Related provisions for DISP 1.2.4
81 - 100 of 200 items.
(1) The purposes of this chapter are:(a) to remind firms of the provisions of PIDA; and(b) to encourage firms to consider adopting and communicating to workers appropriate internal procedures for handling workers' concerns as part of an effective risk management system.(2) In this chapter "worker" includes, but is not limited to, an individual who has entered into a contract of employment.
(1) In order to discharge its functions under the Act, the FSA needs timely and accurate information about firms. The provision of this information on a regular basis enables the FSA to build up over time a picture of firms' circumstances and behaviour.(2) Principle 11 requires a firm to deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and to tell the FSA appropriately anythingof which the FSA would reasonably expect notice. The reporting requirements are part of the
Sections 393 (Third party rights) and 394 (Access to FSA material) of the Act confer additional procedural rights relating to third parties and to disclosure of FSA material. These rights apply in certain warning notice and decision notice cases referred to in section 392 of the Act (Application of sections 393 and 394). The cases in which these additional rights apply are identified in DEPP 2 Annex 1 by asterisks; these are generally cases in which the warning notice or decision
(1) MCOB 5 amplifies Principle 6 and Principle 7.1(2) The purpose of MCOB 5 is to ensure that, before a customer submits an application for a particular home finance transaction1, he is supplied with information that makes clear:1(a) (in relation to a regulated mortgage contract) its features, any linked deposits, any linked borrowing and any tied products; and11(b) the price that the customer will be required to pay under that home finance transaction, 1to enable the customer
(1) If the FSA considers that an issuer, a person discharging managerial responsibilities or a connected person has breached any of the disclosure rules it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty or publish a statement censuring that person.(2) If the FSA considers that a former director was knowingly concerned in a breach by an issuer it may, subject to the provisions of the Act, impose on that person a financial penalty.
After submitting a notificationunder SUP 11.4.2 R orSUP 11.4.2AR (1) and R (2) and until the change in control occurs (or is no longer to take place), SUP 15.6.4 R and SUP 15.6.5 R apply to a UK domestic firm in relation to any information its controller or proposed controller provided to the FSA under SUP 11.5.1 R or SUP 11.3.7 D.1
Principles 3, 4 and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FSA) 11 (and this chapter) also:(1) apply with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities (for Principle 3 this is only in a prudential context); and(2) take into account any activity of other members of a group of which the firm is a member.
Section 87B(1) of the Act sets out when the FSA may authorise the omission of information from a prospectus:
(1) |
The [FSA] may authorise the omission from a prospectus of any information, the inclusion of which would otherwise be required, on the ground – |
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(a) |
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest; |
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(b) |
that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission would be unlikely to mislead the public with regard to any facts or circumstances which are essential for an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2); or |
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(c) |
that the information is only of minor importance for a specific offer to the public or admission to trading on a regulated market and unlikely to influence an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2). |
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(1) Principle 6 requires a firm to pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. A firm is also under an obligation, as a consequence of this sourcebook's disclosure requirements,1 to make charges transparent to customers. This chapter reinforces these requirements by preventing a firm from imposing unfair and excessive charges.1(2) The level of charges under a regulated mortgage contract or home reversion plan1 is not typically a matter for regulation.
The purpose of this chapter is
to:(1) promote prompt and fair disclosure
of relevant information to the market; and [Note: Recital
24 Market Abuse Directive](2) set out specific circumstances
when an issuer can delay public
disclosure of inside information and
requirements to ensure that such information is kept confidential in order
to protect investors and prevent insider dealing. [Note: Recital
5 2003/124/EC]
The FSA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 9.7A.1 R or LR 9.7A.2 R if it considers that disclosure of such information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that such omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the shares.1
It is likely that the information sent to members will include a statement explaining the reasons for the amalgamation or transfer and the choice of partner. Although this is not a statutory statement and not subject to FSA approval, the FSA will take the statement into account whenconsidering whether to confirm the amalgamation or transfer. A friendly society will therefore find it helpful to consult the FSA about the content of such a statement.
The FSA will send copies of all written representations to the society(ies), and will afford them an opportunity to comment on the representations. It may consider the written representations and a society's response to them, before the date set for hearing oral representations. A synopsis of the written representations (probably in the form of a summary of each of the points made and the numbers of persons making each point) and a society's responses will be made available to
In most cases a firm will provide the information required by this section as part of its compliance with the provisions of SUP. To the extent that the FSA does not obtain sufficient, or sufficiently detailed, information it may seek this by using its general information gathering powers (see SUP 2 (Information gathering by the FSA on its own initiative)).