Related provisions for BIPRU 7.4.15
61 - 80 of 246 items.
3Firms should substitute equivalent home reversion terminology for lifetime mortgage terminology, where appropriate. Examples of terms and expressions that should be replaced in relation to home reversion plans are 'loan' or 'amount borrowed', which should be replaced with 'amount released' or 'amount to be released', as appropriate, and 'mortgage lender' and 'mortgage intermediary' which should be replaced with 'reversion provider' and 'reversion intermediary'.
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should
A business illustration provided to a customer must:(1) use the headings and prescribed text in MCOB 5 Annex 1 (except as provided in MCOB 5.7) but need not follow the format;(2) include the content required by MCOB 5.6.3 R to MCOB 5.6.130 G (except MCOB 5.6.5 R, MCOB 5.6.101 R, MCOB 5.6.109 R to MCOB 5.6.112 G, MCOB 5.6.120 R and MCOB 5.6.121 R);1(3) use the key facts logo followed by the text 'about this [term used by the firm to describe the borrowing, for example 'mortgage']';(4)
(1) MCOB 5.7.2 R(1) means that firms do not have to follow the ordering of sections set down in MCOB 5.6, although they may choose to do so.(2) In accordance with MCOB 5.7.2 R(8) an example of an appropriate variation to the risk warning would be:'Your home may be repossessed if you are unable to fulfil the terms of this secured overdraft'.(3) A firm may also choose to include other information beyond that required by MCOB 5.6. However, when adding additional material a firm should
416These procedures should, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the respondent's business, ensure that lessons learned as a result of determinations by the Ombudsman are effectively applied in future complaint handling, for example by:(1) relaying a determination by the Ombudsman to the individuals in the respondent who handled the complaint and using it in their training and development;(2) analysing any patterns in determinations by the Ombudsman concerning
In respect of complaints that do not relate to MiFID business, a respondent must put in place appropriate management controls and take reasonable steps to ensure that in handling complaints it identifies and remedies any recurring or systemic problems, for example, by: 1(1) analysing the causes of individual complaints so as to identify root causes common to types of complaint;(2) considering whether such root causes may also affect other processes or products, including those
(1) does not envisage that an issuer will: DTR 2.5.3 R (1) does
not allow an issuer to delay
public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its
worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the
negotiations to deal with such a situation. An issuer cannot
delay disclosure of inside information on
the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation
will be jeopardised by the disclosure of its financial
(1) When an issuer is
permitted to delay public disclosure of inside
information in accordance with DTR 2.5.1 R, it may selectively disclose
that information to persons owing
it a duty of confidentiality.(2) Such selective disclosure may be
made to another person if it
is in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties.
However, selective disclosure cannot be made to any person simply
because they owe the issuer a
duty of confidentiality. For example,
A firm must ensure that, as soon as possible after the sale of a repossessed property, if the proceeds of sale are less than the amount due under the regulated mortgage contract or home purchase plan1, the customer is informed in a durable medium of:1(1) the sale shortfall; and(2) where relevant, the fact that the sale shortfall1may be pursued by another company (for example, a mortgage indemnity insurer).1
This chapter1 recognises the need to apply a differing level of regulatory protection to the assets which form the basis of the two different types of arrangement described in CASS 3.1.5 G. Under the bare security interest arrangement, the asset continues to belong to the client until the firm's right to realise that asset crystallises (that is, on the client's default). But under a "right to use arrangement", the client has transferred to the firm the legal title and associated
In this appendix:(1) "historic interest" means the interest the complainant paid to the firm because a single premium payment protection contract was added to a loan or credit product;(2) "simple interest" means a non-compound rate of 8% per annum; and(3) "claim" means a claim by a complainant seeking to rely upon the policy under the payment protection contract that is the subject of the complaint.
