Related provisions for PERG 6.7.11
81 - 100 of 536 items.
(1) Regulation 15(8)(f) of the OEIC Regulations (Requirements for authorisation) requires independence between the depositary, the ICVC and the ICVC's directors, as does section 243(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the trustee and manager of an AUT. COLL 6.9.3 G to COLL 6.9.5 G give FSA's view of the meaning of independence of these relationships. An ICVC, its directors and depositary or a manager and a trustee of an AUT are referred to as "relevant parties" in this guidance.(2)
(1) Independence is likely to be lost if, by means of executive power, either relevant party could control the action of the other.(2) The board of one relevant party should not be able to exercise effective control of the board of another relevant party. Arrangements which might indicate this situation include quorum provisions and reservations of decision-making capacity of certain directors.(3) For an AUT, the FSA would interpret the concept of directors in common to include
Independence is likely to be lost if either of the relevant parties could control the actions of the other by means of shareholders' votes. The FSA considers this would happen if any shareholding by one relevant party and their respective associates in the other exceeds 15% of the voting share capital, either in a single share class or several share classes. The FSA would be willing, however, to look at cross-shareholdings exceeding 15% on a case-by-case basis to consider if there
(1) Regulation 15(9) of the OEIC Regulations and section 243(8) of the Act require that an authorised fund's name must not be undesirable or misleading. This section contains guidance on some specific matters the FSA will consider in determining whether the name of an authorised fund is undesirable or misleading. It is in addition to the requirements of regulation 19 of the OEIC Regulations (Prohibition on certain names).(2) The FSA will take into account whether the name of the
An ICVC must notify the FSA within 14 days of the occurrence of any of the following:(1) any amendment to the instrument of incorporation;(2) any change in the address of the head office of the ICVC;(3) any change of director;(4) any change of depositary;(5) in respect of any director or depositary, any change in the information mentioned in regulation 12(1)(b) or (c) of the OEIC Regulations (Applications for authorisation);(6) any change of the auditor of the ICVC;(7) any order
GENPRU 3.1.26 R to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and GENPRU 3 Annex 1 implement the detailed capital adequacy requirements of the Financial Groups Directive. They only deal with a financial conglomerate for which the FSA is the coordinator. If another competent authority is coordinator of a financial conglomerate, those rules do not apply with respect to that financial conglomerate and instead that coordinator will be responsible for implementing those detailed requirements.
Paragraph 5.7 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates) deals with a case in which there are no capital ties between entities in a financial conglomerate. In particular, the FSA, after consultation with the other relevant competent authorities and in accordance with Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive, will determine which proportional share of a solvency deficit in such an entity will have to be taken into account, bearing in mind
With respect to a firm and a financial conglomerate of which it is a member:(1) GENPRU 3.1.26 R (Method 4 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) is applied to the firm with respect to that financial conglomerate for the purposes of GENPRU 3.1.27R (2); or(2) GENPRU 3.1.29 R (Methods 1 to 3 from Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive) is applied to the firm with respect to that financial conglomerate;if the firm'sPart IV permission contains a requirement obliging the
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the FSA may impose such obligations on a case by case
(1) In accordance with Article 30 of the Financial Groups Directive (Asset management companies), this rule deals with the inclusion of an asset management company that is a member of a financial conglomerate in the scope of regulation of financial conglomerates. This rule does not apply to the definition of financial conglomerate.(2) An asset management company is in the overall financial sector and is a regulated entity for the purpose of:(a) GENPRU 3.1.26 R to GENPRU 3.1.36
(1) If a firm wishes to cancel its Part IV permission, it must complete and submit to the FSA the form in SUP 6 Annex 6 (Cancellation of permission application form).2(2) A firm's application for cancellation of Part IV permission must be:(a) given to a member of, or addressed for the attention of, the Cancellations 4Team at the FSA; and4(b) delivered to the FSA by one of the methods in SUP 15.7.5 R (Form and method of notification).(3) [deleted]2(4) Until the application has
(1) In addition to applying for cancellation of Part IV permission in accordance with SUP 6.4.5 D, a firm may discuss prospective cancellations with its usual supervisory contact at the FSA.4 Alternatively a firm can contact the Firms Contact Centre on 0845 606 9966.4(2) To contact the Cancellations Team: Cancellations4 Team:4(a) write to: Cancellations Team, The Financial ServicesAuthority, 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5HS; or(b) email cancellation.team@fsa.gov.uk(3)
(1) If a firm is subject to the complaints rules in DISP, the FSA may request confirmation from the firm that there are no unresolved, unsatisfied or undischarged complaints against the firm from a customer of the firm.(2) If there are unresolved or undischarged complaints against a firm from a customer of the firm, the FSA may request confirmation, as appropriate, of the steps (if any) which have been taken under the firm's complaints procedures and the amount of compensation
Consequently, the FSA considers that it will have good reason not to grant a firm's application for cancellation of permission where:(1) it proposes to exercise any of the powers described in SUP 6.4.24 G; or(2) it has already begun disciplinary and restitution proceedings against the firm by exercising either or both of these powers against the firm.
