Related provisions for DISP App 3.7A.3
1 - 13 of 13 items.
In relation to a regular premium payment protection contract, the firm should pay to the complainant in respect of each redress period a sum equal to:(1) an amount appropriately representing the commission paid in respect of that period; plus (2) an amount appropriately representing profit share in respect of that period; minus (3) 50% of the amount appropriately representing the total amount paid in respect of that period2 (or other percentage as in DISP App 3.7A.4E). A firm
If the complainant has received any rebate, the firm may calculate the amount of the rebate that represents commission and actual profit share sums paid up to the point of the rebate that were more than 50% (or such other percentage determined under DISP App 3.7A.4E) of the total amount paid in relation to the payment protection contract and deduct this from the amount of redress otherwise payable to the complainant.
Additionally, where a single premium policy was added to a loan:(1) for live policies, where there remains an outstanding loan balance, the firm should, where possible, arrange for the loan to be restructured (without charge to the complainant but using any applicable cancellation value) with the effect of ensuring the number and amounts of any future repayments (including any interest and charges) are the same as would have applied if the commission plus anticipated profit share
Additionally, for a regular premium payment protection contract, where the policy is live the firm should disclose the current level of known or reasonably foreseeable commission and currently anticipated profit share and give the complainant the choice of continuing with the policy without change or cancelling the policy without penalty.
Additionally, where a single premium was added to a loan:(1) for live policies:(a) subject to DISP App 3.7.5 E, where there remains an outstanding loan balance, the firm should, where possible, arrange for the loan to be restructured (without charge to the complainant but using any applicable cancellation value) with the effect of:(i) removing amounts relating to the payment protection contract (including any interest and charges); and(ii) ensuring the number and amounts of any
Where the firm presumes that the complainant would have purchased a regular premium payment protection contract and if the complainant expressly wishes it, the existing cover should continue until the end of the existing policy term. The complainant should pay the price of the alternative regular premium payment protection contract (at DISP App 3.7.13 E) and should be able to cancel at any time. This pricing does not apply where DISP App 3.7.4 E (1)(b) applies.
So that the complainant can make the decision on the continuation of cover from an informed position, the firm should:(1) offer to provide details of the existing payment protection contract;(2) inform the complainant that he may be able to find similar cover more cheaply from another provider in the event that he chooses to cancel the policy and take an alternative but remind the complainant that if his circumstances (for example, his health or employment prospects) have changed
MCOB 9.4.111 R(3) would require, for example, a reference to the fact that the overall cost takes into account mortgage payment protection insurance where this is required as a condition of the lifetime mortgage7 to which the illustration relates. The requirement to take out such insurance must be stated in Sections 5 and 12 of the illustration in accordance with MCOB 9.4.24 R(7), MCOB 9.4.72 R or MCOB 9.4.76 R.7
MCOB 5.6.31 R(5) and MCOB 5.6.32 R(5) would require, for example, a reference to the fact that the overall cost takes into account mortgage payment protection insurance where this is required as a condition of the regulated mortgage contract to which the illustration relates. The requirement to take out such insurance must be stated in Sections 4 and 9 of the illustration in accordance with MCOB 5.6.25 R(6), MCOB 5.6.74 R or MCOB 5.6.77 R.
Where the firm did not disclose to the complainant in advance of a payment protection contract being entered into (and is not aware that any other person did so at that time): (1) the anticipated profit share plus the commission known at the time of the sale; or (2) the anticipated profit share plus the commission reasonably foreseeable at the time of the sale; or (3) the likely range in which (1) or (2) would fall;the firm should consider whether it can satisfy itself on reasonable
(1) The firm should presume that failure to disclose commission gave rise to an unfair relationship under section 140A of the CCA if: (a) the anticipated profit share plus the commission known at the time of the sale; or(b) the anticipated profit share plus the commission reasonably foreseeable at the time of the sale; was: (c) in relation to a single premium payment protection contract, more than 50% of the total amount paid in relation to the payment protection contract; or(d)
The presumption that failure to disclose commission gave rise to an unfair relationship is rebuttable. Examples of factors which may contribute to its rebuttal include:(1) the CCA lender did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know or foresee the level of commission and anticipated profit share; or(2) the complainant could reasonably be expected to be aware of the level of commission and anticipated profit share (e.g. because they worked in a role in the financial
For the purposes of the provisions in this section, what is reasonably foreseeable should be determined with regard to all relevant factors, including, where relevant, any agreement specifying rate changes over the first years of the payment protection contract’s life (as in some regular premium payment protection contracts), and the length of time over which the commission will be governed by the agreement between lender and insurer that is in place at the time of sale.
