Related provisions for MAR 1.2.3
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The following are examples of behaviour that might fall within the scope of section 123(1)(b) :(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to deal in qualifying investments or related investments in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in behaviour which, if he himself engaged
This chapter provides assistance in determining whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse. It also forms part of the UK's implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (including its EU implementing legislation, that is Directive 2003/124/EC, Directive 2003/125/EC, Regulation 2273/2003 and Directive 2004/72/EC) and the auction regulation.4 It is therefore likely to be helpful to persons who:(1) want to avoid engaging in market abuseor to avoid requiring or encouraging another
The Code does not exhaustively describe all types of behaviour or may not amount to market abuse. In particular, the descriptions of behaviour which, in the opinion of the FSA , amount to market abuse should be read in the light of:(1) the elements specified by the Act as making up the relevant type of market abuse; and(2) any relevant descriptions of behaviour
For market makers and persons that may lawfully deal in qualifying investments or related investments on their own account, pursuing their legitimate business of such dealing (including entering into an agreement for the underwriting of an issue of financial instruments) will not in itself amount to market abuse (insider dealing). [Note: Recital 18 Market Abuse Directive]
(1) Behaviour which conforms with articles 3 to 6 of the Buy-back and Stabilisation Regulation (see MAR 1 Annex 1) will not amount to market abuse.(2) See MAR 2 in relation to stabilisation.(3) Buy-back programmes which are not within the scope of the Buy-back and Stabilisation Regulation are not, in themselves, market abuse.
(1) The FSA will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FSA’s view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s employment,
(1) Notification of suspicious transactions to the FSA requires sufficient indications (which may not be apparent until after the transaction has taken place) that the transaction might constitute market abuse. In particular a firm will need to be able to explain the basis for its suspicion when notifying the FSA (see SUP 15.10 R). Certain transactions by themselves may seem completely devoid of anything suspicious, but might deliver such indications of possible market abuse,
Where the behaviour of a person which amounts to market abuse is behaviour to which the Takeover Code is relevant, the use of the Takeover Panel's powers will often be sufficient to address the relevant concerns. In cases where this is not so, the FSA will need to consider whether it is appropriate to use any of its own powers under the market abuse regime. The principal circumstances in which the FSA is likely to consider such exercise are:(1) where the behaviour falls within
(1) If it appears to the FSA that there is, or there may be, a breach of the listing rules or the disclosure rules and transparency rules4 by an issuer with a premium listing4, the FSA may in writing require the issuer to appoint a sponsor to advise the issuer on the application of the listing rules, the disclosure rules and the transparency rules4.4(2) If required to do so under (1), an issuer must, as soon as practicable, appoint a sponsor to advise it on the application of
This chapter sets out:(1) guidance on the type of event or change in condition which a firm should consider notifying in accordance with Principle 11; the purpose of this guidance is to set out examples and not to give comprehensive advice to firms on what they should notify in order to be in compliance with Principle 11;(2) rules on events and changes in condition that a firm must notify; these are the types of event that the FSA must be informed about, usually as soon as possible,
Where the securities are subject to an underwriting agreement a listed company may, at its discretion and subject to DTR 2 (Disclosure and control of inside information by issuers), delay notifying a RIS as required by LR 9.6.4R (6) for up to two business days until the obligation by the underwriter to take or procure others to take securities is finally determined or lapses. In the case of an issue or offer of securities which is not underwritten, notification of the result must