A consumer2 has no right to cancel a home finance transaction1 concluded with a firm but may have a right to cancel a distance contract concluded with a mortgage intermediary,3 a home purchase intermediary or a SRB intermediary31for the provision of his services. Whether a mortgage intermediary,3 a home purchase intermediary or a SRB intermediary31 concludes a distance mortgage mediation contract,3 a distance home purchase mediation contract or a distance regulated sale and rent
Regulation 11 (Automatic cancellation of an attached distance contract) of the Distance Marketing Regulations, has the effect that when notice of cancellation is given in relation to a contract, that notice also operates to cancel any attached contract, which is also a distance financial services contract. An example of such an attached contract might be a distance non-investment insurance contract.
(1) There are certain additional disclosure requirements laid down by the Distance Marketing Directive that will have to be provided by a mortgage intermediary,6 a home purchase intermediary and a SRB intermediary64 to a consumer5 prior to the conclusion of a distance mortgage mediation contract,66 a distance home purchase mediation contract4 or a distance regulated sale and rent back mediation contract.6 The purpose of this section, MCOB 4.5, is to set out those additional requirements.
(1) The information in MCOB 4 Annex 3 will be provided in 'good time' for the purposes of MCOB 4.5.2 R (1), if provided in sufficient time to enable the customer to consider properly the services on offer.(2) An example of the circumstances in which MCOB 4.5.2 R (4) or (5) may apply is given in MCOB 4.4.4 G. If the initial disclosure document and accompanying information (including that in MCOB 4 Annex 3) was previously provided to a customer and continues to be appropriate, there
If the SRB agreement seller or a member of his family makes contact with the SRB agreement provider during the 14 day cooling-off period, for example because he wants to query a term of the written pre-offer document, the provider must endeavour to answer the query in as factual a manner as the circumstances permit but avoid any language or conduct which could be interpreted as amounting to an attempt to exert pressure on the SRB agreement seller to enter into the proposed ag
The SRB agreement provider must keep a record of the written pre-offer document at Stage One and the written offer document for signing at Stage Two for a period of:(1) one year after the end of the fixed term of the tenancy under the regulated sale and rent back agreement; or(2) five years from the date of the disclosures and warnings, written offer documents and cooling-off period notices;whichever is the longer.
MCOB 2.3.2 R does not prevent a firm: (1) assisting a home finance intermediary2 so that the quality of the home finance intermediary's2 service to customers is enhanced; or 22(2) giving or receiving indirect benefits (such as gifts, hospitality and promotional competition prizes); providing in either case this is not likely to give rise to a conflict with the duties that the recipient owes to the customer. In particular, such benefits should not be of a kind or value that is
(1) A firm must not operate a system of giving or offering inducements to a mortgage intermediary, reversion intermediary,2SRB intermediary3 or any other third party whereby the value of the inducement increases if the intermediary2 or third party, such as a packager, exceeds a target set for the amount of business referred (for example, a volume override). 2(2) A firm must not solicit or accept an inducement whereby the value of the inducement increases if the firm exceeds a
A firm may meet the requirement in BIPRU 7.10.26R by using different model parameters and employing a suitable adjustment mechanism to produce a figure which is equivalent to the figure produced using the parameters set out in BIPRU 7.10.26R. For example, a firm's model may use a 95% one-tailed confidence limit if the firm has a mechanism to convert the output of the model to reflect a 99% one-tailed confidence limit.
This paragraph provides guidance onBIPRU 7.10.46 R (2). Take as an example a VaR model based on a factor model or on a historical simulation model. The ability of the model to explain price variation could be demonstrated by a statistical comparison over the same period of time between actual price changes on the portfolio and the profit and loss impact of risk factors included within the model. A firm may wish to include an estimate of residual variation not explained by the
For example, BIPRU 7.10.53R might involve creating and documenting a prudent incremental PRR charge for the risk not captured in the VaR model and holding sufficient capital resources against this risk. In that case the firm should hold capital resources at least equal to its capital resources requirement as increased by adding this incremental charge to the model PRR. Alternatively the firm may make valuation adjustments through its profit and loss reserves to cover this material
- (1)
The main provision within the definition of alternative debenture arrangements that seeks to ensure that only instruments that display the characteristics of a debt security can be alternative debentures is set out at PERG 2.6.11CG (5). It provides that the amount of additional payments under the arrangements must not exceed an amount which would, at the time the bond is issued, be a reasonable commercial return on a loan of capital. Where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered in deciding this question. The following example demonstrates how this condition should be approached.
