MIFIDPRU 7.6 ICARA process: assessing and monitoring the adequacy of own funds
1This section applies to a MIFIDPRU investment firm.
1As part of its ICARA process, a firm must produce a reasonable estimate of the own funds it needs to hold to address:
- (1)
any potential material harms that the firm has identified under MIFIDPRU 7.4.13R and in relation to which it has not taken any measures to reduce the impact of the harms under MIFIDPRU 7.4.9R; and
- (2)
any residual potential material harms that remain after the firm has taken measures to reduce the impact of the harms under MIFIDPRU 7.4.9R.
- (1)
1A firm must assess on the basis of its analysis under MIFIDPRU 7.6.2R whether it should hold additional own funds in excess of its own funds requirement to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule.
- (2)
When carrying out the assessment in (1), a firm must not:
- (a)
determine that it needs a lower level of own funds for an activity or harm than is required by a rule in MIFIDPRU 4 (Own funds requirements) or MIFIDPRU 5 (Concentration risk); or
- (b)
use components of the own funds requirement to cover potential material harms that cannot reasonably be attributed to that component.
- (a)
- (1)
1The overall financial adequacy rule requires a firm to hold adequate own funds to ensure that:
- (2)
To comply with the overall financial adequacy rule, a firm must therefore hold the higher of:
- (a)
the amount of own funds that the firm requires at any given point in time to fund its ongoing business operations, taking into account potential periods of financial stress during the economic cycle; and
- (b)
the amount of own funds that a firm would need to hold to ensure that the firm can be wound down in an orderly manner.
- (a)
- (3)
The own funds threshold requirement is the amount of own funds that a firm needs to hold at any given time to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule.
- (4)
The firm’s analysis of potential material harms under MIFIDPRU 7.6.2R is particularly relevant when it is considering the level of own funds that are necessary for the ongoing operation of its business. It is also be relevant when considering how the firm should address potential material harms as part of an orderly wind-down.
- (5)
The following diagram summarises the process that a firm should undertake to determine its own funds threshold requirement:
![MIFIDPRU_7_6_4](/publication/handbook/graphic/MIFIDPRU_7_6_4.png)
* The own funds threshold requirement cannot be lower than the K-factor requirement or the fixed overheads requirement.
** The K-factor requirement does not apply to SNI MIFIDPRU investment firms and the permanent minimum capital requirement (PMR) is not linked to harm.
*** Unless otherwise specified by the FCA.
- (1)
1Unless (2) applies, a firm must meet its own funds threshold requirement with own funds that satisfy the following conditions:
- (a)
subject to (b), at least 75% of the own funds threshold requirement must be met with any combination of common equity tier 1 capital and additional tier 1 capital; and
- (b)
at least 56% of the own funds threshold requirement must be met with common equity tier 1 capital.
- (a)
- (2)
The FCA may specify an alternative combination of own funds for the purpose of (1) in a requirement applied to a firm.
- (1)
MIFIDPRU 7.6.7G and 7.6.8G explain the approach a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should apply to carry out the assessment in MIFIDPRU 7.6.3R.
- (2)
MIFIDPRU 7.6.9G explains the approach that an SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should apply to carry out the assessment in MIFIDPRU 7.6.3R.
- (3)
MIFIDPRU G explains the approach that all MIFIDPRU investment firms should apply when assessing their own funds threshold requirement.
- (1)
1MIFIDPRU 4 and 5 explain how a firm must determine its own funds requirement. Where, as part of its ICARA process, a firm has identified potential material harms that cannot be fully mitigated, the firm should first consider the extent to which the impact of the residual harm on own funds is covered (wholly or partly) by the framework in MIFIDPRU 4 and 5.
- (2)
Example 1: If the potential material harm arises from the ordinary course of the firm’s portfolio management business, a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should consider the potential impact of the harm by comparison with the firm’s K-AUM requirement. If the harm is a harm that might typically arise from portfolio management, the firm may treat the harm as covered by the K-AUM requirement. However, if the harm is unusual in nature or might be particularly severe (for example, fraud or other irregularities), it would be unreasonable for the firm to treat the harm as fully covered by the K-AUM requirement. This is because the K-AUM requirement is designed to address typical harms from ordinary portfolio management, and not every conceivable material harm that might result from this activity.
