Purpose, status and application of the guidelines
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1.
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These guidelines have been agreed by the following bodies ("the
agencies"):
• the Financial Services Authority ("the FSA");
• the Serious
Fraud Office ("the SFO");
• the Department of Trade and Industry ("the DTI");
• the Crown
Prosecution Service ("the CPS");
• the Association of Chief Police
Officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland ("ACPO");
• the Crown
Office;
•
the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland
("the DPP(NI)");
• the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland ("ACPO(S)").
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2.
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The guidelines are intended to assist the agencies when considering
cases concerning financial crime and/or regulatory misconduct that are, or
may be, of mutual interest to the FSA and one or more of the other agencies.
Their implementation and wider points arising from them will be kept under
review by the agencies who will liaise regularly.
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3.
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The purpose of the guidelines is to set out some broad principles
which the agencies agree should be applied by them in order to assist them
to:
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(a)
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decide which of them should investigate such cases;
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(b)
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co-operate with each other, particularly in cases where more than
one agency is investigating;
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(c)
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prevent undue duplication of effort by reason of the involvement
of more than one agency;
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(d)
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prevent the subjects of proceedings being treated unfairly by
reason of the unwarranted involvement of more than one agency.
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4.
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The guidelines are intended to apply to the relationships between
the FSA and the other agencies. They are not intended to apply to the relationships
between those other agencies themselves where there is no FSA interest. They
are not legally binding.
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5.
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The guidelines are subject to the restrictions on disclosure of
information held by the agencies. They are not intended to override them.
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6.
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The guidelines are relevant to ACPO and ACPO(S) only in so far
as they relate to investigations. Similarly, they are relevant to the CPS
and the DPP(NI) only in so far as they relate to prosecutions.
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Commencing Investigations
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7.
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The agencies recognise that there are areas in which they have
an overlapping remit in terms of their functions and powers (the powers and
functions of the agencies are set out in the Appendix to this document). The
agencies will therefore endeavour to ensure that only the agency or agencies
with the most appropriate functions and powers will commence investigations.
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8.
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The agencies further recognise that in certain cases concurrent
investigations may be the most quick, effective and efficient way for some
cases to be dealt with. However, if an agency is considering commencing an
investigation and another agency is already carrying on a related investigation
or proceedings or is otherwise likely to have an interest in that investigation,
best practice is for the agencies concerned to liaise and discuss which agency
or agencies should take action, ie investigate, bring proceedings or otherwise
deal with the matter.
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Indicators for deciding which agency should take
action
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9.
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The following are indicators of whether action by the FSA or one
of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular
order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should
be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered
in the round.
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(a)
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Tending towards action by the FSA
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•
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Where
the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market
confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated by the FSA.
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•
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Where
the suspected conduct in question would be best dealt with by:
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criminal prosecution of offences which the FSA has powers to prosecute by
virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") (see
Appendix paragraph 1.4) and other incidental offences;
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civil proceedings under the 2000 Act (including applications for injunctions,
restitution and to wind up firms carrying on regulated activities);
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regulatory action which can be referred to the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal (including proceedings for market abuse); and
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proceedings for breaches of listing rules.
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•
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Where
the likely defendants are FSA authorised or approved persons.
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•
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Where
the likely defendants are issuers or sponsors of a security admitted to the
official list or in relation to which an application for listing has been
made
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Where
there is likely to be a case for the use of FSA powers which may take immediate
effect (eg powers to vary the permission of an authorised firm or to suspend
listing of securities).
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•
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Where
it is likely that the investigator will be seeking assistance from overseas
regulatory authorities with functions equivalent to those of the FSA.
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Where
any possible criminal offences are technical or in a grey area whereas regulatory
contraventions are clearly indicated.
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Where
the balance of public interest is in achieving reparation for victims and
prosecution is likely to damage the prospects of this.
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•
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Where
there are distinct parts of the case which are best investigated with regulatory
expertise.
