Related provisions for SUP 11.7.1

261 - 280 of 369 items.

PERG 8.15.6G01/10/2005

A financial promotion made under article 55A must contain a statement in the following terms: “The [firm/company] is not authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 but we are able in certain circumstances to offer a limited range of investment services to clients because we are members of [relevant designated professional body]. We can provide these investment services if they are an incidental part of the professional services we have been engaged to provide".

SYSC 10.2.3G01/01/2007

SYSC 10.2.2 R is made under section 147 of the Act (Control of information rules). It has the following effect:(1) acting in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) provides a defence against proceedings brought under section 397(2) or (3) of the Act (Misleading statements and practices) - see sections 397(4) and (5)(c);(2) behaviour in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) does not amount to market abuse (see SYSC 10.2.2 R (4)); and(3) acting in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) provides

FEES 2.2.3G01/01/2006

Paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 1 and section 99(5) to the Act permit the FSA to recover fees ( and, where relevant, FOS levies), and section 213(6) permits the FSCS to recover shares of the FSCS levy payable, as a debt owed to the FSA and FSCS respectively, and the FSA and FSCS, as relevant, will consider taking action for recovery (including interest) through the civil courts. Also, the FOS Ltd (in respect of case fees) may take steps to recover any money owed to it (including

SYSC 2.1.6G01/02/2004

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

This table belongs to SYSC 2.1.5 G

	Question	Answer
1	Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R need to be an approved person?	An individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 2.1.3 R will be performing the apportionment and oversight function (CF 8, see SUP 10.7.1 R) and an application must be made to the FSA for approval of the individual before the function is performed under section 59 of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements). There are exceptions from this in SUP 10.1 (Approved persons - Application). In particular, an incoming EEA firm is referred to the EEA investment business oversight function (CF 9, see SUP 10.7.6 R).
2	If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?	If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.
3	What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?	The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 2.1.1 R and SYSC 3.1.1 R. The FSA considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.
4	If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?	Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3).If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see Question 7).
5	Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?	Yes.
6	Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?	Although unusual, some firm may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).
7	If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?	Normally, yes, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2. But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of to the firm's chief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals willnevertheless require approval by the FSA (see Question 1). If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FSA would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate. See also Question 14.
8	If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?	Yes. SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).
9	What if a firm does not have a chief executive?	Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 3. But if the firm: (1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and (2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division; then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 2.1.4 R, column 2.2
10	What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?	A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided. If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 2.1.4 R, be to: (1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions; together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)
11	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an overseas firm which is not an incoming EEA firm, incoming Treaty firm or UCITS qualifier?	The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 2.1.4 R, but: (1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1.1.7 R). Note that SYSC 1.1.10 R does not extend the territorial scope of SYSC 2 for an overseas firm. (2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm's UK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility. The apportionment and oversight function applies to such a firm, unless it falls within a particular exception from the approved persons regime (see Question 1).
12	How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 2.1.3R apply to an incoming EEA firm or incoming Treaty firm?	SYSC 1.1.1 R (2) and SYSC 1.1.7 R restrict the application of SYSC 2.1.3 R for such a firm. Accordingly: (1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 2.1.3 R (1). (2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 2.1.3 R (2). However, the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to matters which the FSA, as Host State regulator, is entitled to regulate (there is guidance on this in SYSC App 1). Those are primarily, but not exclusively, the systems and controls relating to the conduct of the firm's activities carried on from its UK branch. (3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm's group under SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (2). (4) An incoming EEA firm which has provision only for cross border services is not required to allocate either function if it does not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom; for example if they fall within the overseas persons exclusions in article 72 of the Regulated Activities Order. See also Questions 1 and 15.1
13	What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?	The FSA envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 2.1.4 R, row (1) or (2).
14	What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?	The Note to SYSC 2.1.4 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the Combined Code developed by the Committee on Corporate Governancerecommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of non-executive directors to be responsible for oversight of the audit. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval by the FSA in relation to that function (see Question 1).
15	What about incoming electronic commerce activities?	ECO 1.1.6 R has the effect that SYSC does not apply to an incoming ECA provider acting as such.1

PERG 9.11.1G01/07/2005

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question	Answer
1	Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?	In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).
2	Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?	In the FSA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.
3	Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?	The FSA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FSA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FSA's view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FSA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.
4	Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?	In the FSA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).
5	In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?	In the FSA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account. The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means. The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFSA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise. Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.
6	Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?	In the FSA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).
7	Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?	In the FSA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.
8	Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?	In the FSA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).
9	Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?	In the FSA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).

