Related provisions for SUP App 2.7.2
21 - 40 of 111 items.
Threshold condition 2(1) and (2) (Location of offices), implement the requirements of article 6 of the Post BCCI Directive and threshold condition 2(3) and (4) implements article 2.9 of the Insurance Mediation Directive, although the Act extends threshold condition 2 to firms which are outside the scope of the Single Market Directives and the UCITS Directive.1
(1) If the transferee is (or will be) an EEA firm (authorised in its Home State to carry on insurance business under the Insurance Directives) or a Swiss general insurance company, then the FSA has to consult the transferee's Home State regulator, who has 3 months to respond. It will be necessary for the FSA to obtain from the transferee's Home State regulator a certificate confirming that the transferee will meet the Home State's solvency margin requirements (if any) after the
Applicable sections
(1) |
Category of firm |
(2) Applicable sections |
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(1) |
A long-term insurer, other than: |
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(a) |
a registered friendly society which is a non-directive friendly society; |
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(b) |
an incorporated friendly society that is a flat rate benefits business friendly society; and |
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(c) |
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(2) |
A friendly society, other than a friendly society within (1). |
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(3) 2 |
A Lloyd's managing agent, in respect of each syndicate it manages2 |
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(4) 2 |
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If the FSA gives a firm a waiver, then the relevant rule no longer applies to the firm. But:(1) if a waiver directs that a rule is to apply to a firm with modifications, then contravention of the modified rule could lead to FSA enforcement action and (if applicable) a right of action under section 150 of the Act (Actions for damages); and(2) if a waiver is given subject to a condition, it will not apply to activities conducted in breach of the condition, and those activities,
Substantive changes to the rules (this would not include simple editorial changes) in the Handbook may affect existing waivers, changing their practical effect and creating a need for a change to the original waiver. The FSA will consult on proposed rule changes. A firm should note proposed rule changes and discuss the impact on a waiver with its usual supervisory contact at the FSA.
Firms are also referred to SUP 15.6 (Inaccurate, false or misleading information). This requires, in SUP 15.6.4 R, a firm to notify the FSA if false, misleading, incomplete or inaccurate information has been provided. This would apply in relation to information provided in an application for a waiver.
Once the FSA has given a waiver, it may vary it with the firm's consent, or on the firm's application. If a firm wishes the FSA to vary a waiver, it should follow the procedures in SUP 8.3.3 D, giving reasons for the application. In a case where a waiver has been given to a number of firms (see SUP 8.3.10 G), if the FSAwishes to vary such waivers with the consent of those firms, it will follow the procedures in SUP 8.3.10 G.
Section 340 of the Act gives the FSA power to make rules requiring an authorised person, or an authorised person falling into a specified class, to appoint an actuary3. Section 340 further empowers the FSA to make rules governing the manner, timing and notification to the FSA of such an appointment and, where an appointment is not made, for the FSA to make an appointment on the firm's behalf. The FSA's rule-making powers under section 340 of the Act also extend to an actuary's3
The functions3 described by SUP 4.2.2 G (1) are performed by one or more actuaries who are3 required to hold office continuously and must be approved persons3. The principal duty of an actuary appointed to perform these functions3 is to advise the firm (see SUP 4.3.13 R to SUP 4.3.18 G3 for the rights and duties of such an actuary3).333333
3In making appointments under this chapter and in allocating duties to actuaries, firms are reminded of their obligation under SYSC 2.1.1 R to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities so that it is clear who has which of those responsibilities and that the business and affairs of the firm can be adequately monitored and controlled by the directors, relevant senior managers and governing body of the firm.
Where this section applies with respect to a financial conglomerate, the risk management processes referred to in SYSC 12.1.8R (2) must include:(1) sound governance and management processes, which must include the approval and periodic review by the appropriate managing bodies within the financial conglomerate of the strategies and policies of the financial conglomerate in respect of all the risks assumed by the financial conglomerate, such review and approval being carried out
Where this section applies with respect to a financial conglomerate, the internal control mechanisms referred to in SYSC 12.1.8R (2) must include:(1) mechanisms that are adequate to identify and measure all material risks incurred by members of the financial conglomerate and appropriately relate capital in the financial conglomerate to risks; and(2) sound reporting and accounting procedures for the purpose of identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling intra-group transactions
INSPRU 1.1.16 R requires a firm to establish adequate technical provisions for its long-term insurance contracts. INSPRU 1.1.20 R requires a firm to hold admissible assets of a value at least equal to the amount of the technical provisions and its other long-term insurance liabilities. INSPRU 1.1.21 R ensures that a composite firm identifies separate admissible assets with a value at least equal to the technical provisions for long-term insurance business and its other long-term
As a result of INSPRU 1.5.27R (2), an actuarial investigation undertaken to determine an established surplus remains in-date for three months from the date as at which the determination of the surplus was made. However, even where the investigation is still in-date, the firm should not make the transfer unless there is sufficient surplus at the time of the transfer to allow it to be made without breach of INSPRU 1.1.20 R or INSPRU 1.1.21 R.
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
(1) SYSC 3.2.13 G includes assessing an individual's honesty, and competence. This assessment should normally be made at the point of recruitment. An individual's honesty need not normally be revisited unless something happens to make a fresh look appropriate.(2) Any assessment of an individual's suitability should take into account the level of responsibility that the individual will assume within the firm. The nature of this assessment will generally differ depending upon whether
Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities of the
A firm should have in place appropriate arrangements, having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business, to ensure that it can continue to function and meet its regulatory obligations in the event of an unforeseen interruption. These arrangements should be regularly updated and tested to ensure their effectiveness.
Behaviour
of the type referred to in APER 4.1.3 E includes, but is not limited to, deliberately:(1) falsifying documents;(2) misleading
a client about the risks of
an investment;(3) misleading
a client about the charges or
surrender penalties of investment products;(4) misleading
a client about the likely performance
of investment products by providing
inappropriate projections of
future investment returns;(5) misleading
a client by informing him that
products require only a single
Deliberately
failing to inform, without reasonable cause:(1) a customer; or(2) his firm (or its auditors or an actuary appointed
by his firm under SUP 4 (Actuaries)1); or1(3) the FSA;of the fact that their understanding
of a material issue is incorrect, despite being aware of their misunderstanding,
falls within APER 4.1.2 E.
The amount to be deducted with respect to each material insurance holding is the higher of:(1) the book value of the material insurance holding; and(2) the solo capital resources requirement for the insurance undertaking or insurance holding company in question calculated in accordance with Part 3 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Method 3 of the capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates).
The firm may allocate the responsibility for its insurance mediation activity to an approved person (or persons) performing:(1) a governing function (other than the non-executive director function); or(2) the apportionment and oversight function; or(3) the significant management (other business operations) function.
(1) Typically an insurance intermediary will appoint a person performing a governing function (other than the non-executive director function) to direct its insurance mediation activity. Where this responsibility is allocated to a person performing another function, the person performing the apportionment and oversight function with responsibility for the apportionment of responsibilities must ensure that the firm'sinsurance mediation activity is appropriately allocated.(2) The
If a firm ceases to be a participant firm part way through a financial year of the compensation scheme:(1) it will remain liable for any unpaid levies which the FSCS has already made on the firm; and(2) the FSCS may make a levy upon it (which may be before or after the firmhas ceased to be a participant firm, but must be before it ceases to be an authorised person) for the costs which it would have been liable to pay had the FSCS made a levy on all participant firms at the time