Related provisions for PERG 6.5.2
81 - 100 of 557 items.
Where an overseas recognised body includes in its report made under section 295(1) of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) a statement in compliance with section 295(2)(a) of the Act that an event has occurred in the period covered by that report which is likely to affect the FSA's assessment of whether it is satisfied as to the requirements set out in section 292(3) (Overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses), it
An overseas recognised body must include in the first report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act after the recognition order in relation to that overseas recognised body is made: (1) particulars of any events of the kind described in section 295(2) of the Act which occurred; (2) particulars of any change specified in REC 6.7.4 R (1) or disciplinary action specified in REC 6.7.4 R (2) which occurred; and(3) any annual report and accounts which covered a period ending; after
Where an overseas recognised body proposes to change: (1) its address in the United Kingdom for the service of notices or other documents required or authorised to be served on it under the Act; or(2) the address of its head office;it must give notice to the FSA and inform it of the new address at least 14 days before the change is effected.
Where an overseas recognised body has notice that any licence, permission or authorisation which it requires to conduct any regulated activity in its home territory has been or is about to be:(1) revoked; or(2) modified in any way which would materially restrict the overseas recognised body in performing any regulated activity in its home territory or in the United Kingdom;it must immediately notify the FSA of that fact and must give the FSA the information specified for the purposes
The activity in article 25(1) is carried on only if the arrangements bring about, or would bring about, the transaction to which the arrangement relates. This is because of the exclusion in article 26 of the Regulated Activities Order (Arrangements not causing a deal). Article 26 excludes from article 25(1) arrangements which do not bring about or would not bring about the transaction to which the arrangements relate. In the FSA's view, a person would bring about a contract of
Article 25(2) may, for instance, include activities of persons who help potential policyholders fill in or check application forms in the context of ongoing arrangements between these persons and insurance undertakings. A further example of this activity would be a person introducing customers to an intermediary either for advice or to help arrange an insurance policy. The introduction might be oral or written. By contrast, the FSA considers that a mere passive display of literature
In the FSA's view, 'incidental' in this context means that the activity must arise out of, be complementary to or otherwise be sufficiently closely connected with the profession or business. In other words, there must be an inherent link between the activity and the firm's main business. For example, introducing dental insurance may be incidental to a dentist's activities; introducing pet insurance would not be incidental to his activities. In addition, to be considered 'incidental',
This exclusion applies to a person whose profession or business does not otherwise consist of regulated activities. In the FSA's view, the fact that a person may carry on regulated activities in the course of the carrying on of a profession or business does not, of itself, mean that the profession or business consists of regulated activities. This is provided that the main focus of the profession or business does not involve regulated activities and that the regulated activities
In the FSA's view, the crucial element of the exclusion in article 27 is the inclusion of the word 'merely'. When a publisher, broadcaster or internet website operator goes beyond what is necessary for him to provide his service of publishing, broadcasting or otherwise facilitating the issue of promotions, he may well bring himself within the scope of article 25(2). Further detailed guidance relating to the scope of the exclusion in article 27 is contained in PERG 2.8.6G (2) (Arranging
The restriction in the scope of article 28 raises an issue where there is a trust with co-trustees, where each trustee will be a policyholder with equal rights and obligations. If the activities of one of the trustees include arranging in respect of contracts of insurance, that trustee could be viewed as arranging on behalf of his co-trustees who will also be policyholders. Similar issues also arise in respect of trustees assisting in the administration and performance of a contract
The effect of PERG 5.6.17G (4) is that some persons who, in making introductions, are making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments under article 25(2) of the Regulated Activities Order, cannot use the introducing exclusion. This is if, in general terms, the arrangements for making introductions relate to contracts of insurance (PERG 5.6.19 G has further guidance on when arrangements for introductions may be regarded as relating to contracts of insurance). However,
Where a person is making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments by way of making introductions, and he is not completely indifferent to whether or not transactions may result, it may still be the case that the exclusion in article 33 will apply. In the FSA's view, this is where:(1) the introduction is for independent advice on investments generally; and(2) the introducer is indifferent as to whether or not a contract of insurance may ultimately be bought (or
To contact the Authorisation and Approvals Department (Authorisation teams):(1) telephone on 020 7066 1000; fax on 020 7066 1099; or(2) write to: Authorisation and Approvals Department (Authorisation teams), The Financial Services Authority, 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS; or(3) email appreps@ fsa.gov.uk.
