Related provisions for GEN 1.1.2
261 - 280 of 640 items.
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
This chapter applies to an incoming firm or a UCITS qualifier only in respect of a top-up permission. An incoming firm or a UCITS qualifier should refer to SUP 14 (Variation of passport rights by incoming EEA firms and ending authorisation) for the procedures for changes to permission granted under Schedules 3, 4 or 5 of the Act.
(1) 7In SUP 6 the "relevant regulator" is the regulator to which a firm with a Part 4A permission has made or can make (in accordance with SUP 6) an application to vary or cancel its Part 4A permission or to have imposed on it a new requirement or to vary or cancel any existing requirement (see SUP 6.2.3A G to SUP 6.2.3E G).(2) Where the PRA can only determine an application with the consent of the FCA, the FCA may request further information as if it were the relevant regulator.(3)
As with any other contract, a contract of insurance that is not effected by way of a deed will only be legally binding if, amongst other things, it is entered into for valuable consideration. Determining what amounts to sufficient consideration in any given case is a matter for the courts. In practice, however, the legal definition of consideration is very wide. In particular, just because a contract of insurance is 'free' in the colloquial sense does not mean that there is no
(1) This chapter sets out the requirements that a person must follow in applying for an authorisation order for a scheme under regulation 12 of the OEIC Regulations (Applications for authorisation),2section 242 of the Act (Applications for authorisation of unit trust schemes) or section 261C of the Act (Applications for authorisation of contractual schemes)2.2(2) COLLG 3A (The FCA’s responsibilities under the Act) and COLLG 4A (The FCA’s responsibilities under the OEIC Regulations)
1An EEA UCITS management company that proposes to act as the authorised fund manager2 of an AUT, ACS or2ICVC that is a UCITS scheme, should be aware that it is required under paragraph 15A(1) of Schedule 3 to the Act to apply to the appropriate regulator for approval to do so. The form that the firm must use for this purpose is set out in SUP 13A Annex 3 R (EEA UCITS management companies: application for approval to manage a UCITS scheme established in the United Kingdom). In
1This
manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved
persons and other persons,
whether or not they are regulated by the FCA.5 It sets out:5(1) the FCA's5 decision-making procedure for giving statutory
notices. These are warning
notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);5(1A) the FCA's decision-making
procedure in cases where the PRA is
required to seek the FCA's consent
before approving an application (a) for Part
4A permission; (b) for the variation
In cases against individuals, including market abuse cases, the FCA3 may make a prohibition order under section 56 of the Act or withdraw an individual’s approval under section 63 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 reflects the FCA's3 assessment of the individual’s fitness to perform regulated activity or suitability for a particular role, and does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach.
2The FCA3 may withdraw a firm’s authorisation under section 33 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach. However, the fact that the FCA3 has withdrawn a firm’s authorisation, as a result of which the firm may have less earning potential, may be relevant in assessing whether the penalty will cause the firm serious financial hardship.3333
If an approval is limited under MCOB 3A.4.6 R, and an unauthorised personcommunicates the financial promotion to persons not covered by the approval, the unauthorised person may commit an offence under section 21(1) of the Act (Restrictions on financial promotion). A firm giving a limited approval may wish to advise the unauthorised person accordingly.
A firm must not communicate or approve a financial promotion which relates to qualifying credit provided by an overseas person, unless:(1) the financial promotion of qualifying credit makes clear which firm has approved or communicated it and, where relevant, explains:(a) that the rules made under the Act for the protection of customers do not apply;(b) the extent and level to which the compensation scheme will be available or, if the scheme will not be available, a statement
(1) Where a restriction under MAR 4.3.1 R applies, an authorised professional firm is not prevented from providing professional advice or representation in any proceedings to the person where that falls within section 327(8) of the Act. This means that the person can obtain legal advice or representation in any proceedings from a law firm and accounting advice from an accounting firm: see MAR 4.4.1 R (2).(2) While the FCA recognises the duty of authorised professional firms to
(1) A proposal that an authorised fund should be involved in a scheme of arrangement is subject to written notice to and approval by the FCA under section 251 of the Act (Alteration of schemes and changes of manager or trustee), section 261Q of the Act (Alteration of contractual schemes and changes of operator or depositary)2 or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company). Effect cannot be given to such a change
(1) If a scheme of arrangement is entered into in relation to an authorised fund ("transferor fund") or a sub-fund of a scheme which is an umbrella ("transferor sub-fund"), an authorised fund manager must ensure that the unitholders of the transferor fund or sub-fund do not become unitholders of units in a collective investment scheme other than a regulated collective investment scheme.(2) For a UCITS scheme or a sub-fund of a UCITS scheme, (1) applies as if the reference to a
The FCA may, on a case-by-case basis, require a firm which does not meet any of the conditions in IFPRU 1.2.3 R to comply with the rules and requirements that apply to a significant IFPRU firm if the FCA considers it appropriate to do so to meet its strategic objective or to advance one or more of its operational objectives under the Act.
(1) A firm may apply to the FCA under section 138A of the Act to waive any one or more of the conditions in IFPRU 1.2.3 R if it believes that one or more of the governance requirements in (2) that apply to a significant IFPRU firm may be disproportionate to it. In its application for such waiver, the FCA expects the firm to demonstrate, taking into account size, nature, scope and complexity of its activities in the context of it being a member of a group and the internal organisation
This chapter gives guidance to a firm, which is considering appointing an appointed representative, on how the provisions of section 39 of the Act (Exemption of appointed representatives) work. For example, it gives guidance on the conditions that must be satisfied for a person to be appointed as an appointed representative. It also gives guidance to a firm on the implications, for the firm itself, of appointing an appointed representative.
