A decision notice under section 36A(5A) may only relate to the issue of a prohibition order under section
A decision to: (1) revoke a recognition order under section 297 of the Act (Revoking recognition); or(2) make a direction under section 296 (FSA's powers to give directions); or(3) refuse to make a recognition order under section 290 (Recognition orders);is a serious one and section 298 of the Act (Directions and revocation: procedure) sets out a procedure (see REC 4.8.9 G) which the FSA will follow unless, in the case of a revocation of a recognition order, the recognised body
In considering whether it would be appropriate to exercise the powers under section 296 or section 297 of the Act, the FSA will have regard to all relevant information and factors including:(1) its guidance to recognised bodies;(2) the results of its routine supervision of the body concerned;(3) the extent to which the failure or likely failure to satisfy the recognition requirements or other obligations in or under the Act or, in the case of a UK RIE, the MiFID implementing requirements1may
If the firm or its group is subject to lead supervision arrangements by the FSA, the firm or group may give or address a notice under SUP 15.7.4 R(1) to the supervisory contact at the FSA, designated as lead supervisor, if the firm has chosen to make use of the lead supervisor as a central point of contact (see SUP 1.5).
The FSA has made arrangements with the Society of Lloyd's with respect to the monitoring of underwriting agents. Underwriting agents should check whether these arrangements provide for any notifications required under this chapter to be sent to the Society instead of to the FSA. [For further details see the FSA website.]
A firm must arrange for orderly records to
be kept of its business and internal organisation, including all services
and transactions undertaken by it, which must be sufficient to enable the FSA or any other
relevant competent authority under MiFID to monitor the firm's compliance
with the requirements under the regulatory
system, and in particular to ascertain that the firm has complied with all obligations with
respect to clients.[Note:
article 13(6) of MiFID and article 5(1)(f)
(1) The purpose of the precautionary measure rule is to ensure that an incoming EEA firm is subject to the standards of MiFID and the MiFID implementing Directive to the extent that the Home State has not transposed MiFID or the MiFID implementing Directive by 1 November 2007. It is to 'fill a gap'.(2) The rule is made in the light of the duty of the United Kingdom under Article 62 of MiFID to adopt precautionary measures to protect investors. (3) The rule will be effective for
As part of the decision making process the FSA will normally contact the person in SUP 5.2.1 G to discuss its needs before finalising its decision to require a report by a skilled person. This will provide an opportunity for discussion about the appointment, whether an alternative means of obtaining the information would be better, what the scope of a report should be, who should be appointed, and the likely cost.