(1) If:434(a) (i) the scope of appointment of an appointed representative is extended to cover insurance mediation activities for the first time; and42(ii) the appointed representative is not included on the Register as carrying on insurance mediation activities in another capacity; or42(b) the scope of appointment of an appointed representative ceases to include insurance mediation activity;42the appointed representative's principal must give written notice to the FSA of that
(1) As soon as a firm has reasonable grounds to believe that any of the conditions in SUP 12.4.2 R,SUP 12.4.6 R or SUP 12.4.8A R4 (as applicable) are not satisfied, or are likely not to be satisfied, in relation to any of its appointed representatives, it must complete and submit to the FSA the form in SUP 12 Annex 4 (Appointed representative notification form), in accordance with the instructions on the form.3(2) In its notification under SUP 12.7.8 R (1), the firm must state
Examples of when the FSA may cancel the listing of securities include (but are not limited to) situations where it appears to the FSA that:(1) the securities are no longer admitted to trading as required by these rules; or(2) the issuer no longer satisfies its continuing obligations for listing, for example if the percentage of shares in public hands falls below 25% or such lower percentage as the FSA may permit (the FSA may however allow a reasonable time to restore the percentage,
Subject to LR 5.2.6 R1LR 5.2.7 R, LR 5.2.10 R and LR 5.2.12 R, 1an issuer that wishes the FSA to cancel the listing of any of its equity shares1with a primary listing must:111(1) send a circular to the holders of the securities. The circular must:(a) comply with the requirements of LR 13.3.1 R and LR 13.3.2 R (contents of all circulars);(b) be submitted to the FSA for approval prior to publication; and(c) include the anticipated date of cancellation (which must be not less than
An issuer that wishes the FSA to cancel the listing of listed securities (other than ordinary equity shares1with a primary listing or ordinary equity shares to which LR 5.2.5A R apply1) must notify a RIS, giving at least 20 business days notice of the intended cancellation but is not required to obtain the approval of the holders of those securities contemplated in LR 5.2.5 R (2).1
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that all information it gives to the FSA in accordance with a rule in any part of the Handbook (including Principle 11) is:(1) factually accurate or, in the case of estimates and judgments, fairly and properly based after appropriate enquiries have been made by the firm; and(2) complete, in that it should include anything of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice.
SUP 15.6.1 R applies also in relation to rules outside this chapter, and even if they are not notification rules. Examples of rules and chapters to which SUP 15.6.1 R is relevant, are:(1) Principle 11, and the guidance on Principle 11 in SUP 2 (Information gathering by the FSA on its own initiative);(2) SUP 15 (Notifications to the FSA):(3) SUP 16 (Reporting requirements); (4) SUP 17 (Transaction reporting); 1(5) any notification rule (see Schedule 2 which contains a consolidated
If a firm becomes aware, or has information that reasonably suggests that it has or may have provided the FSA with information which was or may have been false, misleading, incomplete or inaccurate, or has or may have changed in a material particular, it must notify the FSA immediately. Subject to SUP 15.6.5 R, the notification must include:(1) details of the information which is or may be false, misleading, incomplete or inaccurate, or has or may have changed; (2) an explanation
Firms are reminded that section 398 of the Act (Misleading the Authority: residual cases) makes it an offence for a firm knowingly or recklessly to provide the FSA with information which is false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the FSA'srules or any other requirement imposed by or under the Act. An offence by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association may be attributed to an officer or certain other persons (section 400 of the
(1) The rates set for authorisation fees represent an appropriate proportion of the costs of the FSA in processing the application or exercise of Treaty rights.(2) The fees for collective investment schemes reflect the estimated costs to the FSA of assessing applications and notifications. The level of fees payable in respect of an application or a notification will vary depending upon the provision of the Act under which it is made. This fee is adjusted when the scheme concerned
Applications for Part IV permission (and exercises of Treaty rights) are categorised by the FSA for the purpose of fee raising as complex, moderately complex and straightforward as identified in FEES 3 Annex 1. This differentiation is based on the permitted activities sought and does not reflect the FSA's risk assessment of the applicant (or Treaty firm).
