Related provisions for SUP 6.2.4

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APER 4.6.4ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.3 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) permitting transactions without a sufficient understanding of the risks involved;(2) permitting expansion of the business without reasonably assessing the potential risks of that expansion;(3) inadequately monitoring highly profitable transactions or business practices or unusual transactions or business practices;(4) accepting implausible or unsatisfactory explanations from subordinates without
APER 4.6.6ERP
Failing to take reasonable steps to maintain an appropriate level of understanding about an issue or part of the business that he has delegated to an individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) falls within APER 4.6.2 E (see APER 4.6.14 G).
APER 4.6.7ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.6 E includes but is not limited to:(1) disregarding an issue or part of the business once it has been delegated;(2) failing to require adequate reports once the resolution of an issue or management of part of the business has been delegated;(3) accepting implausible or unsatisfactory explanations from delegates without testing their veracity.
APER 4.6.8ERP
Failing to supervise and monitor adequately the individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) to whom responsibility for dealing with an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business has been delegated falls within APER 4.6.2 E.
APER 4.6.9ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.6.8 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to take personal action where progress is unreasonably slow, or where implausible or unsatisfactory explanations are provided;(2) failing to review the performance of an outside contractor in connection with the delegated issue or business.
APER 4.6.11GRP
An approved person performing a significant influence function will not always manage the business on a day-to-day basis himself. The extent to which he does so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale and complexity of the business and his position within it. The larger and more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation and reporting lines. The FSA will look to the approved person performing a significant influence function
APER 4.6.12GRP
(1) It is important for the approved person performing a significant influence function to understand the business for which he is responsible (APER 4.6.4 E). An approved person performing a significant influence function is unlikely to be an expert in all aspects of a complex financial services business. However, he should understand and inform himself about the business sufficiently to understand the risks of its trading, credit or other business activities.(2) It is important
APER 4.6.13GRP
(1) An approved person performing a significant influence function may delegate the investigation, resolution or management of an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business to individuals who report to him or to others.(2) The approved person performing a significant influence function should have reasonable grounds for believing that the delegate has the competence, knowledge, skill and time to deal with the issue. For instance, if the compliance department only
APER 4.6.14GRP
Although an approved person performing a significant influence function may delegate the resolution of an issue, or authority for dealing with a part of the business, he cannot delegate responsibility for it. It is his responsibility to ensure that he receives reports on progress and questions those reports where appropriate. For instance, if progress appears to be slow or if the issue is not being resolved satisfactorily, then the approved person performing a significant influence
SYSC 4.2.1RRP
(1) Under PIDA, any clause or term in an agreement between a worker and his employer is void in so far as it purports to preclude the worker from making a protected disclosure (that is, "blow the whistle").(2) In accordance with section 1 of PIDA:(a) a protected disclosure is a qualifying disclosure which meets the relevant requirements set out in that section;(b) a qualifying disclosure is a disclosure, made in good faith, of information which, in the reasonable belief of the
SYSC 4.2.2RRP
(1) Firms are encouraged to consider adopting (and encouraged to invite their appointed representatives to consider adopting) appropriate internal procedures which will encourage workers with concerns to blow the whistle internally about matters which are relevant to the functions of the FSA.(2) Smaller firms may choose not to have as extensive procedures in place as larger firms. For example, smaller firms may not need written procedures. The following is a list of things that
SYSC 4.1.1RRP
1This chapter is relevant to every firm to the extent that the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 ("PIDA") applies to it.
REC 4.2.2GRP
UK recognised bodies are likely to develop and adapt their businesses in response to customer demand and new market opportunities. Where such developments involve changes to the way the UK recognised body operates, they are likely to involve changes to the way it satisfies the recognition requirementsand other obligations in or under the Act.
REC 4.2.3GRP
The FSA expects a UK recognised body to take its own steps to assure itself that it will continue to satisfy the recognition requirements and other obligations in or under the Act when considering any changes to its business or operations.
SYSC 2.1.1RRP
A firm must take reasonable care to maintain a clear and appropriate apportionment of significant responsibilities among its directors and senior managers in such a way that:(1) it is clear who has which of those responsibilities; and(2) the business and affairs of the firm can be adequately monitored and controlled by the directors, relevant senior managers and governing body of the firm.
SYSC 2.1.4RRP

