Related provisions for IFPRU 2.2.58

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SYSC 19D.3.2GRP
SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 of which a firm is a member, comply with the obligations in this section on a consolidated basis (or sub-consolidated basis). In the FCA’s view, the application of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19D.3.1R(1) is in line with 3 the application of systems
SYSC 19D.3.7RRP
A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is consistent with, and promotes, sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the firm.[Note: article 92(2)(a) of CRD]
SYSC 19D.3.12RRP
(1) A significant firm2 must establish a remuneration committee .(2) A firm in (1) must ensure that:(a) the remuneration committee is constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgement on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity;(b) the chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the firm;(c)
SYSC 19D.3.17RRP
A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19D.3.12R or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note: article 92(2)(f) of CRD]
SYSC 19D.3.21RRP
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including (when appropriate) establishing limits to the remuneration of members of its management body; and(2) no
SYSC 19D.3.23RRP
(1) A firm must ensure that any measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components: (a) includes adjustments for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost and quantity of the capital and the liquidity required; and (b) takes into account the need for consistency with the timing and likelihood of the firm receiving potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings. (2)
SYSC 19A.3.2GRP
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group7 of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the FCA’s6 view, the application of6 this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19A.3.1R(1) is in line with67the application of
SYSC 19A.3.7RRP
A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the firm.[Note:3article 92(2)(a) of CRD]3
SYSC 19A.3.12RRP
(1) A6firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. 3(2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be
SYSC 19A.3.16RRP
A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19A.3.12 R, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note:3article 92(2)(f) of CRD]3
SYSC 19A.3.20RRP
A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:(1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;(2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of3members of its management body; and3(3) no
SYSC 7.1.4RRP
The management body13 of a common platform firm or of an operator of an electronic system in relation to lending23 must approve and periodically review the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the firm is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle.[Note: 13article 76(1) of CRD]1313
SYSC 7.1.17RRP
(1) 13The management body of a CRR firm has overall responsibility for risk management. It must devote sufficient time to the consideration of risk issues.(2) The management body of a CRR firm must be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in the rules implementing the CRD and in the UK CRR22 as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external ratings and internal models related to those risks.
SYSC 7.1.19RRP
(1) 13A CRR firm must ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk profile of the firm and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice.(2) The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee must determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the
SYSC 7.1.20RRP
13In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee must, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings.[Note: article 76(4) of CRD]
SYSC 7.1.21RRP
(1) 13A CRR firm's risk management function (article 23 of the MiFID Org Regulation19) must be independent from the operational functions and have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body.(2) The risk management function must ensure that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. It must be actively involved in elaborating the firm's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and it must be able to deliver
SYSC 7.1.22RRP
13The head of the risk management function must be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the CRR firm do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the firm may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest. The head of the risk management function must not be removed without prior approval of the management body and must
BIPRU 8.7.34RRP
[deleted]5
BIPRU 8.7.37RRP
[deleted]5
SYSC 19A.1.6GRP
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the 3CRD which relate to remuneration. 7In applying the Remuneration Code, firms should comply with the EBA “Guidelines on sound remuneration policies
BIPRU 12.3.27RRP
A firm must develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies must include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk.22[Note: article 86(4) of the CRD]4
SYSC 19A.2.1RRP
A firm must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.[Note:1article 74(1) of CRD]1
CASS 7.13.11GRP
In complying with CASS 7.13.8 R and CASS 7.13.10 R, a firm should consider, as appropriate, together with any other relevant matters:(1) the capital of the CRD credit institution or bank;(2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the CRD credit institution or bank's capital and deposits, and, in the case of a qualifying money market fund, compared to any limit the fund may place on the volume of redemptions in any period;(3) the extent to which client money that
SYSC 19D.1.6GRP
(1) The aim of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the CRD which relate to remuneration. In applying the rules in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code,
SYSC 19D.2.1RRP
A firm must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management.[Note: article 74(1) of CRD]
MAR 5.3.1RRP
1A firm4 must have:(1) transparent4 rules and procedures for fair and orderly trading;[Note: articles 18(1) and 19(1)4of MiFID](2) objective criteria for the efficient execution of orders which are established and implemented in non-discretionary rules4; [Note: articles 18(1) and 19(1)4 of MiFID](2A) arrangements for the sound management of the technical operations of the facility, including the establishment of effective contingency arrangements to cope with the risks of systems
COLL 5.2.20RRP
(1) A transaction in a derivative must:(a) be in an approved derivative; or(b) be one which complies with COLL 5.2.23 R (OTC transactions in derivatives).(2) The underlying of a transaction in a derivative must consist of any one or more of the following to which the scheme is dedicated:(a) transferable securities permitted under COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(a) to (c) and COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(e)7;(b) approved money-market instruments7 permitted underCOLL 5.2.8 R (3)(a) to COLL 5.2.8 R (3)(d)7;77(c)
REC 2.5.1UKRP

Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, paragraphs 3 – 3H4

Paragraph 3 – Systems and controls4

(1)

The [UK RIE] must ensure that the systems and controls, including procedures and arrangements,4 used in the performance of its functions and the functions of the trading venues it operates are adequate, effective4 and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business.

7[Note: SYSC 15A contains requirements relating to the operational resilience of UK RIEs]

(2)

Sub-paragraph (1) applies in particular to systems and controls concerning -

(a)

the transmission of information;

(b)

the assessment, mitigation and management of risks to the performance of the [UK RIE'srelevant functions];

(c)

the effecting and monitoring of transactions on the [UK RIE];

(ca)

the technical operation of the [UK RIE], including contingency arrangements for disruption to its facilities;

(d)

the operation of the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 4(2)(d); and

(e)

(where relevant) the safeguarding and administration of assets belonging to users of the [UK RIE's] facilities.

4(f)

the resilience of its trading systems;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the resilience of trading systems operated by trading venues that enable algorithmic trading]

4(g)

the ability to have sufficient capacity to deal with peak order and message volumes;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the adequacy of capacity of trading systems operated by trading venues that enable algorithmic trading]

4(h)

the ability to ensure orderly trading under conditions of severe market stress;

4(i)

the effectiveness of business continuity arrangements to ensure the continuity of the [UK RIE’s] services if there is any failure of its trading systems including the testing of the [UK RIE’s] systems and controls;

4(j)

the ability to reject orders that exceed predetermined volume or price thresholds or which are clearly erroneous;

4(k)

the ability to ensure algorithmic trading systems cannot create or contribute to disorderly trading conditions on trading venues operated by the [UK RIE];

4(l)

the ability to ensure disorderly trading conditions which arise from the use of algorithmic trading systems, including systems to limit the ratio of unexecuted orders to transactions that may be entered into the [UK RIE’s] trading system by a member or participant are capable of being managed;

[Note:MiFID RTS 9 contains requirements on the ratio of unexecuted orders to transactions to be taken into account by a trading venue that operates electronic continuous auction order book, quote-driven or hybrid trading systems]

4(m)

the ability to ensure the flow of orders is able to be slowed down if there is a risk of system capacity being reached;

4(n)

the ability to limit and enforce the minimum tick size which may be executed on its trading venues; and

4(o)

the requirement for members and participants to carry out appropriate testing of algorithms.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the appropriate testing of algorithms to ensure that trading systems, when they enable algorithmic trading, cannot create or contribute to disorderly trading conditions]

4(3)

For the purposes of sub-paragraph 2(c), the [UK RIE] must -

4(a)

establish and maintain effective arrangements and procedures including the necessary resource for the regular monitoring of the compliance by members or participants with its rules; and

4(b)

monitor orders sent including cancellations and the transactions undertaken by its members or participants under its systems in order to identify infringements of those rules, disorderly trading conditions or conduct that may indicate behavior that is prohibited under the market abuse regulation or system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument.

4(4)

For the purpose of sub-paragraph (2)(o) the [UK RIE] must provide environments to facilitate such testing.

