Related provisions for SUP App 2.7.2
Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R
This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G
Question |
Answer |
|
1 |
Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person? |
An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). In particular, an incoming EEA firm is referred to the EEA investment business oversight function (CF 9, see SUP 10.7.6 R). |
2 |
If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately? |
If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes. |
3 |
What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context? |
The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms. |
4 |
If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee? |
Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7). |
5 |
Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner? |
Yes. |
6 |
Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive? |
Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7). |
7 |
If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual? |
Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14. |
8 |
If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive? |
Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). |
9 |
What if a firm does not have a chief executive? |
Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2 |
10 |
What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"? |
A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.) |
11 |
How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier? |
The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1.1.7 R). Note that SYSC 1.1.10 R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1). |
12 |
How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm? |
SYSC 1.1.1 R (2) and SYSC 1.1.7 R restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SYSC App 1). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.1 |
13 |
What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership? |
The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2). |
14 |
What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance? |
The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the Combined Code developed by the Committee on Corporate Governancerecommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1). |
15 |
What about incoming electronic commerce activities? |
ECO 1.1.6 R has the effect that SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1 |
Table: application of sectoral rules
This table belongs to GENPRU 3.1.35 R
The most important financial sector |
Applicable sectoral rules |
||
Risk concentration |
Intra-group transactions |
||
BIPRU 8.9 (Consolidated concentration risk requirements) including BIPRU TP as it applies to a UK consolidation group. |
BIPRU 10 (Concentration Risk) including BIPRU TP as it applies on a solo basis and relates to BIPRU 10. |
||
None |
|||
Note |
Any waiver granted to a member of the financial conglomerate, on a solo or consolidated basis, shall not apply in respect of the financial conglomerate for the purposes of GENPRU 3.1.36 R. |
Multiple principal agreement
Matter |
Explanation |
|
1. |
Scope of appointment |
The scope of appointment given by each principal to the appointed representative. |
2. |
Complaints handling |
The identity of the principal which will be the point of contact for a complaint from a client (referred to as the "lead-principal" in SUP 12.4.5D G to SUP 12.4.5E G). |
An agreement that each principal will co-operate with each other principal in resolving a complaint from a client in relation to the appointed representative's conduct. |
||
The arrangements for complaints handling, including arrangements for resolving disputes between the principals in relation to their liability to a client in respect of a complaint and arrangements for dealing with referrals to the Financial Ombudsman Service. |
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3. |
The arrangements for approving financial promotion. |
|
4. |
Control and monitoring |
The arrangements for the control and monitoring of the activities of the appointed representative (see in particular SUP 12.6.6 R (Regulated activities and investment services outside the scope of appointment) and SUP 12.6.7 G (Senior management responsibility for appointed representatives)). |
5. |
Approved person status |
The arrangements for making applications for approved person status (see SUP 10 (Approved persons)). |
6. |
Training and competence |
The arrangements for training and competence (see TC). |
7. |
Co-operation |
The arrangements for co-operation over any other issues which may arise from the multiple appointments, including issues which may damage the interests of clients dealing with the appointed representative and administrative issues. |
An agreement by each principal to take reasonable steps to ensure that it does not cause the appointed representative or any of its other principals to be in breach of their obligations to each other or under the regulatory system. |
||
8. |
Sharing information |
The arrangements for sharing information on matters relevant to the matters covered under the multiple principal agreement and each principal's obligations under SUP 12.6 (Continuing obligations of firms with appointed representatives). |
An agreement that each principal will notify each other principal of any information which is materially relevant to the multiple principal agreement. |
Table: Positions other than ones with short-term credit assessments
This table belongs to BIPRU 9.11.1 R
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 and below |
|
20% |
50% |
100% |
350% |
1250% |
[Note: For mapping of the credit quality step to the credit assessments of eligible ECAIs, refer to: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/ecais_securitisation.pdf ]