1. (1)

   1SYSC 19F.1 applies to:

   1. (a)

      a common platform firm, unless it is a collective portfolio management investment firm;

   2. (b)

      a MiFID optional exemption firm;

   3. (c)

      a third country firm; and

   4. (d)

      a UKbranch of an EEA MiFID investment firm, unless it is a UCITS investment firm or an AIFM investment firm.

2. (2)

   In relation to a firm that falls under (1)(c), SYSC 19F.1 applies only in relation to activities carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom.

2A firm which provides investment services to clients must ensure that it does not remunerate or assess the performance of its staff in a way that conflicts with its duty to act in the best interests of its clients. In particular, a firm must not make any arrangement by way of remuneration, sales targets or otherwise that could provide an incentive to its staff to recommend a particular financial instrument to a retail client when the firm could offer a different financial instrument which would better meet that client’s needs.

[Note: article 24(10) of MiFID]

1. (1)

   2A dormant account fund operator in respect of its investment services and ancillary services, a MiFID optional exemption firm in respect of its investment services and ancillary services and a third country firm in respect of its MiFID or equivalent third country business must:

   1. (a)

      define and implement remuneration policies and practices under appropriate internal procedures taking into account the interests of all the clients of the firm, with a view to ensuring that clients are treated fairly and their interests are not impaired by the remuneration practices adopted by the firm in the short, medium or long term. Remuneration policies and practices must be designed in such a way so as not to create a conflict of interest or incentive that may lead relevant persons to favour their own interests or the firm’s interests to the potential detriment of any client;

   2. (b)

      ensure that their remuneration policies and practices apply to all relevant persons with an impact, directly or indirectly, on investment services and ancillary services provided by the firm or on its corporate behaviour, regardless of the type of clients, to the extent that the remuneration of such persons and similar incentives may create a conflict of interest that encourages them to act against the interests of any of the firm’sclients; and

   3. (c)

      ensure that its management body approves, after taking advice from the compliance function, the firm’sremuneration policy. The senior management of the firm must be responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the remuneration policy and the monitoring of compliance risks related to the policy.

2. (2)
   1. (a)

      Remuneration and similar incentives must not be solely or predominantly based on quantitative commercial criteria, and must take fully into account appropriate qualitative criteria reflecting compliance with the applicable regulations, the fair treatment of clients and the quality of services provided to clients.

   2. (b)

      A balance between fixed and variable components of remuneration must be maintained at all times, so that the remuneration structure does not favour the interests of the firm or its relevant persons against the interests of any client.

1This section applies to insurance distributors carrying on insurance distribution activities from an establishment maintained by it, or its appointed representative, in the United Kingdom.

[Note: article 7(2) of the IDD]

2This section does not apply to an authorised professional firm with respect to its non-mainstream regulated activities if:

1. (1)

   the firm’sdesignated professional body has made rules which implement article 17(3) of the IDD;

2. (2)

   those rules have been approved by the FCA under section 332(5) of the Act; and

3. (3)

   the firm is subject to the rules in the form in which they were approved.

1. (1)

   1Insurance distributors must not:

   1. (a)

      be remunerated; or

   2. (b)

      remunerate or assess the performance of their employees,

   in a way that conflicts with their duty to comply with the customer’s best interests rules (ICOBS 2.5.-1R, in relation to a non-investment insurance contract, or COBS 2.1.1R, in relation to a life policy).

2. (2)

   In particular, an insurance distributor must not make any arrangements by way of remuneration, sales target or otherwise that could provide an incentive to itself or its employees to recommend a particular contract of insurance to a customer when the insurance distributor could offer a different insurance contract which would better meet the customer’s needs.

[Note: article 17(3) of the IDD]