The Companies Act 1989 also gives the FSA powers to supervise the taking of action under default rules. Under section 166 of the Companies Act 1989 (Powers of the FSA to give directions) (see REC 4.5.4 G), the FSA may direct a UK recognised body to take, or not to take, action under its default rules. Before exercising these powers the FSA must consult the recognised body concerned. The FSA may also exercise these powers if a relevant office-holder applies to it under section
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FSA may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under itsdefault rules- if it appears to [the FSA] that it could take action, [the FSA may direct it to do so, |
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but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and [the FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, |
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The FSA may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FSA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FSA] may direct it not to do so. |
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but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FSA] shall consult the [UK RIE] or [UK RCH] in question; and the [FSA] shall not give a direction unless [the FSA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market. |
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The FSA's view is that the exercise of these powers will only be justified in exceptional circumstances. The most likely case in which the FSA would consider exercising them is if there were a need to coordinate action by different UK recognised bodies because, for example: (1) the likelihood of a default may not be apparent to all UK recognised bodies; or(2) there was a need to avoid premature default action by one UK recognised body; or(3) significantly different settlement
Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK recognised body has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FSA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK recognised body concerned under its default rules. However, the FSA cannot give such a direction unless it is satisfied that this will not impede or frustrate the proper and efficient conduct of the default proceedings.
Where, in relation to a member (or designated non-member) of a UK RIE or a member of a UK RCH:(1) a bankruptcy order; or(2) an award of sequestration of his estate; or(3) an order appointing an interim receiver of his property; or(4) an administration or winding-up order; or(5) a resolution for a voluntary winding-up; or(6) an order appointing a provisional liquidator; has been made or passed and the UK recognised body has not taken action under its default rules as a result of
The procedure is that the FSA must notify the UK recognised body of the application and, unless within three business days after receipt of that notice, the UK recognised body: (1) takes action under its default rules; or(2) notifies the FSA that it proposes to take action forthwith; or(3) is directed to take action by the FSA under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989; the provisions of sections 158 to 165 of the Companies Act 1989 do not apply in relation to market contracts
The test in section 236(3)(a) of the Act is whether the reasonable investor would expect that, were he to invest, he would be in a position to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable. In the FSA's view, this is an objective test with the appropriate objective judgment to be applied being that of the hypothetical reasonable investor with qualities such as those mentioned in PERG 9.7.2 G (The investment condition: the 'reasonable investor').
In the FSA's view, the 'realisation' of an investment means converting an asset into cash or money. The FSA does not consider that 'in specie' redemptions (in the sense of exchanging shares or securities of BC with other shares or securities) will generally count as realisation. Section 236(3)(a) refers to the realisation of an investment, the investment being represented by the 'value' of shares or securities held in BC. In the FSA's view, there is no realisation of value where
The most typical means of realising BC's shares or securities will be by their being redeemed or repurchased, whether by BC or otherwise. There are, of course, other ways in which a realisation may occur. However, the FSA considers that these will often not satisfy all the elements of the definition of an open-ended investment company considered together. For example, the mere fact that shares or securities may be realised on a market will not meet the requirements of the 'satisfaction
An investor in a body corporate may be able to realise part, but not all, of his investment. The FSA considers that the fact that partial realisations may take place at different times does not prevent the body corporate coming within the definition of an open-ended investment company. But, in any particular case, the 'expectation test' will only be met if the overall period for realising the whole of the investment can be considered to be reasonable. Apart from this, the simple
The use of an expectation test ensures that the definition of an open-ended investment company is not limited to a situation where a holder of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate has an entitlement or an option to realise his investment. It is enough if, on the facts of any particular case, the reasonable investor would expect that he would be able to realise the investment. The following are examples of circumstances in which the FSA considers that a reasonable investor
In the FSA's view, the fact that a person may invest in the period shortly before a redemption date would not cause a body corporate, that would not otherwise be regarded as such, to be open-ended. This is because the investment condition must be applied in relation to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general).