- (3)
Example 2: If the potential material harm arises from the ordinary course of the firm investing its own proprietary capital in positions allocated to the trading book, a non-SNI MIFIDPRU firm should consider the nature of that harm. For example, if the harm relates to the ordinary operational aspects of dealing on own account, the firm may treat the harm as covered by the K-DTF requirement, unless the harm is unusual or particularly severe. If the harm arises from adverse market movements in relation to the firm’s trading book positions, the firm may treat the harm as covered by the K-NPR requirement (or K-CMG requirement if the position arises in a portfolio for which the firm has received a K-CMG permission), unless the relevant positions have particular features that mean the harm may be unusual or particularly severe.
- (4)
Example 3: Some components of the K-factor requirement, such as the K-CON requirement, reflect specific types of harm. In this case, the firm should consider the purpose of the relevant requirement. As the K-CON requirement is designed to address the potential harm arising from a firm having concentrated exposures to a counterparty or group of connected counterparties, a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should only compare a harm to the K-CON requirement where that harm arises from, or is connected to, these concentrated exposures.
- (5)
Example 4: When assessing harms that may occur during a wind-down of the firm’s business, a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should consider the potential impact of the harm by comparison with its fixed overheads requirement. In this case, the firm should identify the likely costs of winding down the firm and the potential financial impact of any material harms that might occur while doing so and compare the aggregate amount with the fixed overheads requirement. This will allow a firm to determine whether they are holding sufficient own funds to ensure an orderly wind-down, as required by the overall financial adequacy rule.
- (1)
1Some harms may not fit within the own funds requirement framework in MIFIDPRU 4 or 5 because they cannot reasonably be attributed to the activities or risks that the rules in those chapters are designed to address. Where the harms are potentially material in nature, a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm will need to assess their potential financial impact separately and cannot treat those harms as covered (either wholly or partly) by a requirement under MIFIDPRU 4 or 5. This includes potential material harms resulting from any regulated activities that are not MiFID business and from any unregulated activities.
- (2)
Example 1: A non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm undertakes significant amounts of corporate finance business. The K-factor requirement does not include any components which are designed to address the potential harms arising from this type of business, as none of the K-factor metrics relate to corporate finance business. If the firm identifies potential material harms that may arise from its corporate finance activities, it cannot therefore compare that harm to any part of the K-factor requirement. In this case, the firm will need to assess the potential financial impact of that harm and will need to hold additional own funds to cover that impact.
- (3)
Example 2: A non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm holds client money in connection with designated investment business that is not MiFID business. The K-CMH requirement applies only to MiFID client money. If the firm identifies potential material harms that result from holding client money for non-MiFID business, it will therefore need to assess the potential financial impact of that harm and hold additional own funds to cover that impact. Similarly, if there are material issues arising from currency mismatches in relation to MiFID client money, this may be a risk that is not adequately covered by the K-CMH requirement.
- (4)
A firm is not required to map the financial impact of every potential material harm to components of its K-factor requirement. In some circumstances, it may be impractical or disproportionate to allocate the potential financial impact of harms in this way. Alternatively, it may not be clear that a harm can be allocated to one or more components of the K-factor requirement. A firm may therefore hold an amount that is additional to its K-factor requirement to address a particular harm without determining whether that harm might already be partly covered by the K-factor requirement.
- (5)
Example 3: A non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm determines that there is a risk of material harm from a cyber incident affecting its IT systems. The firm’s IT systems are used across all its business lines and the firm considers that it is impractical to allocate the financial impact of the cyber incident between particular components of the K-factor requirement. In this situation, the firm may hold an additional amount of own funds (i.e. over and above its K-factor requirement) to cover the potential financial impact of the cyber incident without mapping the impact of the harm to specific components of the K-factor requirement. However, the firm should clearly record the basis on which it has determined the amount of additional own funds that are required.
- (1)
1An SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm is not subject to the K-factor requirement. In practice, this means that its own funds requirement is typically determined by the fixed overheads requirement, although for smaller firms, the permanent minimum capital requirement may be determinative.
- (2)
An SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should therefore identify all relevant potential material harms from its ongoing business operations that cannot be mitigated by other means and estimate their impact on the firm’s own funds. It should then compare the aggregate financial impact on own funds with the firm’s fixed overheads requirement (or, if higher, the permanent minimum capital requirement).
