Related provisions for IFPRU 4.12.19
61 - 80 of 158 items.
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
(1) 3Where a firm has established that a historical policy does exist, the response should confirm what cover was provided and set out any available information that is relevant to the request received.(2) Where there is evidence to suggest that a historical policy does exist, but the firm is unable to confirm what cover was provided, the response should set out any information relevant to the request and describe the next steps (if any) the firm will take to continue the search.
1The FCA will adopt a risk-based approach to its enforcement under2 the Money Laundering Regulations. Failures in anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing2 controls will not automatically result in disciplinary sanctions, although enforcement action is more likely where a firm has not taken adequate steps to identify its2 risks or put in place appropriate controls to mitigate those risks, and failed to take steps to ensure that controls are being effectively implemented.
(1) 1This rule applies to a UK firm operating a multilateral trading facility or an OTF and a UK branch of a third country investment firm operating a multilateral trading facility or an OTF.(2)
A firm must make public and provide to the FCA and ESMA a weekly report with the aggregate positions held by the different categories of persons for the different commodity derivatives or emission allowances traded on the trading venue, where those instruments meet the criteria of article
The FCA would not expect a firm to treat an obligor as part of a single obligor under IFPRU 4.5.1 G if the firm rates its exposures on a standalone basis or if its rating is notched. (For these purposes, a rating is notched if it takes into account individual risk factors or otherwise reflects risk factors that are not applied on a common group basis.) Accordingly, if a group has two members which are separately rated, the FCA will not expect that the default of one will necessarily
1The FCA expects a firm to use the client assets report as a tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the systems that it has in place for the purpose of complying with requirements to which SUP 3.10.5 R refers. Accordingly, a firm should ensure that the report is integrated into its risk management framework and decision-making.
If a firm intends either (a) to remedy a fall in capital resources, or (b) to prevent such a fall, for example, by taking management action to reduce the risks to which a with-profits fund is exposed or by reducing non-contractual benefits for policyholders, it should explain to the FCA how such proposed actions are consistent with the firm's obligations under Principle 6 (Customers' interests).
(1) In designing its approach to supervision,
the FCA has regard to the regulatory
principles set out in section 3B of the Act.
In particular, the FCA's regulatory
approach aims to focus and reinforce the responsibility of the senior management
of each firm (section 3B(1)(d)
of the Act) to ensure that it
takes reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the firm responsibly and effectively, and develops
and maintains adequate risk management systems. It is the responsibility
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems or resources will automatically lead to a firm contravening Principle 3 or 4. Rather, the potential impact of a group member's activities (and, for example, risk management systems
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
Business and internal control risks vary from firm to firm, according to the nature and complexity of the business. The FCA's assessment of these risks is reflected in how its rules apply to different categories of firm as well as in the use of its other regulatory tools. One of the tools the FCA has available is to give a firm individual guidance on the application of the requirements or standards under the regulatory system in the firm's particular circumstances.
(1) 1Regulation 17 of the MiFI Regulations regulates the position limit exemption applicable to positions in a commodity derivative held by or on behalf of a non-financial entity which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity, and which is approved by the FCA in accordance with the relevant criteria and procedures. Regulation 17(1) imposes an obligation on the FCA to disregard such positions, when calculating
The articles in IFPRU 1.2.1 G do not always carry the same wording in describing what may be significant in terms of a firm's scope, nature, scale, internal organisation and complexity, but the articles have a general policy to restrict the application of those requirements to institutions which pose higher risks by virtue of broadly their size, types of business and complexity of activities. The FCA's policy is to apply an objective definition with pre-defined thresholds to determine