Related provisions for COLL 6.9.5
1 - 20 of 33 items.
(1) The credit risk of an asset is the risk of loss if another party fails to perform its obligations or fails to perform them in a timely fashion.(2) Where, for example, the asset pool includes residential mortgages the relevant factors which the FCA may consider include: (a) whether the asset pool contains (or could contain) loans made to individuals who have been made bankrupt or have had court judgments made against them;(b) the extent to which the asset pool contains (or
The FCA expects the issuer to demonstrate, as part of showing that Regulations 17 (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations will be complied with, that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme which enable the views and interests of investors in the regulated covered bond to be taken account of in an appropriate and timely way by a suitably qualified, adequately resourced,
(1) Regulation 15(8)(f) of the OEIC Regulations (Requirements for authorisation) requires independence between the depositary, the ICVC and the ICVC's directors, as does section 243(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the trustee and manager of an AUT, and section 261D(4) of the Act (Authorisation orders) for the depositary and authorised fund manager of an ACS6. COLL 6.9.3 G to COLL 6.9.5 G give the6FCA's view of the meaning of independence of these relationships. An ICVC,
(1) Independence is likely to be lost if, by means of executive power, either relevant party could control the action of the other.(2) The board of one relevant party should not be able to exercise effective control of the board of another relevant party. Arrangements which might indicate this situation include quorum provisions and reservations of decision-making capacity of certain directors.(3) For an AUT or ACS6, the FCA would interpret the concept of directors in common to
Independence is likely to be lost if either of the relevant parties could control the actions of the other by means of shareholders' votes. The FCA considers this would happen if any shareholding by one relevant party and their respective associates in the other exceeds 15% of the voting share capital, either in a single share class or several share classes. The FCA would be willing, however, to look at cross-shareholdings exceeding 15% on a case-by-case basis to consider if there
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
(1) 15This guidance is relevant to a relevant authorised person required to
appoint a compliance officer under SYSC 6.1.4R.(2) Taking account of the nature, scale and complexity of its activities,
the firm should have appropriate procedures to ensure that the
removal or any other disciplinary sanctioning of the compliance
officer does not undermine the independence of the compliance
function.(3) In the FCA's view, it will be appropriate, in many cases, for the
removal or any other
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to any relevant factor including, but not limited to:4(1) the commitment shown by the UK recognised body'sgoverning body to satisfying the recognition requirements and to complying with other obligations in or under the Act;(2) its arrangements, policies and resources for fulfilling its obligations under the Act in relation to its activities as a UK recognised body;(3) the extent to
At least two independent minds should be applied to the formulation and implementation of the policies of a common platform firm, a management company3, a full-scope UK AIFM5 and the UK branch of a non-EEA bank1. Where a firm1 nominates just two individuals to direct its business, the appropriate regulator will not regard them as both effectively directing the business where one of them makes some, albeit significant, decisions relating to only a few aspects of the business.