4(5)

The [UK RIE] must be adequately equipped to manage the risks to which it is exposed, to implement appropriate arrangements and systems to identify all significant risks to its operation, and to put in place effective measures to mitigate those risks.

4Paragraph 3A – Market making arrangements

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must -

4(a)

have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (“market making agreements”);

4(b)

have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into such agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis;

4(c)

monitor and enforce compliance with the market making agreements;

4(d)

inform the FCA of the content of its market making agreements; and

4(e)

provide the FCA with any information it requests which is necessary for the FCA to satisfy itself that the market making agreements comply with paragraphs (c) and (d) of this sub-paragraph and sub-paragraph 2.

4(2)

A market making agreement must specify-

4(a)

the obligations of the investment firm in relation to the provision of liquidity;

4(b)

where applicable, any obligations arising from the participation in a scheme mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b);

4(c)

any incentives in terms of rebates or otherwise offered by the [UK RIE] to the investment firm in order for it to provide liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis; and

4(d)

where applicable, any other rights accruing to the investment firm as a result of participation in the scheme referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b).

4(3)

For the purposes of this paragraph, an investment firm pursues a market making strategy if -

4(a)

the firm is a member or participant of one or more trading venues;

4(b)

the firm’s strategy, when dealing on own account, involves posting firm, simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size at competitive prices relating to one or more financial instruments on a single trading venue, across different trading venues; and

4(c)

the result is providing liquidity on a regular and frequent basis to the overall market.

4Paragraph 3B – Halting trading

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must be able to -

4(a)

temporarily halt or constrain trading on any trading venue operated by it if there is a significant price movement in a financial instrument on such a trading venue or a related trading venue during a short period; and

4(b)

in exceptional cases be able to cancel, vary, or correct any transaction.

4(2)

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the [UK RIE] must ensure that the parameters for halting trading are appropriately calibrated in a way which takes into account -

4(a)

the liquidity of different asset classes and subclasses;

4(b)

the nature of the trading venue market model; and

4(c)

the types of users,

4to ensure the parameters are sufficient to avoid significant disruptions to the orderliness of trading.

4(3)

The [UK RIE] must report the parameters mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) and any material changes to those parameters to the FCA in a format to be specified by the FCA.

4(4)

If a trading venue operated by the [UK RIE] is material in terms of liquidity of the trading of a financial instrument and it halts trading in the United Kingdom6 in that instrument it must have systems and procedures in place to ensure that it notifies the FCA.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 12 contains requirements for when a regulated market is material in terms of liquidity in a financial instrument for purposes of trading halt notifications]

4Paragraph 3C – Direct electronic access

4Where the [UK RIE] permits direct electronic access to a trading venue it operates, it must -

4(1)

(a)

ensure that a member of, or participant in that trading venue is only permitted to provide direct electronic access to the venue if the member or participant -

4(i)

an investment firm which has permission under Part 4A of the Act to carry on a regulated activity which is any of the investment services or activities;6

4(ii)

a qualifying credit institution that has Part 4A permission to carry on the regulated activity of accepting deposits;6

4(iii)

is a person who falls within regulation 30(1A) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2017 and has permission under Part 4A of the Act to carry on a regulated activity which is any of the investment services or activities;6

4(iv)

is a third country firm providing the direct electronic access in the course of exercising rights under Article 46.1 (general provisions) 6of the markets in financial instruments regulation;

4(v)

is a third country firm and the provision of the direct electronic access by that firm is subject to the exclusion in Article 72 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001; or

4(vi)

is a third country firm which does not come within paragraph (iv) or (v) and is otherwise permitted to provide the direct electronic access under the Act;

4(b)

ensure that appropriate criteria are set and applied for the suitability of persons to whom direct electronic access services may be provided;

4(c)

ensure that a member of, or participant in, the trading venue retains responsibility for adherence to the requirements of any provisions of the law of the United Kingdom relied on by the United Kingdom before IP completion day to implement6 the markets in financial instruments directive in respect of orders and trades executed using the direct electronic access service, as those provisions have effect on IP completion day, in the case of rules made by the FCA under the Act, and as amended from time to time, in all other cases6;