- (3)
Separately, an SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm should also identify the likely costs of winding down the firm and the potential financial impact of any material harms that might occur while doing so and should compare the aggregate amount with the fixed overheads requirement. This will allow the firm to determine if it is holding sufficient own funds to ensure an orderly wind-down, as required by the overall financial adequacy rule.
- (4)
Where an SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm is close to exceeding one or more of the thresholds in MIFIDPRU 1.2.1R that would result in the firm being reclassified as a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm, the firm should begin to compare its assessment of the own funds that it needs to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule with the K-factor requirement that would apply to the firm if it were a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm. The guidance in MIFIDPRU 7.6.7G and 7.6.8G is relevant in these circumstances. Comparison with the future K-factor requirement will ensure that the firm is better prepared to comply with the additional obligations in MIFIDPRU 4 and 5, and that its ICARA process is calibrated appropriately, at the point at which the firm becomes a non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm.
- (1)
1MIFIDPRU 7.6.7G to MIFIDPRU 7.6.9G explain the approach that a firm should take to determine if a potential harm is covered by the firm’s own funds requirement. Where a firm has identified potential harms that are not covered by its own funds requirement, or are covered only partly by its own funds requirement, the firm should aggregate the estimated financial impact of those harms to determine the overall additional amount of own funds (i.e. above its own funds requirement) that the firm needs to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule.
- (2)
Where the FCA disagrees with a firm’s assessment of the amount of own funds that is required by the overall financial adequacy rule, the FCA may provide individual guidance to that firm about the amount of own funds that the FCA considers is necessary to comply with that rule. Alternatively, the FCA may apply a requirement to the firm that specifies an amount of own funds that the firm must hold for that purpose.
- (3)
The effect of MIFIDPRU 7.6.3R(2) is that a firm must not:
- (a)
determine that it needs a lower level of own funds for an activity or harm than is required by a component of the own funds requirement that addresses that risk or harm; or
- (b)
use components of the own funds requirement to cover harms that cannot be attributed to that component.
This is illustrated by the example in (4).
- (a)
- (4)
Example: A non-SNI MIFIDPRU investment firm carries on portfolio management and determines that its K-AUM requirement is £50,000. However, the firm estimates that the actual financial impact of potential harm that may result from its portfolio management activities is only £30,000. The firm also carries on corporate finance advisory business (which does not give rise to a K-factor requirement) and estimates that the financial impact of the potential harm arising from this business is £40,000. The firm should not conclude that its own funds threshold requirement is £70,000. This is because the firm is not permitted to:
- (a)
conclude that the amount of own funds that it holds in relation to its portfolio management activities is less than the K-AUM requirement. This means that the firm is not permitted to substitute its own estimate of £30,000 for the minimum K-AUM requirement of £50,000; or
- (b)
use part of the K-AUM requirement to cover potential material harms that do not arise in connection with portfolio management. This means that the firm cannot reallocate part of the own funds that should be held to cover the K-AUM requirement to cover risks arising from its corporate finance business.
- (a)
- (5)
Instead, assuming that there are no other relevant potential materials harms to be taken into account, the firm should conclude that its own funds threshold requirement is £90,000, which is the sum of the K-AUM requirement and the firm’s estimate of the potential financial impact of harms arising from its corporate finance business.
Requirement to notify the FCA of certain levels of own funds
- (1)
1A firm must notify the FCA immediately in each case where its own funds fall below the level of the firm’s:
- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
own funds wind-down trigger, or the firm considers that there is a reasonable likelihood that its own funds will fall below that level in the foreseeable future.
- (2)
A notification under (1) must include the following information:
- (a)
a clear statement of the current level of the firm’s own funds in comparison to:
- (i)
its own funds threshold requirement; and
- (ii)
in the case of a notification under (1)(c), the firm’s own funds wind-down trigger;
- (i)
- (b)
an explanation of why the firm’s own funds have reached the current level;
- (c)
in the case of a notification made under (1)(a), where the firm has identified that its own funds may fall below a level specified by the firm for the purposes of MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(1), the recovery actions that the firm intends to take, as identified under MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(2)(a) and 7.5.6G;
- (d)
in the case of a notification made under (1)(a), confirmation of whether the firm expects that its own funds could fall below its own funds threshold requirement in the foreseeable future and an explanation of why the firm expects this to happen;
- (e)
in the case of a notification made under (1)(b), the recovery actions specified for the purposes of MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(2)(b) and 7.5.6G that the firm has already taken or will take to restore compliance with its own funds threshold requirement; and
- (f)
in the case of a notification made under (1)(c), the firm’s intentions in relation to activating its wind-down plan.