A potential applicant for Part IV permission (or Treaty firm) has the opportunity to discuss its proposed application (or exercise of Treaty rights) with the FSA before submitting it formally.2 (For more information, contact the Firm Contact Centre (020 7066 3954) or visit the FSA website How do I get authorised: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Doing/how/index.shtml.)2 If an applicant for Part IV permission (or Treaty firm) does so, the FSA will be able to use that dialogue to make
The word ‘communicate’ is extended under section 21(13) of the Act and includes causing a communication to be made. This means that a person who causes the communication of a financial promotion by another person is also subject to the restriction in section 21. Article 6(d) of the Financial Promotion Order also states that the word ‘communicate’ has the same meaning when used in exemptions in the Order. Article 6(a) also states that the word ‘communication’ has the same meaning
Apart from the originators of a financial promotion, the FSA considers the following persons to be communicating it or causing it to be communicated:(1) publishers and broadcasters who carry advertisements (including websites carrying banner advertisements); and(2) intermediaries who redistribute another person’s communication probably with their own communications.
In the FSA's view, the following persons will not be causing or communicating:(1) advertising agencies and others when they are designing advertising material for originators;(2) persons who print or produce material for others to use as advertisements;(3) professional advisers when they are preparing material for clients or advising them on the need to communicate or the merits or consequences of their communicating a financial promotion; and(4) persons who are responsible for
The FSA considers that, to communicate, a person must take some active step to make the communication. This will be a question of fact in each case. But a person who knowingly leaves copies of a document where it is reasonable to presume that persons will pick up copies and may seek to act on them will be communicating them.
A general point arises about causing and communicating on whether a particular exemption that applies to a communication made by a specified person also applies to a person who is causing that communication to be made. For example, article 551 of the Financial Promotion Order (Communications by members of professions)1 applies only to a communication by an exempt professional firm.1 This exemption may apply where a person ('P') requests an exempt professional firm ('E') to1communicate
Another general point arises about the scope of exemptions that apply only to financial promotions by a particular person. This is whether the exemption applies to the communication of a financial promotion by an unauthorised person on behalf of the person to whom the exemption applies. In the FSA's view, this will not be the case unless the exemption specifically states that it applies to a communication made on behalf of the person identified in the exemption. For example, article
In the FSA's opinion, the matters in PERG 8.6.9 G have the following effects.(1) Any one particular communication will either be real time or non-real time but not both. This is because:(a) a real time communication is one made in the course of an interactive dialogue (see PERG 8.10.2 G for guidance on the meaning of real time);(b) those exemptions which concern real time communications apply only to communications which are made to persons and not those which are directed at
The relevant requirements in regulation 5(3) are that:(1) the incoming EEA firm has given a notice to the FSA (see SUP 14.4.1 G) and to its Home State regulator stating the details of the proposed change;(2) if the change arises from circumstances beyond the incoming EEA firm's control, that firm has, as soon as practicable, given to the FSA and to its Home State regulator the notice in (1).1
(1) Regulation 15(8)(f) of the OEIC Regulations (Requirements for authorisation) requires independence between the depositary, the ICVC and the ICVC's directors, as does section 243(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the trustee and manager of an AUT. COLL 6.9.3 G to COLL 6.9.5 G give FSA's view of the meaning of independence of these relationships. An ICVC, its directors and depositary or a manager and a trustee of an AUT are referred to as "relevant parties" in this guidance.(2)
(1) Independence is likely to be lost if, by means of executive power, either relevant party could control the action of the other.(2) The board of one relevant party should not be able to exercise effective control of the board of another relevant party. Arrangements which might indicate this situation include quorum provisions and reservations of decision-making capacity of certain directors.(3) For an AUT, the FSA would interpret the concept of directors in common to include
Independence is likely to be lost if either of the relevant parties could control the actions of the other by means of shareholders' votes. The FSA considers this would happen if any shareholding by one relevant party and their respective associates in the other exceeds 15% of the voting share capital, either in a single share class or several share classes. The FSA would be willing, however, to look at cross-shareholdings exceeding 15% on a case-by-case basis to consider if there
(1) Regulation 15(9) of the OEIC Regulations and section 243(8) of the Act require that an authorised fund's name must not be undesirable or misleading. This section contains guidance on some specific matters the FSA will consider in determining whether the name of an authorised fund is undesirable or misleading. It is in addition to the requirements of regulation 19 of the OEIC Regulations (Prohibition on certain names).(2) The FSA will take into account whether the name of the
An ICVC must notify the FSA within 14 days of the occurrence of any of the following:(1) any amendment to the instrument of incorporation;(2) any change in the address of the head office of the ICVC;(3) any change of director;(4) any change of depositary;(5) in respect of any director or depositary, any change in the information mentioned in regulation 12(1)(b) or (c) of the OEIC Regulations (Applications for authorisation);(6) any change of the auditor of the ICVC;(7) any order
GENPRU 3.1.26 R to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and GENPRU 3 Annex 1 implement the detailed capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Groups Directive. They only deal with a financial conglomerate for which the FSA is the coordinator. If another competent authority is coordinator of a financial conglomerate, those rules do not apply with respect to that financial conglomerate and instead that coordinator will be responsible for implementing those detailed requirements.