4(d)

set appropriate standards regarding risk controls and thresholds on trading through direct electronic access;

4(e)

be able to distinguish and if necessary stop orders or trading on that trading venue by a person using direct electronic access separately from -

4(i)

other orders; or

4(ii)

trading by the member or participant providing the direct electronic access; and

4(f)

have arrangements in place to suspend or terminate the provision to a client of direct electronic access to that trading venue by a member of, or participant in, the trading venue in the case of non-compliance with this paragraph.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on direct electronic access permitted through a trading venue’s systems]

4Paragraph 3D – Co-location services

4(1)

The [UK RIE’s] rules on colocation services must be transparent, fair and nondiscriminatory.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements to ensure co-location services are transparent, fair and non-discriminatory]

4Paragraph 3E – Fee structures

4(1)

The [UK RIE’s] fee structure, for all fees it charges including execution fees and ancillary fees and rebates it grants, must -

4(a)

be transparent, fair and non-discriminatory;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements to ensure fee structures are transparent, fair and non-discriminatory]

4(b)

not create incentives to place, modify or cancel orders, or execute transactions, in a way which contributes to disorderly trading conditions or market abuse; and

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements concerning prohibited fee structures]

4(c)

impose market making obligations in individual shares or suitable baskets of shares for any rebates that are granted.

4(2)

Nothing in sub-paragraph (1) prevents the [UK RIE] from -

4(a)

adjusting its fees for cancelled orders according to the length of time for which the order was maintained;

4(b)

calibrating its fees to each financial instrument to which they apply;

4(c)

imposing a higher fee -

4(i)

for placing an order which is cancelled than an order which is executed;

4(ii)

on participants placing a high ratio of cancelled orders to executed orders; or

4(iii)

on a person operating a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique,

4in order to reflect the additional burden on system capacity.

4Paragraph 3F – Algorithmic trading

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must require members of and participants in trading venues operated by it to flag orders generated by algorithmic trading in order for it to be able to identify the -

4(a)

the different algorithms used for the creation of orders; and

4(b)

the persons initiating those orders.

4Paragraph 3G – Tick size regimes

4(1)

Subject to paragraph 1A, the8 [UK RIE] must adopt tick size regimes in respect of trading venues operated by it in -

4(a)

shares, depositary receipts, exchange-traded funds, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on each trading venue; and

4[Note:MiFID RTS 11 contains requirements on the tick size regime for shares, depositary receipts, exchange traded funds and certificates5]

4(b)

any financial instrument for which technical standards are adopted by FCA under paragraphs 24 and 25 of Part 2 of Schedule 3 to6 the markets in financial instruments regulation8 which is traded on that trading venue.

[Note:MiFID RTS 11]

8(1A)

The application of tick sizes shall not prevent the [UK RIE] from matching orders that are large in scale (as determined in accordance with Article 4 of the markets in financial instruments regulation) at the mid-point within the current bid and offer prices.

[Note:MiFID RTS 11]

4 (2)

The tick size regime must -

4(a)

be calibrated to reflect the liquidity profile of the financial instrument in different markets and the average bid-ask spread taking into account desirability of enabling reasonably stable prices without unduly constraining further narrowing of spreads; and

4(b)

adapt the tick size for each financial instrument appropriately.

4(3)

The tick size regime must comply with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/588 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the tick size regime for shares, depositary receipts and exchange-traded funds6.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 11]

4Paragraph 3H – Syncronisation of business clocks

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must synchronise the business clocks it uses to record the date and time of any reportable event in accordance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 of 7 June 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the level of accuracy of business clocks6.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 25]
IPRU-INV 11.1.4GRP
(1) This chapter amplifies threshold condition 2D (Appropriate resources) by providing that a firm must meet, on a continuing basis, a minimum capital resources requirement. This chapter also amplifies Principles 3 and 4 which require a firm to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems, and to maintain adequate financial resources by setting out a capital resources requirement for a firm according