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(b)
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Tending towards action by one of the
other agencies
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•
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Where
serious or complex fraud is the predominant issue in the conduct in question
(normally appropriate for the SFO).
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•
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Where
the suspected conduct in question would be best dealt with by:
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criminal proceedings for which the FSA is not the statutory prosecutor;
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proceedings for disqualification of directors under the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 (normally appropriate for DTI action);
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winding up proceedings which FSA does not have statutory powers to bring (normally
appropriate for DTI action); or
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criminal proceedings in Scotland.
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•
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Where
the conduct in question concerns the abuse of limited liability status under
the Companies Acts (normally appropriate for DTI action).
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Where
powers of arrest are likely to be necessary.
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Where
it is likely that the investigator will rely on overseas organisations (such
as law enforcement agencies) with which the other agencies have liaison.
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Where
action by the FSA is likely to prejudice the public interest in the prosecution
of offences for which the FSA is not a statutory prosecutor.
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Where
the case falls only partly within the regulated area (or criminal offences
for which FSA is a statutory prosecutor) and the prospects of splitting the
investigation are not good.
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10.
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It is also best practice for the agencies involved or interested
in an investigation to continue to liaise as appropriate throughout in order
to keep under review the decisions as to who should investigate or bring proceedings.
This is particularly so where there are material developments in the investigation
that might cause the agencies to reconsider its general purpose or scope and
whether additional investigation by others is called for.
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Conduct of concurrent investigations
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11.
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The agencies recognise that where concurrent investigations are
taking place, action taken by one agency can prejudice the investigation or
subsequent proceedings brought by another agency. Consequently, it is best
practice for the agencies involved in concurrent investigations to notify
each other of significant developments in their investigations and of any
significant steps they propose to take in the case, such as:
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interviewing a key witness;
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requiring provision of significant volumes of documents;
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executing a search warrant; or
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instituting proceedings or otherwise disposing of a matter.
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12.
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If the agencies identify that particular action by one party might
prejudice an investigation or future proceedings by another, it is desirable
for the parties concerned to discuss and decide what action should be taken
and by whom. In reaching these decisions, they will bear in mind how the public
interest is best served overall. The examples provided in paragraph 9 above
may also be used as indicators of where the overall balance of interest lies
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Deciding to bring proceedings
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13.
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The agencies will consider, as necessary, and keep under review
whether an investigation has reached the point where it is appropriate to
commence proceedings. Where agencies are deciding whether to institute criminal
proceedings, they will have regard to the usual codes or guidance relevant
to that decision. For example, agencies other than the DPP(NI) or the Crown
Office will have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Note: Different
guidance applies to the DPP(NI) and the Crown Office. All criminal proceedings
in Scotland are the responsibility of the Lord Advocate. Separate arrangements
have been agreed between the FSA and the Crown Office for the prosecution
of offences in Scotland arising out of FSA investigations). Where they are
considering whether to bring non-criminal proceedings, they will take into
account whatever factors they consider relevant (for example, in the case
of market abuse proceedings brought by the FSA, these are set out in paragraph
14.4 of the FSA Enforcement manual).
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14.
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The agencies recognise that in taking a decision whether to commence
proceedings, relevant factors will include:
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whether commencement of proceedings might prejudice ongoing or
potential investigations or proceedings brought by other agencies; and
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whether, in the light of any proceedings being brought by another
party, it is appropriate to commence separate proceedings against the person
under investigation.
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15.
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Best practice in these circumstances, therefore, is for the parties
concerned to liaise before a decision is taken.
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Closing Cases
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16.
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It is best practice for the agencies, at the conclusion of any
investigation where it is decided that no further action need be taken, or
at the conclusion of proceedings, to notify any other agencies concerned of
the outcome of the investigation and/or proceedings and to provide any other
helpful feedback.