As indicated in PERG 9.3.5 G (The definition), the potential for variation in the form and operation of a body corporate is considerable. So, it is only possible in general guidance to give examples of the factors that the FSA considers may affect any particular judgment. These should be read bearing in mind any specific points considered elsewhere in the guidance. Such factors include:(1) the terms of the body corporate's constitution;(2) the applicable law;(3) any public representations
Energy market participants should bear in mind that section 148 of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FSA must be satisfied that:(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not result in undue risk to persons whose interests the rules are intended to protect.
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FSA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FSA considers
If a certificate is granted then, until it is revoked, it is conclusive evidence that the exclusion under article 54 of the Regulated Activities Order applies. A person to whom a certificate is given should notify the FSA of any significant changes to the purpose or nature of the content of the relevant publication or service. The FSA will need to keep the content of the publication or service in question under review.
The FSA may revoke a certificate at the request of its holder or on the FSA's own initiative if the FSA considers that it is no longer justified. If the FSA revokes a certificate on its own initiative, it would normally expect to give advance notice to the holder of the certificate together with a statement of the reasons for the proposed revocation, and give the holder of the certificate an opportunity to make representations. Where a certificate is revoked, the holder of the
The fact of a person holding a certificate granted under article 54(3) is information which may be of relevance to other persons (including investors or potential investors). For this reason, the FSA considers it appropriate that details of certificates granted under article 54(3) should be included in a list on the public record which the FSA is required to maintain under section 347 of the Act (The record of authorised persons, etc).
The FSA will try to notify the applicant
of its decision on an application for approval of listing
particulars or supplementary
listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified
in section 87C of the Act (consideration
of application for approval) for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary
prospectus.
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 6
(1) The [UK RIE] must be able and willing to promote and maintain high standards of integrity and fair dealing in the carrying on ofregulated activities by persons in the course of using the facilities provided by the [UK RIE]. |
(2) The [UK RIE] must be able and willing to cooperate by the sharing of information or otherwise, with the [FSA], with any other authority, body orperson having responsibility in theUnited Kingdom for the supervision or regulation of anyregulated activity or other financial service, or with anoverseas regulator within the meaning of section 195 of theAct.1 |
In determining whether a UK recognised body is able and willing to promote and maintain high standards of integrity and fair dealing in the carrying on of regulated activities, the FSA may have regard to the extent to which the UK recognised body seeks to promote and encourage, through its rules, practices and procedures, conduct in regulated activities which is consistent with the Code of Market Conduct (see MAR 1) and with any other codes of conduct, rules or principles relating
In assessing the ability of a UK recognised body to cooperate with the FSA and other appropriate bodies, the FSA may have regard to the extent to which the constitution and rules of the UK recognised body and its agreements with its members enable it to obtain information from members and to disclose otherwise confidential information to the FSA and other appropriate bodies.