PERG 6.7.6G01/07/2005

An important part of the conclusion in PERG 6.7.5 G was that, although the provider assumed a risk at the outset of the contract, looking at the contract as a whole and interpreting the common law in the context of the FSA's objectives (see PERG 6.5.2 G and PERG 6.5.3 G) there was no relevant assumption of risk.(1) The presence or absence of an assumption of risk is an important part of the statutory rationale for the prudential regulation of insurance.(2) In Medical Defence Union

SUP 4.2.1G31/12/2004

Section 340 of the Act gives the FSA power to make rules requiring an authorised person, or an authorised person falling into a specified class, to appoint an actuary3. Section 340 further empowers the FSA to make rules governing the manner, timing and notification to the FSA of such an appointment and, where an appointment is not made, for the FSA to make an appointment on the firm's behalf. The FSA's rule-making powers under section 340 of the Act also extend to an actuary's3

REC 2.14.5G21/06/2001

(1) In determining whether a UK recognised body's procedures for consulting members and other users of its facilities are appropriate, the FSA may have regard to the range of persons to be consulted by the UK recognised body under those procedures. (2) In the FSA's view, consultation with a smaller range of persons may be appropriate where limited, technical changes to a UK recognised body's rules are proposed.(3) In the FSA's view, a UK recognised body's procedures may include

MCOB 9.5.4R06/04/2007

The illustration provided as part of the offer document in accordance with MCOB 6.4.1 R(1) must meet the requirements of MCOB 9.4, with the following modifications:(1) the illustration must be suitably adapted and revised to reflect the fact that the firm is making an offer to a customer and updated to reflect changes to, for example, for a lifetime mortgage3 the interest rate, charges, the exchange rate or the APR required by MCOB 10 (Annual Percentage Rate) at the date the illustration

SUP 11.8.2G21/06/2001

In assessing whether a matter should be notified to the FSA under SUP 11.8.1 R (1), SUP 11.8.1 R (2) or SUP 11.8.1 R (3), a firm should have regard to the guidance on satisfying threshold condition 5 (Suitability) contained in COND 2.5.

COLL 4.3.2G01/04/2004

(1) The diagram in COLL 4.3.3 G explains how an authorised fund manager should treat changes it is proposing to a scheme and provides an overview of the rules and guidance in this section.(2) Regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company) and section 251 of the Act (Alteration of schemes and changes of manager or trustee) require the prior approval of the FSA for certain proposed changes to an authorised fund, including

DTR 1A.2.1R20/01/2007

(1) The FSA may dispense with, or modify, the transparency rules in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it considers appropriate (subject to the terms of directives and the Act).(2) A dispensation or modification may be either unconditional or subject to specified conditions.(3) If an issuer, or other person has applied for, or been granted, a dispensation or modification, it must notify the FSA immediately it becomes aware of any matter which is material to the

SUP 11.1.2R01/10/2003

Applicable sections (see SUP 11.1.1 R)

	Category of firm	Applicable sections
(1)	A UK domestic firm other than a building society, a non-directive friendly society or a UK insurance intermediary 3	All except SUP 11.3, SUP 11.4.2A RandSUP 11.4.4 R3
(1A)	A building society	(a) In the case of an exempt change in control (see Note), SUP 11.1, SUP 11.2andSUP 11.9 (b) In any other case, all except SUP 11.3, RandSUP 11.4.4 R3
(2)	A non-directive friendly society	SUP 11.1, SUP 11.2, andSUP 11.9
(2A) 3	A UK insurance intermediary 3	all exceptSUP 11.3, SUP 11.4.2 R, SUP 11.4.3 GandSUP 11.4.4 R3
(3)	An overseas firm	All except SUP 11.3, SUP 11.4.2 R, SUP 11.4.2A R, SUP 11.4.3 G, SUP 11.4.9 G, SUP 11.5.8 G to SUP 11.5.10 G, SUP 11.6.2 R, SUP 11.6.3 R, SUP 11.6.6 G, SUP 11.73
Note	In row (1A), a change in control is exempt if the controller or proposed controller is exempt from any obligation to notify the FSA under Part XII of the Act (Control over Authorised Persons) because of The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Controllers) (Exemption) (No 2) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3338). (See SUP 11.3.2A G).2 1

DTR 5.1.5R20/01/2007

(1) The following are to be disregarded for the purposes of determining whether a person has a notification obligation in accordance with the thresholds in DTR 5.1.2 R except at the thresholds of 5% and 10% and above:(a) voting rights attaching to shares forming part of property belonging to another which that person lawfully manages under an agreement in, or evidenced in, writing;(b) voting rights attaching to shares which may be exercisable by a person in his capacity as the

FEES 1.1.3G01/01/2006

The relevant provisions of FEES 5 and FEES 2 are applied to VJ participants by the standard terms (see DISP 4).

Related provisions for SUP 11.7.1

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Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 2.1.3 R

Applicable sections (see SUP 11.1.1 R)