Related provisions for APER 4.6.3

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APER 4.5.5ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.4 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) implementing confusing or uncertain reporting lines (see APER 4.5.12 G);(2) implementing confusing or uncertain authorisation levels (see APER 4.5.13 G);(3) implementing confusing or uncertain job descriptions and responsibilities (see APER 4.5.13 G).
APER 4.5.7ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.6 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to review regularly the significant responsibilities which the firm is required to apportion under APER 2.1.1 G;(2) failing to act where that review shows that those significant responsibilities have not been clearly apportioned.
APER 4.5.8ERP
Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that suitable individuals are responsible for those aspects of the business under the control of the individual performing a significant influence function falls within APER 4.5.2 E (see APER 4.5.14 G).
APER 4.5.9ERP
Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.8 E includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to review the competence, knowledge, skills and performance of staff to assess their suitability to fulfil their duties, despite evidence that their performance is unacceptable (see APER 4.5.14 G);(2) giving undue weight to financial performance when considering the suitability or continuing suitability of an individual for a particular role (see APER 4.5.14 G);(3) allowing managerial
APER 4.5.12GRP
The organisation of the business and the responsibilities of those within it should be clearly defined (see APER 4.5.5 E (1)). Reporting lines should be clear to staff. Where staff have dual reporting lines there is a greater need to ensure that the responsibility and accountability of each individual line manager is clearly set out and understood.
APER 4.5.14GRP
If an individual's performance is unsatisfactory, then the appropriate approved person (if any) performing a significant influence function should review carefully whether to allow that individual to continue in position. In particular, if he is aware of concerns relating to the compliance with requirements and standards of the regulatory system (or internal controls) of the individual concerned, or of staff reporting to that individual, the approved person performing a significant
APER 4.6.6ERP
Failing to take reasonable steps to maintain an appropriate level of understanding about an issue or part of the business that he has delegated to an individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) falls within APER 4.6.2 E (see APER 4.6.14 G).
APER 4.6.8ERP
Failing to supervise and monitor adequately the individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) to whom responsibility for dealing with an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business has been delegated falls within APER 4.6.2 E.
PRIN 1.1.5GRP
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FSA) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems or resources will automatically lead to a firm contravening Principle 3 or 4. Rather, the potential impact of a group member's activities (and, for example, risk management systems
PRIN 1.1.6GRP
As set out in PRIN 3.3 (Where?), Principles 1 (Integrity), 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and 3 (Management and control) apply to world-wide activities in a prudential context. Principle 5 (Market conduct) applies to world-wide activities which might have a negative effect on confidence in the financial system operating in the United Kingdom. In considering whether to take regulatory action under these Principles in relation to activities carried on outside the United Kingdom,
PRIN 1.1.7GRP
Breaching a Principle makes a firm liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FSA to show that a firm has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity), for example, the FSA would need to demonstrate a lack of integrity
PRIN 3.2.3RRP
Principles 3, 4 and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FSA) 11 (and this chapter) also:(1) apply with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities (for Principle 3 this is only in a prudential context); and(2) take into account any activity of other members of a group of which the firm is a member.
PRIN 3.3.1RRP

Territorial application of the Principles

Principle

Territorial application

Principles1, 2 and 3

in a prudential context, apply with respect to activities wherever they are carried on; otherwise, apply with respect to activities carried on from an establishment maintained by the firm (or its appointed representative) in the United Kingdom unless another applicable rule which is relevant to the activity has a wider territorial scope, in which case the Principle applies with that wider scope in relation to the activity described in that rule.

Principle 4

applies with respect to activities wherever they are carried on.

Principle5

if the activities have, or might reasonably be regarded as likely to have, a negative effect on confidence in thefinancial system operating in the United Kingdom, applies with respect to activities wherever they are carried on; otherwise, applies with respect to activities carried on from an establishment maintained by the firm (or its appointed representative) in the United Kingdom.

Principles 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10

Principle 8, in a prudential context, applies with respect to activities wherever they are carried on; otherwise apply with respect to activities carried on from an establishment maintained by the firm (or its appointed representative) in the United Kingdom unless another applicable rule which is relevant to the activity has a wider territorial scope, in which case the Principle applies with that wider scope in relation to the activity described in that rule.

Principle11

applies with respect to activities wherever they are carried on.2
PRIN 2.1.1RRP

The Principles

1 Integrity

A firm must conduct its business with integrity.

2 Skill, care and diligence

A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence.

3 Management and control

A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.

4 Financial prudence

A firm must maintain adequate financial resources.

5 Market conduct

A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.

6 Customers' interests

A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.

7 Communications with clients

A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.

8 Conflicts of interest

A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client.

9 Customers: relationships of trust

A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment.

10 Clients' assets

A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assets when it is responsible for them.