Paragraph 5.7 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates) deals with a case in which there are no capital ties between entities in a financial conglomerate. In particular, the FSA, after consultation with the other relevant competent authorities and in accordance with Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive, will determine which proportional share of a solvency deficit in such an entity will have to be taken into account, bearing in mind
With respect to a firm and a financial conglomerate of which it is a member:(1) GENPRU 3.1.26 R (Method 4 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) is applied to the firm with respect to that financial conglomerate for the purposes of GENPRU 3.1.27R (2); or(2) GENPRU 3.1.29 R (Methods 1 to 3 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) is applied to the firm with respect to that financial conglomerate;if the firm'sPart IV permission contains a requirement obliging the
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the FSA may impose such obligations on a case by case
(1) In accordance with Article 30 of the Financial Groups Directive (Asset management companies), this rule deals with the inclusion of an asset management company that is a member of a financial conglomerate in the scope of regulation of financial conglomerates. This rule does not apply to the definition of financial conglomerate.(2) An asset management company is in the overall financial sector and is a regulated entity for the purpose of:(a) GENPRU 3.1.26 R to GENPRU 3.1.36
The Companies Act 1989 also gives the FSA powers to supervise the taking of action under default rules. Under section 166 of the Companies Act 1989 (Powers of the FSA to give directions) (see REC 4.5.4 G), the FSA may direct a UK recognised body to take, or not to take, action under its default rules. Before exercising these powers the FSA must consult the recognised body concerned. The FSA may also exercise these powers if a relevant office-holder applies to it under section
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FSA may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under itsdefault rules- if it appears to [the FSA] that it could take action, [the FSA may direct it to do so, |
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but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and [the FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, |
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The FSA may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FSA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FSA] may direct it not to do so. |
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but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and the [FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market. |
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The FSA's view is that the exercise of these powers will only be justified in exceptional circumstances. The most likely case in which the FSA would consider exercising them is if there were a need to coordinate action by different UK recognised bodies because, for example: (1) the likelihood of a default may not be apparent to all UK recognised bodies; or(2) there was a need to avoid premature default action by one UK recognised body; or(3) significantly different settlement
Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK recognised body has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FSA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK recognised body concerned under its default rules. However, the FSA cannot give such a direction unless it is satisfied that this will not impede or frustrate the proper and efficient conduct of the default proceedings.
Where, in relation to a member (or designated non-member) of a UK RIE or a member of a UK RCH:(1) a bankruptcy order; or(2) an award of sequestration of his estate; or(3) an order appointing an interim receiver of his property; or(4) an administration or winding-up order; or(5) a resolution for a voluntary winding-up; or(6) an order appointing a provisional liquidator; has been made or passed and the UK recognised body has not taken action under its default rules as a result of
The procedure is that the FSA must notify the UK recognised body of the application and, unless within three business days after receipt of that notice, the UK recognised body: (1) takes action under its default rules; or(2) notifies the FSA that it proposes to take action forthwith; or(3) is directed to take action by the FSA under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989; the provisions of sections 158 to 165 of the Companies Act 1989 do not apply in relation to market contracts
The test in section 236(3)(a) of the Act is whether the reasonable investor would expect that, were he to invest, he would be in a position to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable. In the FSA's view, this is an objective test with the appropriate objective judgment to be applied being that of the hypothetical reasonable investor with qualities such as those mentioned in PERG 9.7.2 G (The investment condition: the 'reasonable investor').
