Related provisions for SUP 1A.4.7
181 - 200 of 1113 items.
The FCA expects that if a firm ordinarily assigns exposures in the corporate, institution or central government and central bank exposure classes to a member of a group, substantially on the basis of membership of that group and a common group rating, and the firm does so in the case of a particular obligor group, the firm should consider whether members of that group should be treated as a single obligor for the purpose of the definition of default in article 178(1) of the EU
The FCA would not expect a firm to treat an obligor as part of a single obligor under IFPRU 4.5.1 G if the firm rates its exposures on a standalone basis or if its rating is notched. (For these purposes, a rating is notched if it takes into account individual risk factors or otherwise reflects risk factors that are not applied on a common group basis.) Accordingly, if a group has two members which are separately rated, the FCA will not expect that the default of one will necessarily
Under article 178(1)(b)1 of the EU CRR, the FCA is empowered to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential or SME commercial real estate in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities (PSEs).1
The FCA would expect to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential real estate in the retail exposure class, and/or for exposures to PSEs,1 where this was requested by the firm. Where this occurred, it would be specified in the firm's IRB permission.
To be satisfied that a firm complies with the documentation requirements in article 175(3) of the EU CRR, the FCA expects a firm should have a clear and documented policy for determining whether an exposure that has been in default should subsequently be returned to performing status (see article 175(3) of the EU CRR).
In the FCA's view, the matters identified in PERG 8.10.2 G mean that:(1) for a communication to be real time it must be made in course of an interactive dialogue; but that(2) if the interactive dialogue takes place by means of the exchange of letters or e-mails or in a publication, the communication will be deemed to be non-real time. In this case, publications include newspapers, journals, magazines or other periodical publications, websites or similar systems for the electronic
The words ‘personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive dialogue’ clearly imply that the first two are types of the third. In the FCA's view, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which a personal visit or telephone conversation would not be interactive. The very fact of a conversation taking place would mean two or more persons were interacting with each other. A telephone call is not the same thing as a conversation. It may be made to, or even by, an intelligent
In the FCA's view, the fact that scope for interaction is essential if a financial promotion is to be real time leads to the following conclusions.(1) Most communications made in written or pictorial form will not offer scope for interaction. The most likely exception to this is where persons are expected to respond immediately. This situation may arise, for example, where the equivalent of a telephone conversation is conducted by e-mail. This is the basis of the exemption in
In the FCA's view, a communication which may exist in enduring form will be a non-real time communication. Examples of this include videos, audio cassettes, bulletin boards, websites and recorded telephone messages. Messages placed on Internet chat-rooms will also be non-real time. Radio or television programmes or teletext services may contain communications that involve an interactive dialogue. For example, a communication made by the broadcaster and addressed to an interviewee
PERG 8.6.9 G explains that article 6 of the Financial Promotion Order has the broad effect that a communication is made to another person where it is addressed to a particular person or persons. It also states that a ‘recipient’ of a communication is the person or persons to who it is made (that is to whom it is addressed). This takes on importance where certain exemptions which apply to real time financial promotions made to a person are concerned. It appears to the FCA that,
In the FCA's view, persons who may be engaging in investment activity or engaging in claims management activity1 jointly include:(1) a married couple;(2) two or more persons, who will invest jointly in a product (for example, a cohabiting couple who are not married or members of a family);(3) the directors of a company or partners in a firm;(4) members of a group of companies;(5) the participants in a joint commercial enterprise;(6) the members of an investment club; and(7) the
In the FCA's view, the mere fact of a person accepting an invitation to attend a meeting does not automatically mean that he has initiated any dialogue which may take place during the meeting and which may amount to a financial promotion. This will depend on the facts of each case and such matters as the manner in which the invitations are made, the arrangements for acceptance and how the meeting is conducted. For example, the fact that investments or investment services will
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
In the FCA's view, the circumstances in which a person is giving advice on the borrower varying the terms of a regulated mortgage contract so as to vary his obligations under the contract include (but are not limited to) where the advice is about:(1) the borrower obtaining a further advance secured on the same land as the original loan; or(2) a rate switch or a product switch (that is, where the borrower does not change lender but changes the terms for repayment from, say, a variable
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may7 take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:7(1) a person may provide information on a selected, rather than balanced7, basis that would tend to influence the decision of the borrower; and7(2) a person, as a result of going through the sales process, may discuss7 the merits of one regulated mortgage contract over another, resulting in advice to
(1) There are two aspects of the definition of advising on regulated mortgage contracts that are particularly relevant to whether pre-sale questioning involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts:7(a) the fact that advice must relate to a particular regulated mortgage contract (see PERG 4.6.5G); and (b) the distinction between information and advice (see PERG 4.6.13G). (2) Whether or not pre-sale7 questioning in any particular case is advising on regulated mortgage contracts
7The first type involves identifying regulated mortgage contracts based on7 factual matters. For example, the purpose may be to identify7 whether a borrower wishes to pay a fixed or variable rate of interest or the size of deposit available.7 There are various possible scenarios, including the following:(1) the questioner may go on to identify several particular7regulated mortgage contracts which match features identified by the pre-sale7 questioning; provided these are presented
When the scripted pre-sale questioning identifies particular regulated mortgage contracts (see7PERG 4.6.23G(3) and PERG 4.6.24G(2)), the FCA considers that it is necessary to look at the process and outcome of the pre-sale questioning as a whole7 in deciding whether the process involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts. Factors that may be relevant7 include:1111(1) any representations made by the questioner at the start of the questioning relating to the service they are7
2Further examples of what is and is not regulated advice
This table belongs to PERG 4.6.33 G.