11 Relations with regulators

A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FSA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice.
SYSC 1.2.1GRP
The purposes of SYSC are:(1) to encourage firms' directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for their firms' arrangements on matters likely to be of interest to the FSA because they impinge on the FSA's functions under the Act;(2) to increase certainty by amplifying Principle 3, under which a firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems; and(3) to encourage
COLL 6.2.11RRP
(1) Where the authorised fund manager has not complied with COLL 6.2.8 R (1) (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units), it must correct the error as soon as possible and must reimburse the authorised fund any costs it may have incurred in correcting the position.(2) The authorised fund manager need not reimburse the authorised fund when:(a) the amount under (1) is not, in the depositary's opinion, material to the authorised fund;(b) the authorised fund manager can demonstrate
COLL 6.2.12GRP

Explanatory table: This table belongs to COLL 6.2.2 G (4) (Purpose).

Correction of box management errors

1

Controls by authorised fund managers

An authorised fund manager needs to be able to demonstrate that it has effective controls over:

(1)

its calculations of what units are owned by it (its 'box'); and

(2)

compliance with COLL 6.2.8 R which is intended to prevent a negative box.

2

Controls by depositaries

(1)

Under COLL 6.6.4 (General duties of the depositary), a depositary should take reasonable care to ensure that a scheme is managed in accordance with COLL 6.2 (Dealing) and COLL 6.3 (Pricing and valuation).

(2)

A depositary should therefore make a regular assessment of the authorised fund manager's box management procedures (including supporting systems) and controls. This should include reviewing the authorised fund manager's controls and procedures when the depositary assumes office, on any significant change and on a regular basis, to ensure that a series of otherwise minor changes do not have a cumulative and a significant effect on the accuracy of the controls and procedures.

3

Recording and reporting of box management errors

(1)

An authorised fund manager should record all errors which result in a breach of COLL 6.2.8 R (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units) and as soon as an error is discovered, the authorised fund manager should report the fact to the depositary, together with details of the action taken, or to be taken, to avoid repetition of the error.

(2)

A depositary should report material box management errors to the FSA immediately. Materiality should be determined by taking into account a number of factors including:

  • the implications of the error for the sufficiency of controls put into place by the authorised fund manager;
  • the significance of any breakdown in the authorised fund manager's management controls or other checking procedures;
  • the significance of any failure of systems or back-up arrangements;
  • the duration of an error; and
  • the level of compensation due to the scheme, and an authorised fund manager's ability (or otherwise) to meet claims for compensation in full.

(3)

A depositary should also make a return to the FSA (in the manner prescribed by SUP 16.6.8 R) on a quarterly basis.
SYSC 2.1.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?

An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). In particular, an incoming EEA firm is referred to the EEA investment business oversight function (CF 9, see SUP 10.7.6 R).

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or

(2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1.1.7 R). Note that SYSC 1.1.10 R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm.

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?

SYSC 1.1.1 R (2) and SYSC 1.1.7 R restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly:

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SYSC App 1). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch.

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2).

(4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order.

See also Questions 1 and 15.1

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the Combined Code developed by the Committee on Corporate Governancerecommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).

15

What about incoming electronic commerce activities?

ECO 1.1.6 R has the effect that SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1
SUP 4.3.10GRP
To comply with SUP 4.3.9 R and Principle 3, before an actuary1 takes up his appointment the firm should ensure that the actuary: 1(1) has skills and experience appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business and the requirements and standards under the regulatory system to which it is subject; and(2) has adequate qualifications and experience, which includes holding an appropriate practising certificate1 under the rules of the Institute of Actuaries or the
SYSC 3.2.4GRP
(1) The guidance relevant to delegation within the firm is also relevant to external delegation ('outsourcing'). A firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations. So, for example, under Principle 3 a firm should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions by its contractor.(2) A firm should take steps to obtain sufficient information from its contractor to enable it to assess the impact of outsourcing on its systems and controls.
DISP 1.3.3RRP
DISP 1.4 - DISP 1.51 do not apply: (1) where the firm has taken reasonable steps to determine, and has determined, that the complaint:(a) is not made by, or on behalf of, an eligible complainant; or(b) does not relate to an activity of that firm (or of any other firm with whom that firm has some connection in marketing financial services)3 which comes under the jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service; or(c) does not involve an allegation that the complainant has suffered,
REC 2.5.3GRP
In assessing whether the systems and controls used by a UK recognised body in the performance of its relevant functions are adequate and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business, the FSA may have regard to the UK recognised body's:(1) arrangements for managing, controlling and carrying out its relevant functions, including: (a) the distribution of duties and responsibilities among its key individuals and the departments of the UK recognised body responsible for performing
SUP App 3.6.15GRP
The FSA considers that, in order to comply with Principle 3:Management and control (see PRIN 2.1.1 R), a firm should have appropriate procedures to monitor the nature of the services provided to its customers. Where a UK firm has non-resident customers but has not notified the EEA State in which the customers are resident that it wishes to exercise its freedom to provide services, the FSA would expect the firm's systems to include appropriate controls. Such controls would include
PRIN 3.1.1RRP
PRIN applies to every firm, except that:(1) for an incoming EEA firm or an incoming Treaty firm, the Principles apply only in so far as responsibility for the matter in question is not reserved by a European Community instrument to the firm's Home State regulator;(2) for an incoming EEA firm which is a BCD credit institution without a top-up permission, Principle 4 applies only in relation to the liquidity of a branch established in the United Kingdom;(3) for an incoming EEA firm