2This chapter also sets out:5(1) guidance about section 39A of the Act, which is relevant to a UK MiFID investment firm that is considering appointing an FCA registered tied agent; and5(2) the FCA’s rules, and guidance on those rules, in relation to the appointment of:5(a) an EEA tied agent by a UK MiFID investment firm;5(b) a MiFID optional exemption appointed representative; and5(c) a structured deposit appointed representative.5
A contravention of a rule in SYSC 11 to 2SYSC 21,7SYSC 22.8.1R or SYSC 22.9.1R7 does not give rise to a right of action by a private person under section 138D of the Act (and each of those rules is specified under section 138D(3) of the Act as a provision giving rise to no such right of action). 3443
In the3 case of a senior staff committee,3 the
decision will be taken by FCA3 staff who have not been directly involved in establishing the
evidence on which the decision is based
or by two or more FCA staff
who include a person not directly involved in establishing that evidence,3 except in accordance with section 395(3) of the Act.33
1If an individual appears to be unable to pay a regulated activity debt, or to have no reasonable prospect of doing so, then section 372 of the Act permits the FCA to petition for the individual's bankruptcy, or in Scotland, for the sequestration of the individual's estate. The FCA will petition for bankruptcy or sequestration only if it believes that the individual is, in fact, insolvent. In determining this, as a general rule, the FCA will serve a demand requiring the individual
1If the FCA believes that the individual is insolvent, the factors it will consider when it decides whether to seek a bankruptcy order or sequestration award include: (1) whether others have taken steps to deal with the individual's insolvency, including a proposal by the individual of a voluntary arrangement, a petition by the individual for his own bankruptcy or sequestration, or a petition by a third party for the individual's bankruptcy or the sequestration of the individual's
Section 333T of the Act (Funding of action against illegal money lending) requires the Treasury to notify the FCA of the amount of the Treasury’s illegal money lending costs. The FCA must make rules requiring authorised persons, or any specified class of authorised person, to pay to the FCA the specified amounts or amounts calculated in a specified way, with a view to recovering the amounts notified to it by the Treasury.
Under section 21(4) of the Act, the Treasury has the power to specify circumstances in which a person is viewed as ‘acting in the course of business’ or ‘not acting in the course of business’. The power under section 21(4) relates only to financial promotions and is distinct from the power in section 419 which relates to regulated activities. To date, the Treasury has not used the power in section 21(4). As a result, the phrase has its ordinary or natural meaning.
The FCA considers that ‘in the course of business’ requires a commercial interest on the part of the communicator. This does not necessarily have to be a direct interest. And the communicator does not need to be carrying on regulated activities (the test in section 19 of the Act) as or as part of his business. Neither does the communication need to be made in the course of carrying on activities as a business in their own right (the test in article 3 of the Financial Services
1Exceptionally, the FCA will consider making such a challenge using its powers in sections 356 and 357 of the Act after considering, in particular, the following matters: (1) The composition of the creditors of the company including the ratio of consumer to non-consumer creditors or the nature of their claims;
(2) whether the FCA has concerns, or is aware of concerns of creditors, about the regularity of the meeting or the identification of connected or associated
1This section applies to a firm:(1) communicating with a customer; or(2) communicating or approving a financial promotion other than:(a) a financial promotion that would benefit from an exemption in the Financial Promotion Order if it were communicated by an unauthorised person;(b) a promotion of an unregulated collective investment scheme that would breach section 238(1) of the Act if made by an authorised person (firms may not communicate or approve such promotions).
4As well as potentially breaching the requirements in this section, misleading statements by a firm may involve a breach of Principle 7 (Communications with clients) or section Part 7 (Offences relating to financial services) of the Financial Services Act 2012, as well as giving rise to private law actions for misrepresentation.
2In general, although the legislation governing transfers of engagements involves friendly societies is the Friendly Societies Act 1992, similar issues arise in these transfers as in insurance business transfers under Part VII of the Act and so the regulators would expect firms to be subject to a similar process followed under the Act. Accordingly, firms should usually first discuss the procedural aspects for dealing with friendly society transfers and amalgamations with the PRA.
For an amalgamation the successor society, and for a transfer the transferee, may need to apply for permission, or to vary its permission, under Part 4A2 of the Act. The regulators2 will need sufficient time before a transfer is confirmed2 to consider whether any necessary permission or variation should be given. If the transferee is an EEA firm or a Swiss general insurance company, then confirmation will be needed from its Home State regulator that it meets the Home State's solvency
The criteria that the appropriate authority2 must use in determining whether to confirm a proposed amalgamation or transfer are set out in schedule 15 to the Friendly Societies Act 1992. These criteria include that:2(1) confirmation must not be given if the appropriate authority2 considers that:2(a) there is a substantial risk that the successor society or transferee will be unable lawfully to carry out the engagements to be transferred to it;(b) information material to the members'
Under section 115 of the Act, the appropriate regulator3 has the power to give a certificate confirming that a firm possesses any necessary margin of solvency,1 to facilitate an insurance business transfer to the firm under overseas legislation from a firm authorised in another EEA State or from a Swiss general insurance company. This section provides guidance on how the appropriate regulator3 would exercise this power and on related matters.313