In the FSA's view, the 'realisation' of an investment means converting an asset into cash or money. The FSA does not consider that 'in specie' redemptions (in the sense of exchanging shares or securities of BC with other shares or securities) will generally count as realisation. Section 236(3)(a) refers to the realisation of an investment, the investment being represented by the 'value' of shares or securities held in BC. In the FSA's view, there is no realisation of value where
The most typical means of realising BC's shares or securities will be by their being redeemed or repurchased, whether by BC or otherwise. There are, of course, other ways in which a realisation may occur. However, the FSA considers that these will often not satisfy all the elements of the definition of an open-ended investment company considered together. For example, the mere fact that shares or securities may be realised on a market will not meet the requirements of the 'satisfaction
An investor in a body corporate may be able to realise part, but not all, of his investment. The FSA considers that the fact that partial realisations may take place at different times does not prevent the body corporate coming within the definition of an open-ended investment company. But, in any particular case, the 'expectation test' will only be met if the overall period for realising the whole of the investment can be considered to be reasonable. Apart from this, the simple
The use of an expectation test ensures that the definition of an open-ended investment company is not limited to a situation where a holder of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate has an entitlement or an option to realise his investment. It is enough if, on the facts of any particular case, the reasonable investor would expect that he would be able to realise the investment. The following are examples of circumstances in which the FSA considers that a reasonable investor
In the FSA's view, the fact that a person may invest in the period shortly before a redemption date would not cause a body corporate, that would not otherwise be regarded as such, to be open-ended. This is because the investment condition must be applied in relation to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general).
As indicated in PERG 9.3.5 G (The definition), the potential for variation in the form and operation of a body corporate is considerable. So, it is only possible in general guidance to give examples of the factors that the FSA considers may affect any particular judgment. These should be read bearing in mind any specific points considered elsewhere in the guidance. Such factors include:(1) the terms of the body corporate's constitution;(2) the applicable law;(3) any public representations
Energy market participants should bear in mind that section 148 of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FSA must be satisfied that:(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not result in undue risk to persons whose interests the rules are intended to protect.
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FSA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FSA considers
If a certificate is granted then, until it is revoked, it is conclusive evidence that the exclusion under article 54 of the Regulated Activities Order applies. A person to whom a certificate is given should notify the FSA of any significant changes to the purpose or nature of the content of the relevant publication or service. The FSA will need to keep the content of the publication or service in question under review.
The FSA may revoke a certificate at the request of its holder or on the FSA's own initiative if the FSA considers that it is no longer justified. If the FSA revokes a certificate on its own initiative, it would normally expect to give advance notice to the holder of the certificate together with a statement of the reasons for the proposed revocation, and give the holder of the certificate an opportunity to make representations. Where a certificate is revoked, the holder of the
The fact of a person holding a certificate granted under article 54(3) is information which may be of relevance to other persons (including investors or potential investors). For this reason, the FSA considers it appropriate that details of certificates granted under article 54(3) should be included in a list on the public record which the FSA is required to maintain under section 347 of the Act (The record of authorised persons, etc).
The decision maker will:(1) consider whether the material on which the recommendation is based is adequate to support it; the decision maker may seek additional information about or clarification of the recommendation, which may necessitate additional work by the relevant FSA staff;(2) satisfy itself that the action recommended is appropriate in all the circumstances;(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
1DEPP 7 applies when the FSA:(1) has appointed an investigator at
the request of an overseas regulator,
under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators) of the Act;
and(2) has directed, or is considering
directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) of the Act,
to permit a representative of the overseas
regulator to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the
purposes of the investigation.
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FSA's statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction
under section 169(7) has been given or the FSA is considering giving. The FSA is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by
section 169(9) and (11) of the Act.
As required by section 169(10) of the Act, the Treasury has approved
the statement of policy.
The FSA will try to notify the applicant
of its decision on an application for approval of listing
particulars or supplementary
listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified
in section 87C of the Act (consideration
of application for approval) for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary
prospectus.
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FSA) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems or resources will automatically lead to a firm contravening Principle 3 or 4. Rather, the potential impact of a group member's activities (and, for example, risk management systems
As set out in PRIN 3.3 (Where?), Principles 1 (Integrity), 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and 3 (Management and control) apply to world-wide activities in a prudential context. Principle 5 (Market conduct) applies to world-wide activities which might have a negative effect on confidence in the financial system operating in the United Kingdom. In considering whether to take regulatory action under these Principles in relation to activities carried on outside the United Kingdom,
Breaching a Principle makes a firm liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FSA to show that a firm has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity), for example, the FSA would need to demonstrate a lack of integrity
The Principles are also relevant to the FSA's powers of information-gathering, to vary a firm'sPart IV permission, and of investigation and intervention, and provide a basis on which the FSA may apply to a court for an injunction or restitution order or require a firm to make restitution. However, the Principles do not give rise to actions for damages by a private person (see PRIN 3.4.4 R).