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APPENDIX TO THE
GUIDELINES ON INVESTIGATION OF CASES OF INTEREST OR CONCERN TO THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES AUTHORITY AND OTHER PROSECUTING AND INVESTIGATING AGENCIES
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1.
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The FSA
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1.1
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The FSA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business
in the UK. Its regulatory objectives (when acting other than in its capacity as the UK Listing Authority
("UKLA"))under the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") are:
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market confidence;
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public awareness;
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the protection of consumers; and
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the reduction of financial crime.
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(NOTE: The 2000 Act repealed and replaced various enactments which
conferred powers and functions on the FSA and other regulators whose functions
are now carried out by the FSA. Most notable in this context are the Financial
Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987. Transitional provisions under
the 2000 Act permit the FSA to continue to investigate and bring proceedings
for offences under the old legislation. Details of these transitional provisions
are not set out in these guidelines)
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1.2
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The FSA is also the
UKLA. The UKLA's
regulatory objectives in this area are:
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the protection of investors;
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access to capital; and
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investor confidence.
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1.3
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Under the 2000 Act the FSA has powers to investigate concerns
including:
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*regulatory concerns about authorised firms and individuals employed
by them;
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*suspected market abuse under s.118 of the 2000 Act;
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*suspected misleading statements and practices under s.397 of
the 2000 Act;
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*suspected insider dealing under of Part V of the Criminal Justice
Act 1993;
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suspected contraventions of the general prohibition under s.19
of the 2000 Act and related offences;
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*suspected offences under various other provisions of the 2000
Act (see below);
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suspected breaches of the Listing Rules and related offences in relation to listing.
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The FSA's powers of information gathering and investigation
are set out in Part XI of the 2000 Act and in s.97 in relation to its UKLA functions.
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1.4
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The FSA has power to take the following enforcement action:
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discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and
approved persons under s.66 of the 2000 Act;
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impose civil penalties in cases of market abuse under s.123 of
the 2000 Act;
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prohibit an individual from being employed in connection with
a regulated activity, under s.56 of the 2000 Act;
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apply to Court for injunctions (or interdicts) and other orders
against persons contravening relevant requirements (under s.380 of the 2000
Act) or engaging in market abuse (under s.381 of the 2000 Act);
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petition the court for the winding-up or administration of companies,
and the bankruptcy of individuals, carrying on regulated activities;
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apply to the court under ss.382 and 383 of the 2000 Act for restitution
orders against persons contravening relevant requirements or persons engaged
in market abuse;
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require restitution under s.384 of the 2000 Act of profits which
have accrued to authorised persons contravening relevant requirements or persons
engaged in market abuse, or of losses which have been suffered by others as
a result of those breaches;
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(in England and Wales) prosecute offences under the Money Laundering
Regulations 1993, Part V Criminal Justice Act 1993 (insider dealing) and various
offences under the 2000 Act including (Note: The FSA may also prosecute any
other offences which are incidental to those which it has express statutory
power to prosecute):
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- carrying on regulated activity without authorisation or exemption,
under s.23;
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- making false claims to be authorised or exempt, under s.24;
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- promoting investment activity without authorisation, under s.25;
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- breaching a prohibition order, under s.56;
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- failing to co-operate with or giving false information to FSA
appointed investigators, under s.177;
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- failing to comply with provisions about influence over authorised
persons, under s.191;
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- making misleading statements and engaging in misleading practices,
under s.397;
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- misleading the FSA, under s.398;
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- various offences in relation to the FSA's listing authority
function under Part VI;
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Fine, issue public censures, suspend or cancel listing for breaches
of the Listing Rules by an issuer; and
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Issue public censures , suspend or remove a sponsor from the UKLA
list of approved sponsors for breaches of Listing Rules by a sponsor.
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2
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DTI
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2.1
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The Secretary of State for Trade & Industry exercises concurrently
with the FSA those powers and functions marked with an asterisk in paragraphs
1.3 above. The investigation functions are undertaken by Companies Investigation
Branch ("CIB") and the prosecution functions by the Solicitors Office.
