Related provisions for SUP 16.3.10
21 - 40 of 74 items.
The key components of the FSA fee mechanism (excluding the FSCS5levy, the FOS5 levy and case fees, and the CFEB levy5which are dealt with in FEES 5,5FEES 6 and FEES 7)5 are:555(1) a funding requirement derived from:(a) the FSA's financial management and reporting framework;(b) the FSA's budget; and(c) adjustments for audited variances between budgeted and actual expenditure in the previous accounting year, and reserves movements (in accordance with the FSA's reserves policy);(2)
The FSA receives the information in SUP 2.1.3 G through a variety of means, including notifications by firms (see SUP 15) and regular reporting by firms (see SUP 16). This chapter is concerned with the methods of information gathering that the FSA may use on its own initiative in the discharge of its functions under the Act. This chapter does not deal with the information gathering powers that the FSA has under the Unfair Terms Regulations. These are dealt with in UNFCOG2.12
1The rights and duties of auditors are set out in SUP 3.8 (Rights and duties of all auditors) and SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: notification and report on client assets). SUP 3.8.10 G also refers to the auditor's statutory duty to report certain matters to the FSA imposed by regulations made by the Treasury under sections 342(5) and 343(5) of the Act (information given by auditor or actuary to the FSA). An auditor should bear these rights and duties in mind when carrying out client
In complying with the contractual duty in SUP 5.5.1 R, the FSA expects that, in the case of substantial or complex reports, the skilled person will give a periodic update on progress and issues to allow for a re-focusing of the report if necessary. The channel of communication would normally be directly between the skilled person and the FSA. However, the FSA would also expect firms normally to be informed about the passage of information, and the skilled person would usually
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The Chief Risk Officer should be accountable to a firm'sgoverning body.(2) The FSA recognises that in addition to the Chief Risk Officers primary accountability to the governing body, an executive reporting line will be necessary for operational purposes. Accordingly, to the extent necessary for effective operational management, the Chief Risk Officer should report into a very senior executive level in the firm. In practice, the FSA expects this will be to the chief executive,
1This
chapter applies to:(1) a MiFID
investment firm;(2) a third country investment firm; and to(3) a person who
is the operator of an approved reporting
mechanism or of a regulated
market or MTF that
is used by a firm to report transactions to the FSA; and(4) a firm acting in its capacity as
a manager or operator of:(a) a collective investment undertaking;
or(b) a pension
scheme; or(c) an occupational
pension scheme; or(d) a personal
pension scheme; or(e) a stakeholder
pension
A firm and its controllers are required to notify certain changes in control (see7SUP 11 (Controllers and close links)). The purpose of the rules and guidance in this section is:7(1) to ensure that, in addition to such notifications, the FSA receives regular and comprehensive information about the identities of all of the controllers of a firm, which is relevant to a firm's continuing to satisfy the threshold conditions (see COND 2.3); 8(2) to implement certain requirements relating
(1) The purpose of the precautionary measure rule is to ensure that an incoming EEA firm is subject to the standards of MiFID and the MiFID implementing Directive to the extent that the Home State has not transposed MiFID or the MiFID implementing Directive by 1 November 2007. It is to 'fill a gap'.(2) The rule is made in the light of the duty of the United Kingdom under Article 62 of MiFID to adopt precautionary measures to protect investors. (3) The rule will be effective for