In assessing the willingness of a UK recognised body to cooperate with the FSA and other appropriate bodies, the FSA may have regard to:(1) the extent to which the UK recognised body is willing to provide information about it and its activities to assist the FSA in the exercise of its functions;(2) the extent to which the UK recognised body is open with the FSA or other appropriate bodies in regulatory matters;(3) how diligently the UK recognised body investigates or pursues enquiries
A request by an issuer for the listing of its securities to be suspended or cancelled must be in writing and must include:(1) the issuer's name;(2) details of the securities to which it relates and the RIEs on which they are traded;(3) a clear explanation of the background and reasons for the request;(4) the date on which the issuer requests the suspension or cancellation to take effect;(5) for a suspension, the time the issuer wants the suspension to take effect;(6) if relevant,
Cancellations will only be specified to take effect when the market opens on a specified day. An issuer should therefore ensure that all accompanying information has been provided to the FSA well before the date on which the issuer wishes the cancellation to take effect and at the very latest by 3 p.m. on the business day before it is to take effect. If the information is received after 3:00 p.m. on the day before the issuer wishes the cancellation to take effect, it will normally
(1) If an issuer requests the FSA to suspend or cancel the listing of its securities, it may withdraw its request at any time before the suspension or cancellation takes effect. The withdrawal request should initially be made by telephone and then confirmed in writing as soon as possible, with an explanation of the reasons for the withdrawal.(2) Even if an issuer withdraws its request, the FSA may still suspend or cancel the listing of the securities if it considers it is necessary
The FSA recognises that there may be occasions when, because of a particular emergency, a person (generally a firm, but in certain circumstances, for example in relation to price stabilising rules or small e-money issuerrules, an unauthorised person) may be unable to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook. The purpose of GEN 1.3.2 R is to provide appropriate relief from the consequences of contravention of such a rule in those circumstances.1
(1) If any emergency arises which:(a) makes it impracticable for a person to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook; (b) could not have been avoided by the person taking all reasonable steps; and(c) is outside the control of the person, its associates and agents (and of its and their employees);the person will not be in contravention of that rule to the extent that, in consequence of the emergency, compliance with that rule is impracticable. (2) Paragraph (1) applies only
GEN 1.3.2 R operates on the FSA's rules. It does not affect the FSA's powers to take action against a firm in an emergency, based on contravention of other requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the FSA may exercise its own-initiative power in appropriate cases to vary a firm's Part IV permission based on a failure or potential failure to satisfy the threshold conditions (see SUP 7 (Applying the FSA's requirements to individual firms) and ENF 4
(1) Overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses which are considering whether to seek authorisation or recognition should first consider whether they will be carrying on regulated activities in the United Kingdom. Overseas investment exchangesand overseas clearing houses which do not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom need take no action.(2) Prospective applicants should discuss authorisation and recognition with the FSA before deciding whether
There is no standard application form for application for recognition as an overseas recognised body. An application should be made in accordance with any direction the FSA may make under section 287 (Application by an investment exchange) or section 288 (Application by a clearing house) of the Act and should include:(1) the information, evidence and explanatory material necessary to demonstrate to the FSA that the recognition requirements (set out in REC 6.3) will be met;(2)
The FSA may require further information from the applicant and may need to have discussions with the appropriate authorities in the applicant's home territory. To allow sufficient time for applications to be processed and for the necessary contacts to be made with the appropriate home territory authorities, applications should be made not later than six months before the applicant wishes the recognition order to take effect. No guarantee can be given that a decision will be reached
Article 25(1) applies only where the arrangements bring about or would bring about the particular transaction in question. This is because of the exclusion in article 26. In the FSA's view, a person brings about or would bring about a transaction only if his involvement in the chain of events leading to the transaction is of enough importance that without that involvement it would not take place. The second limb (article 25(2)) is potentially much wider as it does not require
The ordinary business of a publisher or broadcaster can involve him in publishing or broadcasting financial promotions (for example, advertisements) on behalf of authorised or exempt persons. Journalists who write about investments or financial services may promote the services of an authorised or exempt person. In the FSA's opinion, such persons would not normally be regarded as making arrangements under article 25(2). This is the case even if any arrangements they may have made
The Regulated Activities Order contains an exclusion (article 27: Enabling parties to communicate) to bring a degree of certainty to this area. This applies to arrangements which might otherwise fall within article 25(2) merely because they provide the means by which one party to a transaction (or potential transaction) is able to communicate with other parties. In the FSA's view, the crucial element of the exclusion is the inclusion of the word ‘merely’. So that, where a publisher,