Example of what the firm3 says and does 3 |
Regulated or not? |
(1) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, including fixed and variable rates. Here are some leaflets which set out the main features.” |
No. Leaflets that just explain the terms and conditions of a lender’s products are not advice (see PERG 4.6.15G (1)). Even if the leaflet contains promotional material, merely handing over the leaflet does not mean that the firm is giving advice. |
(2) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, our best rates are two-year fixed rates, you might want to look at those.” |
Yes. The firm has identified specific products that it offers and is drawing the customer’s attention7 to those products. Identifying which products have the lowest rates is not advice on its own, only facts. However, “best” involves a value judgement7, particularly when a comparison is made with other products that have different periods for which interest is fixed or that have variable interest rates. |
(3) The firm says “In order to provide you with an illustration, I need to know how much you want to borrow, the term and the property value. Which product or products would you like an illustration for?” |
No. The firm is collecting factual information to provide the customer with an illustration of costs. |
(4) The firm says “Based on what you’ve told me I think you would be best to look at two-year fixed rates. Here is some information about our products.” |
Yes. The firm has made a judgment on what type of product is best for the customer and has identified specific products of that type that it offers. |
(5) The firm says “Our fixed rates start at 4.99% for two years with a £900 fee. Our variable rates start at 4.50% with a £800 fee. Depending on how much you want to borrow and your circumstances, this may affect the rate available to you.” |
No. The firm is comparing two products without recommending either, nor is the firm recommending7 one over the other. |
(6) A lender with just one mortgage product advises a customer to take out that mortgage. The lender makes it clear that it does not give advice about products other than its own. |
Yes. The lender may argue that this is not regulated advice because it is not recommending one product over another as it only has one product itself and does not give advice about the products of other lenders. However, in the FCA's view this is still regulated advice. For advice to be regulated it must be advice on the merits of entering into a particular regulated mortgage contract (or varying one). It is possible to give advice about the merits of a product without comparing that product with another. |
Note: Unless otherwise specified, the firm might be the lender or an advisory or intermediary firm. |
|
1When considering whether to cancel a sponsor's approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the sponsor;
(2) the adequacy of the sponsor's systems and controls;
(3) the sponsor's history of compliance with the listing rules;
(4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected failure of the sponsor to meet (at
1When considering whether to cancel a primary information provider’s approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the primary information provider; (2) the adequacy of the primary information provider’s systems and controls;
(3) the primary information provider’s history of compliance with DTR 8; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected
1The following are examples of situations where the FCA may consider it appropriate to seek a court order under section 258 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261Y (in the case of an ACS) to remove the authorised fund
manager or depositary:
(1) Where there are grounds for concern over the behaviour of the authorised fund
manager or depositary in respect of the management of the scheme or of its assets. (2) Where an authorised
1The FCA recognises that participants in an AUT or ACS have a direct financial interest in the scheme
property. It follows that in cases where it considers it appropriate to use its section 254 power (in the case of an AUT) or its section 261U power (in the case of an ACS) to revoke an authorisation order, the FCA will generally first require the authorised fund
manager or depositary to wind up the AUT or ACS (or seek a court order for the
The FCA will try to notify the applicant
of its decision on an application for approval of listing
particulars or supplementary
listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified
in article 20 of the Prospectus Regulation3 for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary
prospectus.
An issuer must
ensure that after listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are approved
by the FCA, the listing
particulars or supplementary
listing particulars are filed and published as if the relevant
requirements in PR 3.2, 1the PD Regulation and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/301 1applied
to them.