- (a)
- (3)
A firm must submit the notification in (1) through the online notification and application system using the form in MIFIDPRU 7 Annex 4R.
1In appropriate cases, the FCA may consider that the early warning indicator should be set at a different level from 110% of a firm’s own funds threshold requirement. In this case, the FCA may invite a firm to apply for a requirement in accordance with section 55L(5) of the Act, or may impose a requirement on the FCA’s own initiative in accordance with section 55L(3) of the Act, to provide for notification to the FCA if the firm’s own funds reach the alternative level.
- (1)
1The notification requirement in MIFIDPRU 7.6.11R does not replace a firm’s obligations under:
- (2)
Where a firm has submitted a notification under MIFIDPRU 7.6.11R, the notification will generally discharge a firm’s obligations under Principle 11 and the general notification requirements in SUP 15.3 in relation to the matters contained in the notification. However, a firm must still consider whether the FCA should be notified of developments before any of the notification indicators in MIFIDPRU 7.6.11R occur. In addition, Principle 11 and SUP 15.3 may require a firm to notify the FCA of additional material information that is not specifically referenced in MIFIDPRU 7.6.11R.
- (3)
A MIFIDPRU investment firm should notify the FCA at an early stage of any significant event which creates a material risk of a firm ceasing to hold adequate financial resources, even if the impact of that event has not yet fully materialised.
FCA approach to intervention in relation to own funds
- (1)
1The table in MIFIDPRU 7.6.15G explains the interventions that the FCA would generally expect to make where there is evidence that a MIFIDPRU investment firm may be at risk of breaching the requirements that apply to its own funds. The table sets out the points at which the FCA would normally intervene and what actions it would normally take.
- (2)
The FCA would generally expect that the interventions in the table would be cumulative – i.e. in a declining prudential situation, as the firm hits each intervention point in turn, the FCA would take some or all of the actions associated with that particular point. The actions are intended to be proportionate and progressively stronger responses to address the prudential concerns raised by each intervention point.
- (3)
However, if a firm experiences a sudden adverse event which causes the firm to hit multiple intervention points simultaneously, the FCA may immediately take the actions associated with the most severe point.
- (4)
The actions specified in the table do not prevent the FCA from taking alternative or additional actions in appropriate cases. The purpose of the table is to provide greater clarity for firms on the FCA’s general expectations and approach to interventions, to assist firms’ own planning and responses.
1This table belongs to MIFIDPRU 7.6.14G.
Intervention point |
Purpose |
Potential FCA supervisory actions |
|
Early warning indicator: When the early warning indicator is triggered, the firm must notify the FCA under MIFIDPRU 7.6.11R(1)(a) |
This is intended as an early warning to the FCA that the firm may be at risk of breaching its own funds threshold requirement. This will allow the firm and the FCA to consider any preventative action that may be appropriate. |
Where the notification is not the expected result of planned action by the firm, the FCA would normally expect the following to occur: |
|
(a) |
a dialogue between the FCA and the firm based on the information provided in the notification to understand the reason for the decline in the firm’s own funds and the firm’s future plans; and |
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(b) |
|||
After having considered the information provided by the firm about its proposed actions, if the FCA reasonably considers that the firm may breach its own funds threshold requirement in the foreseeable future, the FCA may consider the following additional actions: |
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(c) |
requesting that the firm cease making discretionary distributions of capital, loans to affiliated entities, payments of dividends or payments of variable remuneration; |
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(d) |
requesting that the firm take some or all of the recovery actions identified by the firm under MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(2) and 7.5.6G; |
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(e) |
requesting that the firm report additional information to the FCA; |
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(f) |
requesting that the firm improve its internal risk management and systems and controls; |
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(g) |
requesting that the firm cease making acquisitions; or |
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(h) |
where appropriate, inviting the firm to apply for a requirement under section 55L(5) of the Act, or imposing a requirement on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55L(3) of the Act, in relation to (c) – (g) above. |
||
Threshold requirement notification: Firm holding insufficient own funds to meet its own funds threshold requirement |
In the FCA’s view, where a firm is failing to hold sufficient own funds to comply with its own funds threshold requirement, the firm will be failing to meet the appropriate resources threshold condition. This trigger is intended to prompt the firm and the FCA to address the breach of threshold conditions in a timely manner. Where appropriate, the focus should be on recovery of the firm (unless the firm chooses to exit the market by voluntarily winding down). However, any proposed actions for recovery must be credible and achievable within a reasonable and realistic timeframe. |
