Related provisions for LR 10.1.5

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DTR 1A.1.4GRP
In relation to the transparency rules, the FSA is exercising its functions as the competent authority under Part VI of the Act (see section 72(1) of the Act).Other relevant parts of HandbookNote: Other parts of the Handbook that may also be relevant to persons to whom the transparency rules apply include DEC (the Decision making manual), Chapter 9 of SUP (the Supervision manual) and Chapter 21 of ENF (the Enforcement manual).Note: A list of regulated markets can be found on the
PRIN 3.4.5RRP
Where Principle 11 refers to regulators, this means, in addition to the FSA, other regulators with recognised jurisdiction in relation to regulated activities, whether in the United Kingdom or abroad.
SUP 11.4.2ARRP
1A UK insurance intermediary must notify the FSA of any of the following events concerning the firm:(1) a person acquiring control;(2) in relation to an existing controller:(a) the percentage of shares held in the firm decreasing from 20% or more to less than 20%; or(b) the percentage of shares held in a parent undertaking of the firm decreasing from 20% or more to less than 20%; or(c) the percentage of voting power which it is entitled to exercise, or control the exercise of,
BIPRU 9.11.2RRP

Table: Positions other than ones with short-term credit assessments

This table belongs to BIPRU 9.11.1 R

Credit Quality step

1

2

3

4

5 and below

Risk weight

20%

50%

100%

350%

1250%

[Note: For mapping of the credit quality step to the credit assessments of eligible ECAIs, refer to: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/ecais_securitisation.pdf ]

FEES 4.1.4GRP
(1) The periodic fees for collective investment schemes reflect the estimated costs to the FSA of considering proposals to change regulated collective investment schemes, maintaining up to date records about them, and related policy work.(2) The provision of the Transaction Reporting System facilities for firms reporting transactions under SUP 17 incurs costs to the FSA. These costs depend upon the amount the facility is used. Accordingly the income which the FSA receives from
MCOB 13.1.5GRP
The FSA expects a firm to treat a sale shortfall in the same way that it treats a payment shortfall.1
COLL 7.6.1GRP
(1) A proposal that an authorised fund should be involved in a scheme of arrangement is subject to written notice to and approval by the FSA under section 251 of the Act (Alteration of schemes and changes of manager or trustee) or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company). Effect cannot be given to such a change except in accordance with that section or regulation.(2) The issue of units in exchange for assets as
COLL 1.2.2GRP
(1) UCITS schemes have to comply with the conditions necessary in order to enjoy the rights available under the UCITS Directive. Such schemes must in particular comply with:(a) COLL 3.2.8 R (UCITS obligations); and(b) the investment and borrowing powers rules for UCITS schemes set out in COLL 5.2 to COLL 5.5 .(2) Non-UCITS retail schemes are schemes that do not comply with all the conditions set out in the UCITS Directive. Such schemes could become UCITS schemes provided they
SYSC 13.7.9GRP
Operating processes and systems at separate geographic locations may alter a firm's operational risk profile (including by allowing alternative sites for the continuity of operations). A firm should understand the effect of any differences in processes and systems at each of its locations, particularly if they are in different countries, having regard to:(1) the business operating environment of each country (for example, the likelihood and impact of political disruptions or
SYSC 10.2.3GRP
SYSC 10.2.2 R is made under section 147 of the Act (Control of information rules). It has the following effect:(1) acting in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) provides a defence against proceedings brought under section 397(2) or (3) of the Act (Misleading statements and practices) - see sections 397(4) and (5)(c);(2) behaviour in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) does not amount to market abuse (see SYSC 10.2.2 R (4)); and(3) acting in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) provides
LR 18.4.4RRP
Prior to any change of the depositary of certificates representing certain securities, the new depositary must satisfy the FSA that it meets the requirements of LR 18.2.11 R to LR 18.2.14 R.
PERG 9.11.1GRP

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question

Answer

1

Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).

2

Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.

3

Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?

The FSA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FSA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FSA's view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FSA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.

4

Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?

In the FSA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).

5

In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account.

  • The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means.
  • The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFSA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise.
  • Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.

6

Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?

In the FSA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).

7

Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?

In the FSA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.

8

Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?

In the FSA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).

9

Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?

In the FSA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).
PERG 4.3.3GRP
A person will only need authorisation or exemption if he is carrying on a regulated activity 'by way of business' (see section 22 of the Act (Regulated activities)). There are, in fact, three different forms of business test applied to the regulated mortgage activities. In the FSA's view, however, the difference in the business tests should have little practical effect.
COLL 9.3.2RRP
An operator of a scheme recognised under section 272 of the Act must ensure the prospectus:(1) contains a statement that "Complaints about the operation of the scheme may be made to the FSA."; and(2) states whether or not investors in the scheme would be covered by the compensation scheme, and if so, it must state how they are covered and who they would need to contact for further information.
PERG 2.9.22GRP
3The exclusions for business angel-led enterprise capital funds are also disapplied for persons who, in carrying on the relevant regulated activity, are investment firms (see PERG 2.5.4 G (Investment services and activities)).
SUP 4.2.1GRP
Section 340 of the Act gives the FSA power to make rules requiring an authorised person, or an authorised person falling into a specified class, to appoint an actuary3. Section 340 further empowers the FSA to make rules governing the manner, timing and notification to the FSA of such an appointment and, where an appointment is not made, for the FSA to make an appointment on the firm's behalf. The FSA's rule-making powers under section 340 of the Act also extend to an actuary's3