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2.2
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The principal activities of CIB are, however, the investigations
into the conduct of companies under the Companies Acts and the Fair Trading
Act. These are fact-finding investigations but may lead to follow-up action
by CIB such as petitioning for the winding up of a company, disqualification
of directors of the company or referring the matter to the Solicitors Office
for prosecution. CIB may also disclose information to other prosecution or
regulatory authorities to enable them to take appropriate action under their
own powers and functions. Such disclosure is, however, strictly controlled
under a gateway disclosure regime.
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2.3
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The Solicitors Office advises on investigation work carried out
by CIB and undertakes criminal investigations and prosecutions in respect
of matters referred to it by CIB, the Insolvency Service or other divisions
of the DTI or its agencies.
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3
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SFO
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3.1
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The aim of the SFO is to contribute to:
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reducing fraud and the cost of fraud;
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the delivery of justice and the rule of law;
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maintaining confidence in the UK's business and financial
institutions.
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3.2
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Under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 the Director of the SFO may
investigate any suspected offence which appears on reasonable grounds to involve
serious or complex fraud and may also conduct, or take over the conduct of,
the prosecution of any such offence. The SFO may investigate in conjunction
with any other person with whom the Director thinks it is proper to do so;
that includes a police force (or the FSA or any other regulator). The criteria
used by the SFO for deciding whether a case is suitable for it to deal with
are set out in paragraph 3.3.
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3.3
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The key criterion should be that the suspected fraud is such that
the direction of the investigation should be in the hands of those who would
be responsible for any prosecution.
The factors that are taken into account include:
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whether the amount involved is at least £1 million (this
is simply an objective and recognisable signpost of seriousness and likely
public concern rather than the main indicator of suitability);
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whether the case is likely to give rise to national publicity
and widespread public concern. That includes those involving government bodies,
public bodies, the governments of other countries and commercial cases of
public interest;
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whether the case requires highly specialist knowledge of, for
example, stock exchange practices or regulated markets;
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whether there is a significant international dimension;
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whether legal, accountancy and investigative skills need to be
brought together; and
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whether the case appears to be complex and one in which the use
of Section 2 powers might be appropriate.
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4
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CPS
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4.1
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The CPS has responsibility for taking over the conduct of all
criminal proceedings instituted by the police in England and Wales. The CPS
may advise the police in respect of criminal offences. The CPS prosecutes
all kinds of criminal offences, including fraud. Fraud cases may be prosecuted
by local CPS offices but the most serious and complex fraud cases will be
prosecuted centrally.
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5
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ACPO and ACPO(S)
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5.1
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ACPO represents the police forces of England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. ACPO(S) represents the police forces of Scotland.
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6
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The Crown Office
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6.1
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The investigation and prosecution of crime in Scotland is the
responsibility of the Lord Advocate, who is the head of the Procurator Fiscal
Service, which comprises Procurators Fiscal and their Deputes, who are answerable
to the Lord Advocate. The Procurator Fiscal is the sole public prosecutor
in Scotland, prosecuting cases reported not only by the police but all regulatory
departments and agencies. All prosecutions before a jury, both in the High
Court of Justiciary and in the Sheriff Court, run in the name of the Lord
Advocate; all other prosecutions run in the name of the local Procurator Fiscal.
The Head Office of the Procurator Fiscal Service is the Crown Office and the
Unit within the Crown Office which deals with serious and complex fraud cases
and with the investigation of cases of interest or concern to the Financial
Services Authority is the Fraud and Specialist Services Unit: the remit of
this Unit is directly comparable to that of the Serious Fraud Office.
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7
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The DPP(NI)
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7.1
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The DPP(NI) is responsible for the prosecution of all offences
on indictment in Northern Ireland, other than offences prosecuted by the Serious
Fraud Office. The DPP(NI) is also responsible for the prosecution of certain
summary offences, including offences reported to it by any government department.
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