Allocation of functions

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.3 R

1: Firm type

2: Allocation of both functions must be to the following individual, if any (see Note):

3: Allocation to one or more individuals selected from this column is compulsory if there is no allocation to an individual in column 2, but is otherwise optional and additional:

(1) A firm which is a body corporate and is a member of a group, other than a firm in row (2)

(1) the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one); or

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and(2) senior managers

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of:

(a) the group; or(b) a group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall

(2) An incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm (note: only the function in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2) must be allocated)

(not applicable)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior managers

(3) Any other firm

the firm's chief executive (and all of them jointly, if more than one)

the firm's and its group's:

(1) directors; and (2) senior manager's

Note: Column 2 does not require the involvement of the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager in an aspect of corporate governance if that would be contrary to generally accepted principles of good corporate governance.

SYSC 2.1.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). In particular, an incoming EEA firm is referred to the EEA investment business oversight function (CF 9, see SUP 10.7.6 R).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1.1.7 R). Note that SYSC 1.1.10 R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1.1.1 R (2) and SYSC 1.1.7 R restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SYSC App 1). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.1

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the Combined Code developed by the Committee on Corporate Governancerecommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities?

ECO 1.1.6 R has the effect that SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1

SYSC 1.2.1GRP
The purposes of SYSC are:(1) to encourage firms' directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for their firms' arrangements on matters likely to be of interest to the FSA because they impinge on the FSA's functions under the Act;(2) to increase certainty by amplifying Principle 3, under which a firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems; and(3) to encourage
COLL 5.2.27RRP
(1) An ICVC must not acquire transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of that body corporate if:(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held by the ICVC gives the ICVC power to influence significantly the conduct of business of that body corporate; or(b) the acquisition gives the ICVC that power.(2) For the purpose of (1), an ICVC is to
COLL 5.2.28RRP
(1) A manager must not acquire, or cause to be acquired for an AUT of which it is the manager, transferable securities issued by a body corporate and carrying rights to vote (whether or not on substantially all matters) at a general meeting of the body corporate if:(a) immediately before the acquisition, the aggregate of any such securities held for that AUT, taken together with any such securities already held for other AUTs of which it is also the manager, gives the manager
SUP 12.6.7GRP
The senior management of a firm should be aware that the activities of appointed representatives are an integral part of the business that they manage. The responsibility for the control and monitoring of the activities of appointed representatives rests with the senior management of the firm. Guidance is set out in SYSC 3 on delegation (for example, SYSC 3.2.3 G and SYSC 3.2.4 G) and in the Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Approved Persons in APER (for example,
PERG 9.2.1GRP
The nature of many bodies corporate means that they will, in most if not all circumstances, come within the definition of collective investment scheme in section 235(1) to (3) of the Act (Collective investment schemes). The property concerned will generally be managed as a whole under the control of the directors of the body corporate or some other person for the purpose of running its business. The idea underlying the investment is that the investors will participate in or receive
APER 4.7.12GRP
An approved person performing a significant influence function need not himself put in place the systems of control in his business (APER 4.7.4 E). Whether he does this depends on his role and responsibilities. He should, however, take reasonable steps to ensure that the business for which he is responsible has operating procedures and systems which include well-defined steps for complying with the detail of relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system and for
SUP 15.3.8GRP
Compliance with Principle 11 includes, but is not limited to, giving the FSA notice of:(1) any proposed restructuring, reorganisation or business expansion which could have a significant impact on the firm's risk profile or resources, including, but not limited to:(a) setting up a new undertaking within a firm'sgroup, or a new branch (whether in the United Kingdom or overseas); or (b) commencing the provision of cross border services into a new territory; or(c) commencing the
LR 9.6.18RRP
A listed company must notify a RIS as soon as possible after a general meeting of all resolutions passed by the company other than resolutions concerning ordinary business passed at an annual general meeting.
SYSC 3.2.2GRP
A firm's reporting lines should be clear and appropriate having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business. These reporting lines, together with clear management responsibilities, should be communicated as appropriate within the firm.