For example, in the FSA's view a publisher or broadcaster would be likely to be making arrangements within the meaning of article 25(2) and be unable to make use of the exclusion in article 27 if:(1) he enters into an agreement with a provider of investment services such as a broker or product provider for the purpose of carrying their financial promotion; and(2) as part of the arrangements, the publisher or broadcaster does one or more of the following:(a) brands the investment
Other persons who may benefit from the exclusion in article 27 include persons who provide the means for someone to route an order to another person. A person providing such order routing services would not, in the FSA's view, be merely facilitating communication (of the orders) if he provides added value. This added value could be in the form, for example, of such things as formatted screens, audit trails, checking completeness of orders or matching orders or reconciling tra
Recognition Requirements Regulations, Regulation 6
(1) In considering whether a [UK recognised body] or applicant satisfiesrecognition requirementsapplying to it under these [Recognition Requirements Regulations], the [FSA] may take into account all relevant circumstances including the constitution of thepersonconcerned and its regulatory provisions and practices within the meaning of section 302(1) of theAct. |
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), a [UK recognised body] or applicant may satisfyrecognition requirements applying to it under these [Recognition Requirements Regulations] by making arrangements for functions to be performed on its behalf by any otherperson. |
(3) Where a [ UK recognised body ] or applicant makes arrangements of the kind mentioned in paragraph (2), the arrangements do not affect the responsibility imposed by the Act on the [UK recognised body] or applicant to satisfy recognition requirements applying to it under these [Recognition Requirements Regulations ], but it is in addition a recognition requirement applying to the [UK recognised body] or applicant that the person who performs (or is to perform) the functions is a fit and proper person who is able and willing to perform them.1 |
The FSA will usually expect :(1) the constitution, regulatory provisions and practices of the UK recognised body or applicant;(2) the nature (including complexity, diversity and risk) and scale of the UK recognised body's or applicant's business; (3) the size and nature of the market which is supported by the UK recognised body's or applicant's facilities; (4) the nature and status of the types of investor who use the UK recognised body's or applicant's facilities or have an interest
It is the UK recognised body's responsibility to demonstrate to the FSA that a person who performs a function on behalf of the UK recognised body is fit and proper and able and willing to perform that function. The recognition requirement referred to in Regulation 6(3) applies to the UK recognised body and not to any person who performs any function on its behalf. In this context, for a person to be "fit and proper" does not necessarily imply that he is an authorised person, or
In determining whether the UK recognised body meets the recognition requirement in Regulation 6(3), the FSA may have regard to whether that body has ensured that the person who performs that function on its behalf:(1) has sufficient resources to be able to perform the function (after allowing for any other activities);(2) has adequate systems and controls to manage that function and to report on its performance to the UK recognised body;(3) is managed by persons of sufficient
In determining whether a UK recognised body continues to satisfy the recognition requirements where it has made arrangements for any function to be performed on its behalf by any person , the FSA may have regard, in addition to any of the matters described in the appropriate section of this chapter, to the arrangements made to exercise control over the performance of the function, including:(1) the contracts (and other relevant documents) between the UK recognised body and the
(1) A written notice from a Treaty firm under paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 4 to the Act must be: (a) given to a member of, or addressed for the attention of , the Authorisation Department; and(b) delivered to the FSA by one of the methods in (2).(2) The written notice may be delivered by:(a) post to the address in SUP 13A.3.9 G below; or(b) leaving the application at the address in SUP 13A.3.9 G below and obtaining a time-stamped receipt; or(c) hand delivery to a member of the Authorisation
In the FSA's view, this means that the reasonable investor must be satisfied that what he will get when he realises his investment is his proportionate share in the value of BC's underlying assets, less any dealing costs. In other words, that he is satisfied he will get net asset value. The investment condition focuses on the way the body corporate operates over time, and not by reference to particular issues of shares or securities (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition
For the 'satisfaction test' to be met, there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could form a view. He must be satisfied that the value of BC's property will be the basis of a calculation used for the whole, or substantially the whole, of his investment. The FSA considers that the circumstances, or combination of circumstances, in which a reasonable investor would be in a position to form this view include:(1) where the basis of net asset valuation
PERG 9.9.3 G (2)and PERG 9.9.3 G (3) refer to circumstances where the reasonable investor may be satisfied that he can realise his investment at net asset value because of arrangements made to ensure that the shares or securities trade at net asset value on a market. There may, for example, be cases of market dealing where the price of shares or securities will not depend on the market. An example is where BC or a third party undertakes to ensure that the market value reflects
However, where there is a market, the FSA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FSA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
The fact that the definition must be applied to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general)) is also relevant here. So, for example, in a take-over situation the fact that a bidder may be willing to provide an exit route for an investment at net asset value will be irrelevant within the context of the definition. This is so even if an investor invests in particular shares or securities in the knowledge or expectation or in anticipation