The FCA would normally expect that: |
|
(a) |
the firm will have taken any relevant recovery actions identified by the firm under MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(2)(a) and 7.5.6G before breaching its own funds threshold requirement and will be preparing to take, or will have taken, any relevant recovery actions identified under MIFIDPRU 7.5.5R(2)(b); and |
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(b) |
the firm will cease making discretionary distributions of capital, loans to affiliated entities, payments of dividends or payments of variable remuneration. |
||
After having considered the information provided by the firm about its proposed actions, if the FCA reasonably considers that the firm may fail to restore its own funds to the level required by the own funds threshold requirement within a reasonable timeframe, the FCA may consider the following additional actions: |
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(c) |
requesting that the firm cease taking on new business; |
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(d) |
requesting that the firm report additional information to the FCA; |
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(e) |
requesting that the firm’s parent undertaking provides additional own funds for the firm; |
||
(f) |
where appropriate, inviting the firm or its parent undertaking to apply for a requirement under section 55L(5) or section 143K(1) of the Act, or imposing a requirement on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55L(3) or section 143K(2) of the Act, in relation to (a) – (e) above; or |
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(g) |
where appropriate, inviting the firm to apply for variation or cancellation of permission under section 55H of the Act, or varying or cancelling the firm’s permission on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55J of the Act. |
||
The FCA would also expect the firm to consider whether it is appropriate to trigger the firm’s wind-down plan under MIFIDPRU 7.5.7R to ensure an orderly wind-down of its business. This may be the case where the firm’s identified wind-down actions will require a reasonable length of time to execute, such as where the firm will need to transfer customers or close out its own positions. |
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Wind-down trigger notification: Firm’s own funds fall below its own funds wind-down trigger |
The own funds wind-down trigger is intended to specify a level of own funds that is sufficient to ensure an orderly wind-down of the firm. Where the firm’s own funds requirement is determined by the fixed overheads requirement and the firm has not identified that it needs to hold additional own funds to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule, the own funds wind-down trigger may be equal to the firm’s own funds threshold requirement. In that case, the FCA may proceed directly to applying the interventions in this row, rather than those specified for a breach of the own funds threshold requirement above. In order to maximise the potential for an orderly wind-down, the FCA expects that firms that breach this trigger should normally commence winding down immediately, unless the firm’s governing body and the FCA determine that there is an imminent and credible likelihood of recovery. |
The FCA would normally expect the following to occur: |
|
(a) |
the firm’s governing body will make a formal decision to initiate the firm’s wind-down plan, unless the governing body has a reasonable basis for determining that there is an imminent and credible likelihood of the firm’s recovery; and |
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(b) |
where the firm decides to initiate its wind-down plan, the FCA will invite the firm to apply for a requirement under section 55L(5) of the Act, or will impose a requirement on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55L(3) of the Act, that prevents the firm from taking on any new business. |
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The FCA may consider the following additional actions if it has concerns that without such actions, the potential risk of harm to consumers or the markets is likely to increase: |
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(c) |
taking appropriate action to protect any client money or client assets, including, where appropriate, inviting the firm to apply for a requirement under section 55L(5) of the Act, or imposing a requirement on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55L(3) of the Act, to achieve any necessary protection; and |
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(d) |
where appropriate, inviting the firm to apply for variation or cancellation of permission under section 55H of the Act, or varying or cancelling the firm’s permission on the FCA’s own initiative under section 55J of the Act. |
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If a firm refuses to commence an orderly wind-down despite its governing body or the FCA having concluded that there is no imminent and credible likelihood of recovery, the FCA will consider the full range of its supervisory powers. In particular, the FCA may use a combination of its own initiative powers under section 55L(3) and section 55J of the Act to: |
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(e) |
prevent the firm from continuing to carry on any regulated activities; and |
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(f) |
require the firm to take appropriate actions to ensure the fair treatment and appropriate protection of clients and counterparties during any run-off period for its existing regulated business. |