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards applications to the court for an injunction or restitution order. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 10 and EG 11.
Energy market participants should bear in mind that3sections 138A and 138B of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FCA4 must be satisfied that:4344(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of any of the FCA's operational objectives.44
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers
1When determining whether to take action to impose a penalty or to issue a public censure in relation to the contraventions of a CCA Requirement, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6.2 and DEPP 6.4. When determining the level of financial penalty, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5B, DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.7.
1When determining whether to take action to impose a suspension or restriction in relation to the contraventions of CCA Requirements, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6A.2 and DEPP 6A.4. When determining the length of the period of suspension or restriction, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6A.3.
1The FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of each case. The general factors which the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to, those set out in paragraph 14.1.1 (1) to (9) (the conduct of the operator of the scheme and of the trustee or depositary will also, of course, be taken into account in relation to each of these factors).
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for collective investment scheme related orders under the Act will be made by the RDC Chairman or, in an urgent case and if the Chairman is not available, by an RDC Deputy Chairman. In an exceptionally urgent case the matter will be decided by the director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, another member of the FCA's executive of at least director of division level.
1An exceptionally urgent case in these circumstances is one where the FCA staff believe that a decision to begin proceedings (1) should be taken before it is possible to follow the procedure described in paragraph 14.4.3; and (2) it is necessary to protect the interests of consumers or potential consumers.
1The FCA considers that in general, the earlier settlement discussions can take place the better this is likely to be from a public interest perspective. However, the FCA will only engage in such discussions once it has a sufficient understanding of the nature and gravity of the suspected misconduct or issue to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate outcome. At the other end of the spectrum, the FCA expects that settlement discussions following a decision notice or second
1In the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, the FCA will set clear and challenging timetables for settlement discussions to ensure that they result in a prompt outcome and do not divert resources unnecessarily from progressing a case through the formal process. To this end, the FCA will aim to organise its resources so that the preparation for the formal process continues in parallel with any settlement discussions. The FCA will expect firms and others to give it all reasonable
The decision maker will:(1) consider whether the material on which the recommendation is based is adequate to support it; the decision maker may seek additional information about or clarification of the recommendation, which may necessitate additional work by the relevant FCA2 staff;2(2) satisfy itself that the action recommended is appropriate in all the circumstances;(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
1DEPP 7 applies when the FCA3:3(1) has appointed an investigator at
the request of an overseas regulator,
under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators) or of an EEA regulator under
section 131FA2 of the Act;
and(2) has directed, or is considering
directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act,
to permit a representative of the overseas
regulator or
of the EEA regulator2 to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the
purposes
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FCA's3 statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction
under section 169(7) or
section 131FA2 has been given or the FCA3 is considering giving. The FCA3 is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by
section 169(9) and (11) and
section 131FA2 of the Act.
As required by section 169(10) and
section 131FA2 of the Act, the Treasury has approved
the statement of policy.333
1The FCA wishes to encourage firms to exercise judgement about, and take responsibility for, what the Principles mean for them in terms of how they conduct their business. But we also recognise the importance of an environment in which firms understand what is expected of them. So we have indicated that firms must be able reasonably to predict, at the time of the action concerned, whether the conduct would breach the Principles. This has sometimes been described as the “reasonable
1To determine whether there has been a failure to comply with a Principle, the standards we will apply are those required by the Principles at the time the conduct took place. The FCA will not apply later, higher standards to behaviour when deciding whether to take enforcement action for a breach of the Principles. Importantly, however, where conduct falls below expected standards the FCA considers that it is legitimate for consequences to follow, even if the conduct is widespread
The FCA's power to require information to assist EEA regulators in respect of the Market Abuse Regulation or any directly applicable EU regulation made under the Market Abuse Regulation or the auction regulation is contained in section 122B(6) of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an EEA regulator, the FCA may use its power under section 122B to require the production of information.[Note: see Regulation 6 and Schedule 1 to the RAP Regulations in relation to
Section 122B(7) of the Act states that the FCA must, in deciding whether or not to exercise its power to require information, consider whether the exercise of that power is necessary to comply with the Market Abuse Regulation or any directly applicable EU regulation made under the Market Abuse Regulation or the auction regulation.
The FCA may give information under 122D(1) or 176(1) (Entry of premises under warrant) at the request of an EEA regulator where the regulator makes the request in the exercise of its functions under the Market Abuse Regulation. Section 122D(11) of the Act states that the FCA must, in deciding whether or not to exercise it powers of entry of premises under warrant, consider whether the exercise of that power is necessary for the purpose of the exercise by it of its obligations