(1) 1This appendix sets out how:3(a) 3a firm should handle complaints relating to the sale of a payment protection contract by the firm which express dissatisfaction about the sale, or matters related to the sale, including where there is a rejection of claims on the grounds of ineligibility or exclusion (but not matters unrelated to the sale, such as delays in claims handling); and3(b) 3a firm that is a CCA lender and which has received such a complaint should consider whether
3This appendix provides for a two-step approach to handling complaints. Firms should apply it as follows: (1) a firm which is not a CCA lender should only consider step 1;(2) a CCA lender which did not sell the payment protection contract should only consider step 2, but does not have to do so if it knows the complainant has already made a complaint about a breach or failing in respect of the same contract and the outcome was that the firm which considered that complaint concluded
In this appendix:(1) (a) at step 1,3 “historic interest” means the interest the complainant paid to the firm because a payment protection contract was added to a loan or credit product;3(b) at step 2, “historic interest” means in relation to any sum, the interest the complainant paid as a result of that sum being included in the loan or credit product;32(2) "simple interest" means a non-compound rate of 8% per annum;3(3) "claim" means a claim by a complainant seeking to rely upon
3For the purposes of the definitions of “actual profit share”, “anticipated profit share” and “commission”, where the firm has no or incomplete records of the level of commission or profit share arrangements relevant to a particular payment protection contract, it should make reasonable efforts to obtain relevant information from third parties. Where no such information can be obtained, the firm may make reasonable assumptions based on, for example, commission levels or profit
A firm that enters into a lifetime mortgage1 with a customer where interest payments are required (whether or not they will be collected by deduction from the income from an annuity or other linked investment product) must provide the customer with the following information before the customer makes the first payment under the contract:1(1) the amount of the first payment required;(2) the amount of the subsequent payments;(3) the method by which the payments will be collected
Where thelifetime mortgage1 provides for a lump sum payment to be made to the customer, and all or part of the interest will be rolled up during the life of the mortgage, the firm must provide the customer with the following information before the customer makes the first payment under the contract, or if no payments are required from the customer, within seven days of completion of the mortgage:1(1) if no payments are required from the customer, confirmation that no payments
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the firm should presume that the complainant would not have bought the payment protection contract he bought if the sale was substantially flawed, for example where the firm:(1) pressured the complainant into purchasing the payment protection contract; or(2) did not disclose to the complainant, in good time before the sale was concluded, and in a way that was fair, clear and not misleading, that the policy was optional; or(3) made the
The firm should consider all of its sales of payment protection contracts to the complainant in respect of re-financed loans that were rolled up into the loan covered by the payment protection contract that is the subject of the complaint. The firm should consider the cumulative financial impact on the complainant of any previous breaches or failings in those sales or, where relevant, any previous failures to disclose commission1.
(1) When a consumer exercises the right to cancel he may only be required to pay, without any undue delay, for the service actually provided by the firm in accordance with the contract.(2) The amount payable must not:(a) exceed an amount which is in proportion to the extent of the service already provided in comparison with the full coverage of the contract; and(b) in any case be such that it could be construed as a penalty.(3) A firm must not require a consumer to pay any amount:(a)
In assessing redress, the firm should consider whether there are any other further losses that flow from its breach or failing or from its failure to disclose commission (as applicable), 1 that were reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the firm's breach or failing or of its failure to disclose commission,1 for example, where the payment protection contract's cost or rejected claims contributed to affordability issues for the associated loan or credit which led to arrears