- additional payments under the arrangements would exceed a reasonable commercial return on a loan of the capital.
Further, where the return is not fixed at the outset, it is the maximum possible amount of the additional payments that must be considered. Here, the issue terms of the sukuk impose no upper limit on the amount of the periodic distributions: a sakk holder subscribing 1,000 may, in a year, get back 200 or 2,000 or nothing depending on the rental market. The maximum potential return is clearly in excess of a reasonable commercial return on a loan of 1,000; and
- the arrangements have not been admitted to an official list or admitted to trading on a regulated market or recognised investment exchange (see PERG 2.6.11CG (6)).
- (2)
If, in the above example, investors returns were capped at 500 per sakk per year, then this is the amount that must be considered in deciding whether the return exceeds a reasonable commercial return on a loan, even where the amounts actually received turn out to be far lower.
- (3)
In applying the reasonable commercial return test, the sakk should be compared to a hypothetical loan to the issuer on similar terms and carrying similar risks. For example, a conventional security convertible into shares will normally carry a lower rate of interest because the conversion right has a value. The return on an exchangeable or convertible sakk should be measured against the return on an equivalent exchangeable or convertible debt security.
- (4)
The risk to investors in sukuk may vary slightly from that of a conventional bond in some instances. This may be due to the fact that sukuk holders only have recourse to the bond assets or some other structural feature which results in the risk profile being higher. In such instances it may be justifiable for the rate of return to be slightly higher than that of a conventional loan.
- (5)
As with any financial instrument, the pricing of sukuk will depend on the issuers view of the market at the time of issue and reasonable commercial return may vary depending on the issuer and the economic circumstances prevalent at the time of issue.
Example ABC Ltd is a property development company. It wishes to increase its portfolio on a short-term basis. It issues 5-year sukuk to investors and uses the proceeds to buy the head lease of a commercial property. The rental income from the lease is distributed to investors in proportion to their holdings without a cap on the level of return. After 5 years, the head lease is sold on at a profit and the proceeds shared between investors. In this example, the investors participate directly in the success or failure of the underlying property business. The sakk is not really in the nature of a debt instrument. It is unlikely to be an alternative debenture as: |
(1) The FCA will not automatically suspend, cancel or restore the listing of securities at the request of an overseas exchange or overseas authority (for example, if listing of a listed3issuer'ssecurities are suspended, cancelled or restored on its home exchange).(2) The FCA will not normally suspend the listing of securities where there is a trading halt for the security on its home exchange.(3) If a listedissuer3 requests a suspension, cancellation or restoration of the listing
The purpose of REC 3.16 is to ensure that the FCA1receives a copy of the UK recognised body's plans and arrangements for ensuring business continuity if there are major problems with its computer systems. The FCA1does not need to be notified of minor revisions to, or updating of, the documents containing a UK recognised body's business continuity plan (for example, changes to contact names or telephone numbers). 11
(1) Principle 8 requires a firm to manage conflicts of interest fairly. SYSC 10 also requires an insurance intermediary to take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest, and maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to prevent conflicts of interest from constituting or giving rise to a material risk of damage to its clients. 1(2) [deleted]11(3) If a firm acts for a customer in arranging a policy, it is likely to be the customer's
In assessing redress, the firm should consider whether there are any other further losses that flow from its breach or failing that were reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the firm's breach or failing, for example, where the payment protection contract's cost or rejected claims contributed to affordability issues for the associated loan or credit which led to arrears charges, default interest, penal interest rates or other penalties levied by the lender.
3The following is a non-exhaustive list of rules and guidance in the Handbook that are relevant to a firm's management of operational risk: (1) COBS contains rules and guidance that can relate to the management of operational risk; for example, COBS 2 (Conduct of business obligations), COBS 4 (Communicating with clients, including financial promotions), COBS 6 (Information about the firm, its services and remuneration), COBS 7 (Insurance mediation), COBS 9 (Suitability (including